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Abstract 
Political parties serve a number of vital functions in representative democracies. 
Connecting citizens to government is perhaps the most important one. This is how 
parties were traditionally conceived, and it continues to be the main standard 
according to which their legitimacy as representative institutions is evaluated. In 
recent times, observers have noted a growing disconnect between citizens and parties. 
Parties have gradually transformed from agents that mediate between state and civil 
society to agents of the state. This sits uncomfortably with the ideal of parties as 
connectors of citizens and government. How can their capacity to perform this 
function be restored? 
This thesis seeks to offer a new answer to this question. Its main argument is that to 
revitalise their capacity to connect citizens and government, parties need to become 
more internally democratic, and that they need to become more internally democratic 
in a particular way, namely more internally deliberative. By this is meant that parties 
need to strengthen channels of communication from the bottom up and avail 
themselves of their internal deliberative resources: of the partisans on the ground, who 
deliberate over the demands of their community in local party branches. The 
theoretical part of the thesis proposes a model—called a “deliberative model of intra-
party democracy”—showing how these traditional sites of partisanship can be 
empowered. 
The empirical part of the thesis then asks whether such a model can be realised in 
real-world parties. The main focus is here on the deliberative capacity of organised 
party members, which is likely the first target of scepticism. I examine three 
questions, drawing on the findings of a small-scale study of deliberation in party 
branches in Social Democratic parties in Germany and Austria: (1) Do party branches 
provide favourable preconditions for deliberation? (2) Are the political discussions in 
the branches “deliberative”, in the sense that they are marked by respectful exchanges 
of reasons? (3) When does intra-party deliberation fail? Though mainly indicative, the 
analysis of the empirical material suggests that party members do possess the 
deliberative capacity required to realise a deliberative model of intra-party democracy, 
and that possible deliberative deficiencies can be countervailed using simple 
institutional fixes. In light of this, the thesis concludes that making parties more 
internally deliberative in order to reconnect citizens with government is well within 
reach.  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[T]he condition of the parties is the best possible evidence of the nature of 
any regime.—E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government 
One of the most important questions concerning the political party [relates 
to] the party’s capacity to react against force of habit, against the tendency 
to become mummified and anachronistic.—Antonio Gramsci, Prison 
Notebooks 
Believing in progress does not mean believing that any progress has yet 
been made. That would not be belief.—Franz Kafka, Aphorisms 
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Introduction 
The crisis of parties and the ethics of representation 
Parties are perhaps the most discredited political actors in the democratic world. Long 
is the list of wrongs they are being charged with. To pick just a few examples: parties 
have been said to have colluded and formed “cartels”, through which they distribute 
public resources amongst them as they see fit; to be unable to offer voters real 
political choice, having become ideologically indistinguishable from one another; and 
to be decoupled from the demands and concerns of the wider citizenry, serving the 
interests of (trans-) national political and economic elites instead of the interests of 
society. 
 What exercises us about these tendencies is that they signal a growing 
disconnect between citizens and parties. To put it simply, it seems that parties are 
more concerned with governing than with representing citizens. More to the point, 
parties have gradually transformed from agents that mediate between state and civil 
society to agents of the state (Katz and Mair 1995 and 2009). There is much talk of 
this in recent conceptual work on parties in political science. Party scholars have 
charted the widespread decline of mass parties, and a concomitant shift towards 
models of party which depend increasingly on public finance and are dominated by 
professionalised administrative elites whose principal concern is holding on to office. 
Those parties do not so much stand up for principled alternatives but promote policies 
that are, as two prominent observers put it, “more generically policies of the state than 
they are policies of any particular party or coalition” (Katz and Mair 2009, 759). 
 This shift of party models occurred in the second half of the 20th century, 
parallel with two momentous transformations: the decay of traditional cleavage 
politics and the transformation of statehood that resulted from the crisis of national 
Keynesianism in the 1970s and 1980s. Bickerton (2012) argues that the latter 
transformation brought with it a “dilution of representation”. At least in Europe, 
national governments began increasingly to relate to societies in a “distanced and 
sceptical way”, assuming that “representation needs to be qualified by a consideration
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—at the executive level—of how public expectations and desires fit with a 
considered, long-term, and expert-based assessment of public policies” (70). With this 
declining belief in state-managed social transformation, national governments—and 
thus parties—became less and less bound by domestic constituencies and “more 
dependent upon international rules and norms for their own identity and sense of 
purpose” (Bickerton 2012, 75). 
 One way of looking at the just-described trends is to say that the empirical 
reality of parties is out of sync with the normative ideal that parties should provide a 
“linkage” (Lawson 1988) between citizens and government. This ideal, captured 
neatly in Giovanni Sartori’s (1976, ix) classic definition of party as “intermediate and 
intermediary structure between society and government”, is rooted in traditional 
conceptions of party. It emerged in the era of mass political mobilisation, where 
parties established themselves as the principal vehicle for citizens to exercise 
collective self-rule. Those days are long gone, of course. But the view that parties 
should connect citizens to political power encapsulates an important, time-insensitive 
point about parties, namely that their legitimacy as agents of popular representation 
hangs on their ability to mediate between the citizenry and the political institutions of 
the state.  
 To better understand why, think of the expectations parties instil in us citizens, 
and the corresponding moral constraints this generates for them. In asking for our 
vote, parties usually promise that they will be attentive to our demands and concerns. 
Sometimes they even assert that they would do anything in their power to represent 
our will. At the very least, they insist that our preferences and interests matter to them 
and that they take us seriously as mature citizens. Thus, when they get elected and 
then go on to govern largely autonomously from the citizenry, promoting policies that 
are ultimately “policies of the state” (as Katz and Mair suggest), it seems that there is 
a more general moral complaint against them: they violate what might be called 
norms of responsiveness. To be sure, these norms do not generate absolute 
requirements of deference: not any deviation from what citizens presently prefer is 
morally impermissible. But they create pro tanto reasons regarding how parties can 
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permissibly behave.  Parties that violate these norms therefore become a proper target 1
of moral blame and its family of negative reactive attitudes. 
 Moralism about parties and political representation is not an abstract, purely 
philosophical way of criticising the disconnect between citizens and parties. It appeals 
to basic moral intuitions about the demands of integrity. These intuitions are widely 
present in ordinary folk morality, which informs the way in which ordinary citizens 
look to parties. Arguably part of the reason why many citizens grow wary of parties as 
they draw further and further away from society, and gravitate towards the state and 
each other, is that parties do not discharge the duties they incur by promising 
responsiveness (see Mair 2013a). Insofar as parties claim to represent citizens, 
citizens are correct to treat the degree to which they are responsive to their 
preferences and concerns as the yardstick for their credibility and legitimacy.  Thus, 2
even if the days of mass political mobilisation are long over, it is still vitally important 
that parties are connected to the citizenry; the ideal of “linkage” is as relevant as ever. 
The forward-looking task is therefore to imagine ways in which the capacity of parties 
to provide a link between citizens and government can be restored. It is to ask how the 
empirical reality of parties can be brought back in sync with the normative ideal of 
party as “intermediate and intermediary structure between society and government.”  
Bootstrapping a new model of intra-party democracy 
The point of this thesis is to offer a new answer to this question. My focus is on the 
internal life of parties: this, I suggest, is where most work needs to be done. The main 
argument of the thesis is that to restore their capacity to connect citizens and 
government, parties need to become more internally democratic, and that they need to 
become more internally democratic in a particular way, namely more internally 
deliberative. By this I mean that parties need to strengthen channels of 
 On moralism about representation as I understand it here, cf. Guerrero (2010); Beerbohm 1
(forthcoming).
 This is also one explanation for the widespread appeal of the new populist parties on the fringes of the 2
political spectrum, who proclaim to represent “the people” without ifs and buts. 
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communication from the bottom up and avail themselves of their internal deliberative 
resources: of the partisans on the ground, who deliberate over the demands of their 
community in local party branches. The thesis proposes a model in which these 
partisans can be empowered, and empirically explores the prospects of whether such a 
model can be achieved. 
 The model, laid out in Chapter 1, locates the emancipatory force of intra-party 
democracy in the deliberations of the partisan base. It argues that the tendency of 
conventional models of intra-party democracy (which focus on candidate selection or 
direct decision mechanisms) to reinforce the status quo and cement the power of the 
party elite can be corrected for by deliberative exchanges among the organised 
membership, in which they critically question the party line and develop alternative 
proposals that are informed by the demands of their local constituencies. A 
democratically meaningful conception of intra-party democracy must therefore 
empower those organised members and lend them more opportunities to have their 
voices heard. In addition to offering a normative argument for why parties should be 
made more internally deliberative, the chapter also sketches several potential 
institutional design paths parties could follow if their traditional modes of preference 
transmission and delegation are defective.  
 The decision to invest my hope in local party branches, these very traditional 
sites of partisanship, was a deliberate one: if the task is to reconnect parties and 
citizens, it makes sense to bring into focus those sites of partisan activism that are still 
closely connected to the citizenry, even if they perhaps exist only sporadically. 
Participants of branch meetings are not professional politicians but politically active 
lay citizens who engage in a local community. They are constantly in touch with the 
wider constituency and, therefore, especially sensitive to their concerns. Thus, the 
positions that will emerge from their deliberations are more likely to reflect what the 
voters want than the official party line. For they will not be guided by the preferences 
of the “median voter,” this amorphous hypothetical citizen who lacks a coherent 
political identity, but by those of concrete people whose particular demands and 
concerns ought to be taken seriously if the party is to perform its representative role. 
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The model I propose seeks to connect these positions to final policy decisions and the 
party’s more general direction. 
Three initial worries, and why they are unwarranted 
Let me anticipate three objections to this enterprise. Perhaps the reader thinks that 
there are promising alternatives to party—deliberative polls, citizens juries and other 
“democratic innovations” (Smith 2009)—and that our efforts to bring citizens closer 
to government should focus on supplanting parties with these institutions.  
 Without denying that institutions of this kind have their virtues, at least two 
counter-arguments can be given to show why trying to replace parties with such 
institutions is not a fruitful proposal. First, there is a major practical constraint on 
abolishing parties: in virtually all democratic legislatures parties are responsible for 
devising their own regulations (Katz and Mair 2009, 756), and it seems highly 
unlikely that they would acquiesce in their own eradication; so it is hard to see how 
parties could be replaced with democratic means. If, as I assume here without further 
discussion, the option of installing democratic innovations as a substitute for parties in 
an undemocratic, perhaps even violent, fashion is off the table, this implies that these 
institutions can at best be established to supplement parties. 
 The second and more positive argument against replacing parties with 
deliberative polls or citizens juries is that parties can perform important functions that 
these democratic innovations can’t perform. Above all, parties can instil in citizens a 
robust commitment to democratic self-rule. Jonathan White and Lea Ypi (2010) 
endorse a strong version of this view, appealing to the principle-driven and cross-
temporal character of parties. They argue that whereas democratic innovations “have 
no past and no present: no history of joint struggles and defeats, no political errors to 
reflect upon, no projects to articulate in common”, parties can “create enduring 
constituencies”, “support principled alignment” and “provide a sense of shared 
commitment to a collective political project” (821, 820). For in contrast to 
deliberative polls or citizens juries, which convene on an ad hoc basis in order to 
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develop collective responses to emerging or long-standing problems (see Fung 2003, 
341), parties are cross-temporal political projects representing principled views of 
how power should be exercised and social and political institutions should be 
designed (see also Ypi, forthcoming). Even if the reader might want to resist the 
idealising pull of this argument—it is after all open to question whether partisanship 
is necessarily principled, rather than driven by sectional interests (Kelsen 1920)—it is 
arguably true that parties can cultivate a more powerful and lasting participatory 
commitment among citizens than short-lived participatory institutions. 
 A second objection contends that the much-discussed decline of party 
memberships speaks against my proposal. Empiricists might be inclined to dismiss 
empowering party branches as illusory, arguing that there are simply too few active 
party members left for them to form the foundation of a model of intra-party 
democracy.  
 There are at least two ways to answer the empiricist worry. The first is itself 
empirical in focus. The most detailed recent research on party members suggests that 
the decline of party memberships is much less extreme than commonly assumed. 
Different, and less dramatic, figures emerge once we look in more detail at the data on 
which studies of party membership usually draw, and probe their reliability. The main 
problem with party membership data is that in cross-national surveys, differences in 
question wording and institutional differences in the meaning of party membership 
produce unstable results. Studies that systematically control for this and use cleaned-
up data, like the recent work of Susan Scarrow, tend to reach the conclusion that even 
if there are clear tendencies of membership decline, traditional party membership is 
“far from obsolete” (Scarrow 2014, 216; also see Clark 2004). Indeed, many parties, 
especially established ones, still have a membership base at their disposal on which 
they rely in order to mobilise support and enhance the party’s aura of legitimacy. 
 The second argument that can be given in reply is normative: it does not follow 
from the fact that parties have fewer members today than they had in the past (and 
thus fewer vibrant local party branches) that those members who still engage in the 
party should be bypassed. To understand why, consider the following analogy. 
Suppose someone would suggest that just because voter turnout is lower today than in 
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the past, the votes of those who still turn out should not be counted. This rightly 
strikes us as democratically suspect. For to evaluate the appropriateness of democratic 
participatory institutions solely on the basis of how many citizens make use of these 
opportunities is to discount democracy’s intrinsic value as a mode of organising 
political decision-making that instantiates equal respect for persons qua self-
determining agents, capable of leading their lives pursuing their ends and goals (for a 
defence of the intrinsic value of democracy, see Christiano 2004; Valentini 2012a). In 
other words, disenfranchising groups just because some of their members do not 
actively participate in democratic procedures fails fully to honour the democratically 
important commitment to equal respect. The same is true for democracy within 
parties, and true for the same reasons. Empowering those members who are still 
committed to partisan activism has a moral claim as a way of recognising their 
democratic equality—even if they are few in number (I defend this point in more 
detail in Wolkenstein, forthcoming).  
 A final argument that could be held against the deliberative model of intra-party 
democracy proposed in this thesis is that it implies a return to the old mass party 
model, which, as many commentators have objected, is “out of sync with the 
oppor tuni ty s t ructures for pol i t ica l mobi l iza t ion in contemporary 
democracies” (Biezen and Romée Piccio 2013, 45). Let us unpack this objection step-
by-step. To begin, what might the mass party and the deliberative party share in 
common? The mass party was a type of party organisation that arose in the late 19th 
and early 20th century as a result of extended suffrage. It incorporated previously 
disenfranchised segments of society, most importantly the industrial proletariat, into 
the political process. Often this model of party is glorified as epitomising bottom-up 
decision-making and the empowerment of the party base, and it is here that one may 
detect a parallel to the deliberative model of intra-party democracy, which equally 
seeks to promote the transmission of preferences from the base to the legislature.  
 But there are important differences between the mass party and the internally 
deliberative party envisaged in this thesis. Consider first the formal structure of 
internal democracy in the two party models. The mass party’s bottom-up process is 
meant to unfold over several levels of organisational hierarchy. Preferences are 
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supposed to be “passed on” from the branches to local and regional assemblies to the 
national party congress. While this “multi-level” model of preference transmission is 
in principle an appealing way of designing intra-party democracy, in practice it has 
proven largely dysfunctional, in the sense that it failed effectively to democratise the 
parties, and possibly even promoted internal oligarchy (for classic treatments of the 
mass party and its organisational defects, see Michels [1911] 1989; Duverger [1954] 
1989). Blyth and Katz (2005, 37) explain the problem as follows.  
If party was the political arm of a particular social segment, then it followed that the 
party on the ground should control and direct the party in public office which is in 
effect its delegate. However, since the party congress (or equivalent body) cannot be in 
continuous session, it needs to elect an executive committee to act in its place. This 
executive then becomes the core of a central office that, though nominally subordinate 
to the party on the ground, in fact solves the coordination problem of networking 
leaders, members and constituents by effectively rising above all of them.   3
 The internally deliberative party I propose in this thesis is (amongst other 
things) intended to correct for this democratic defect. It aims at minimising the 
distance between party members and party officials by offering novel deliberative 
institutions like partisan deliberative conferences or problem-oriented members’ fora, 
through which members can more directly exercise influence on party elites and hold 
them accountable. This may involve bypassing different hierarchical levels of the 
party. In this sense, one may say that the deliberative party seeks to deliver the 
democratic promise of the mass party—but it does so in an entirely different way than 
intended by the traditional mass party model. 
 The internally deliberative party also differs from the mass party in that it is, 
well, internally deliberative. Because it relied on strong social segmentation, the mass 
party did not have to place particular emphasis on internal deliberation: its 
membership could be expected to have largely aligned preferences (e.g. a clearly 
identifiable class interest). Benevolent party elites could simply “read off” these 
 Scholars of parties sometimes see this feature of the mass party as leading to the further decoupling of 3
party members and party elites in the course of the second half of the 20th century (cf. Katz and Mair 
1995 and 2009). I will discuss this more in chapter 1.
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preferences and weave them into a cohesive partisan agenda. To the extent that 
political discussion among members did occur in real existing mass parties, moreover, 
its purpose was not so much to induce reflection but to reinforce class consciousness 
and mobilise “the masses” for political action (Duverger [1954] 1990, 39-40). The 
deliberative party, in contrast, does not assume mainstreamed preferences or “class 
consciousness” among party members. That would in any case be a dubious 
supposition in an era where the class roots of party ideologies are—to put it mildly—
loosening. Instead, the deliberative party starts from the presumption that the 
members of a party do not necessarily always favour the same policies for society, 
and sometimes even disagree on how the shared principles they subscribe to should 
best be interpreted. This triggers a demand for procedures of mutual justification and 
compromise: absent fixed, pre-politically established preferences, the preferences of 
party members and activists have to be developed in a give-and-take of reasons, in 
continuous discussions about aims articulating how political power should be 
exercised and what appropriate alternatives to the status quo there might be. It is these 
exchanges that the deliberative model of intra-party democracy takes to be the central 
ingredient of any internally democratic party; it is these exchanges that it seeks to 
empower. Thus it does not signal a revival of the mass party but differs sharply from 
it. 
 It should be clear now that the objection that I am simply suggesting to revive 
the mass party in deliberative guise fails. Here is a final related point I want to make 
in support of the internally deliberative party proposed in this thesis. While there can 
be no doubt that the mass party, with its reliance on the mobilisation of a particular 
segment of society, is “out of sync” with today’s opportunity structures for political 
mobilisation, I think that the deliberative party proposed in this thesis is especially 
attuned to these changed structural changes. This is because its emphasis on 
preference formation and refinement through discourse and reasoning caters to the 
more individualist and cognitively mobilised citizenry of contemporary, post-
industrial societies, whose members have the tools to develop their own preferences 
independently of their material circumstances. It caters to those kinds of citizens 
because it allows them openly to express their views irrespective of whether or not 
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these views are consistent with the party line, and, even more importantly, because it 
signals to them that their views are taken seriously in the process of internal will 
formation. These characteristics of the deliberative party—being able to speak one’s 
mind and being taken seriously—stand in stark contrast to the widespread perception 
of parties as hierarchical and ideologically streamlined organisations in which 
individual voices do not count and reasoned debate rarely occurs (cf. the analysis in 
Neblo et al. 2010).  This might increase the attractiveness of parties as participatory 4
venues and generate an incentive for politically committed citizens to engage more in 
partisan politics (I discuss this point elsewhere, namely in Invernizzi Accetti and 
Wolkenstein, forthcoming).  Surely, making parties more internally deliberative is no 5
panacea for all the problems of popular dissatisfaction facing parties. But it can go a 
long way in meeting the demands of politically interested citizens for whom social 
bonds and political preferences are “a matter of taste and choice rather than of 
obligation” (Streeck 2014, 123)—citizens who seek political self-expression without 
subordinating themselves to a bureaucratic leviathan. 
From theory to empirics: studying partisan deliberation in practice 
Though its centre of gravity is theoretical, this thesis also explores the deliberative 
potential of party branches empirically. Since the normative model of intra-party 
democracy proposed in Chapter 1 is tightly pegged to the empirical reality of parties, 
investigating the model’s resonance in real-world party branches is a natural route to 
follow. Specifically, the thesis discusses the findings of a small-scale empirical study 
of deliberation in party branches in Social Democratic parties in Germany and 
 This objection is of course not new. Even Nietzsche, in his The Wanderer and His Shadow, scorned 4
parties as suppressing independence, suggesting that “democracy must [therefore] prevent all measures 
that seem to aim at party organisation” (Nietzsche [1880] 1988a, Aphorism 293).
 Empirical studies of the public willingness to deliberate reveal that those citizens who want to 5
deliberate tend to be dissatisfied with existing partisan politics (Neblo et al. 2010). They look for 
opportunities to discuss politics which leave space for articulating individual views and what Neblo et 
al. call “republican consultation”, that is, communication between citizens and representatives in which 
the latter seek input from the former in forming political agendas. I think that more deliberative parties 
could cater to these demands and so make parties generally more attractive participatory venues 
(Invernizzi Accetti and Wolkenstein, forthcoming).
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Austria, which was conducted between Winter 2013 and Spring 2015. Party branch 
meetings were approached in this study as “natural” (as opposed to artificially 
designed) deliberative fora. Through group interviews, the preconditions for 
deliberation in party branches as well as actual discursive exchanges among the 
branch members were explored. The main objective was not to “test” the normative 
theory, but rather to refine the conceptualisations of the model and show what intra-
party deliberation looks like in practice. So, the guiding concerns were not so much 
those of the empiricist, but those of the applied normative theorist—or, to use an 
expression coined by Jeremy Waldron (2013), the “political political theorist”. 
 Although mainly indicative, the analysis of the empirical material suggests that 
realising a deliberative model of intra-party democracy is far from utopian: indeed, 
the party base exhibits plenty of deliberative potential. Even if there is little candid 
appreciation of partisan deliberation in the literature on deliberative democracy, 
however,  the fact that committed partisans deliberate well with their peers is hardly 6
surprising. After all, like-minded partisans share a lot in common—and that can 
facilitate deliberation. For example, it is a distinguishing feature of intra-party 
deliberation that deliberators enter the exchanges with some agreement on the value 
of certain political ideals. Even if they disagree on how particular ideals should be 
interpreted, they usually agree on the fundamental value of those ideals. Using the 
language of deliberative theory, we might say that there is typically a “normative 
consensus” (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006) among partisans that shapes the way in 
which their deliberations play out. And, as Chapter 4 shows, this normative consensus 
promotes the kind of ethical and principled discussion deliberative theorists would 
like to see prosper. Partisans may be said to approach each other as “political 
friends” (Muirhead 2014, ch. 5; Ypi, forthcoming) whose commitment to shared 
principles serves as the basis for mutual respect and reason-giving. 
 No doubt, the party members who participated in this study are largely “model 
partisans”. They are politically committed “all the way down” and generally well-
informed about politics; some of them are also highly educated. An obvious worry 
here is that these party members are not representative of the wider partisan base, and 
 For important exceptions, see Gundersen 2000; White and Ypi 2011.6
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this worry is certainly warranted. As Chapter 2 explicates, there is an inevitable bias 
in the case selection: since most of the party branches that were contacted in the 
course of the recruitment process did not react to my initial recruiting efforts, those 
party branches who ultimately proved willing to participate are likely to be 
extraordinarily vibrant ones. Thus, one should be cautious with extrapolating from the 
findings. To say that the party branches this study investigates are lively sites of 
deliberation is not to suggest that political discussion is of equally high quality in all 
the branches of a party. 
 But there are good reasons not to be overly concerned about the bias that is built 
into the study’s case selection. The party members whose deliberations have been 
studied are probably more committed than many of their peers, yes—but if the task is 
to restore the capacity of parties to link citizens and government, then there is nothing 
wrong with focusing on the most active and committed partisans. The passive 
members one is likely to find in branches that rarely convene, for example, or outside 
of the party’s organised domains, would in any case be unable to contribute much to 
the linkage between voters and parties that the deliberative model of intra-party 
democracy seeks to resuscitate. Bringing citizens closer to government requires party 
members to be at once continually in touch with the local constituents and willing to 
make efforts to channel their demands into policy or the party’s internal debate. So 
even if the case selection is far from perfect in terms of randomness and variation, the 
fact that it includes only strongly dedicated parties does not undermine the 
significance of the study as a whole. Indeed, prioritising more committed partisans in 
efforts to reinvent parties is broadly in line with the normative considerations put 
forth in Chapter 1. 
Three contributions 
Partly a work of normative political theory and partly an empirical study of parties, 
this thesis contributes to three different bodies of literature. Firstly, in approaching 
political parties as a subject for normative reflection, it contributes to the nascent 
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political theory literature on the topic of parties. In part as a response to the 
widespread discontent with parties across the democratic world, a number of political 
theorists—in particular Nancy Rosenblum (2008), Russell Muirhead (2006; 2010; 
2014), Jonathan White and Lea Ypi (2010; 2011; forthcoming)—have recently 
advanced spirited defences of parties, showing convincingly why democracy needs its 
partisans. While their accounts successfully establish the desirability of parties, 
however, they offer relatively little in the way of institutional prescriptions as to how 
parties could remedy the numerous shortcomings they are being charged with. 
Reacting to this, this thesis takes a distinctive prescriptive turn. It asks not so much 
what is generally desirable about partisanship, or how partisanship “at its best” would 
look, but what parties as organisations can do so as to redeem their ability to perform 
the functions that make them desirable in the first place.  
 On the one hand, this enterprise is inevitably more “non-ideal” in character than 
some of the other theoretical work on parties. It takes as its starting point political 
parties as they are not as they should be, factoring a wealth of real-world constraints 
into the analysis. In this respect it differs sharply from White and Ypi’s work, whose 
principal concern is with reconstructing an ideal conception of partisanship. On the 
other hand, the thesis shifts the focus from the practice of partisanship to the party as 
an institution. Here it differs above all from Muirhead and Rosenblum’s work, which, 
written primarily with the U.S. experience in mind, largely neglects questions of 
membership, intra-party decision-making and institutional design. Besides these 
differences of methodology and research focus, however, the thesis is driven by much 
the same considerations that have given rise to these renewed efforts to rehabilitate 
parties as democratic agents and reinvigorate the theoretical study of partisanship. It 
assumes, that is, that parties are indispensable vehicles for exercising collective 
political agency, and that partisans’ passionate concern for policy and the common 
good is a virtue rather than a vice in a democratic polity. 
 Secondly, in proposing to conceive intra-party democracy in deliberative terms, 
the thesis also contributes to the vast political science literature on intra-party 
democracy. In contemporary scholarship on intra-party democracy, two aspects of the 
topic usually receive attention. The first is candidate or leadership selection methods 
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(LeDuc 2001; Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Cross 2013; Rahat 2013; Spies and Kaiser 
2014); the second opportunities for party members directly to participate in the 
making of internal decisions (Sussman 2007; Scarrow 2014, ch.8). Procedures of 
deliberation, on the other hand, are widely ignored. Some scholars mention 
deliberation in passing—as something that may or may not occur prior to candidate 
selection, for example (Hazan and Rahat 2010, 163-164). But they take little interest 
in studying deliberative procedures as systematically as candidate selection and direct 
participation. Thus, by bringing intra-party deliberation into the focus of attention, 
this thesis enlarges the current research agenda. It adds considerable complexity to 
predominant understandings of intra-party democracy, and shows why party scholars 
should care about deliberation within parties. 
 Thirdly, in empirically studying deliberation within political parties, this thesis 
also contributes to the growing empirical literature on democratic deliberation. 
Scholarship on deliberative democracy has taken several “turns” in the last decade, of 
which the empirical turn is the latest (for an overview of these developments, see 
Dryzek 2012, ch.1). Parties seldom make an appearance in this proliferating literature, 
which is perhaps because of the general dearth of interest in parties in political theory 
(the recent theoretical works on parties that I have mentioned above are an exception 
to the rule and a reaction to this lack of interest). Indeed, deliberativists have 
traditionally looked to partisanship as an obstacle to good deliberation, assuming that 
partisans are unwilling to revise their preferences and values in light of others’ 
arguments because of their strong commitments. But this view fails to acknowledge 
that there is an important difference between (a) inter-party deliberation and (b) intra-
party deliberation. The former is indeed prone to be of relatively low quality, since it 
involves clashes of incompossible policy preferences and sometimes irresolvable 
disagreement over normative principles—think for example of debates in the British 
House of Commons, which characteristically violate virtually any norm of good 
deliberation one may imagine. This is the type of partisan deliberation most 
deliberativists have in mind; hence their dismissive attitude. Intra-party deliberation, 
on the other hand, is much less susceptible to these problems as it usually proceeds on 
the basis of shared values (and possibly even partly shared policy preferences). And, 
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as I have argued earlier, shared values are likely to raise the quality of deliberation, 
facilitating respectful reason giving in circumstances of disagreement at other, less 
fundamental levels. By affording an insight into this kind of partisan deliberation, the 
thesis fills an important gap in the empirical literature on deliberative democracy. It 
establishes that partisans do practice deliberation with each other, and clarifies what is 
particular about their deliberations. 
Outline of the chapters 
The thesis divides into six chapters. Chapter 1, as already mentioned, is concerned 
with the theoretical groundwork on which the remainder of the thesis rests. It 
develops a deliberative model of intra-party democracy, suggesting a way in which 
parties may be reorganised so as to restore their capacity to provide linkage. The 
empirical part of the thesis is structured around the normative considerations this 
chapter puts forth. 
 Chapter 2 outlines the methodology of the empirical study conducted for the 
thesis. It defends a qualitative and interpretative approach to studying deliberation. 
This approach eschews the abstraction inherent in quantitative studies of the practice. 
Rather than moving away from the particulars, it looks to deliberation as a practice 
that is shaped by local norms, and so best understood if the experiences of those 
involved in deliberation are taken into account. None of this demands abandoning 
norms of good deliberation (e.g. mutual respect), but it requires acknowledging that 
these norms are open to different interpretations in different social contexts. 
 Chapter 3 kicks off the empirical part of the study and looks at the 
circumstances of deliberation at the party base. It asks whether party branches provide 
the conditions that are necessary for good deliberation to arise, namely that 
participants have equal opportunities to influence the deliberative process, and that 
they hold a variety of different viewpoints so as to ensure that the issue under 
deliberation is considered from multiple angles. It argues that party branches satisfy 
these two desiderata, showing that diversity is ensured by members’ different 
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occupational backgrounds, and that partisans’ joint commitment to shared political 
ideals establishes an egalitarian “deliberative field” in which everyone’s voice is 
heard. What I have earlier referred to as “normative consensus” proves to be a 
defining feature of party branches as sites of deliberation, and plays out as a equality-
enhancing force. The existence of common adversaries—a byproduct of having 
shared normative commitments—also contributes to the equal standing branch 
members enjoy; thus, partisanship’s inherent exclusionary dynamics have the happy 
effect of rendering branches supportive environments for deliberation. 
 Chapter 4 shifts the focus from the circumstances of deliberation to actual 
deliberative practice. It begins by distinguishing two different types of disagreement 
within party branches: ones about organisational matters and ones about issues 
concerning society at large. It then goes on to examine several exemplary text 
passages that illustrate how partisans “deliberatively” handle these kinds of 
disagreements. The central point that emerges from the analysis is that members of 
party branches engage in acts of reason giving that may reasonably be interpreted as 
satisfying the normative demands of political justification; so the deliberative capacity 
of party branches is affirmed. One of several interesting specificities of party branch 
deliberation is that it is marked by tensions between pragmatically-minded partisans 
and more ideological ones. This, it turns out, is a further important source of diversity 
within party groups. Another notable detail is that the political principles 
underpinning partisanship can facilitate mutual justification. The partisan “normative 
consensus” plays a crucial role in this connection: partisans’ pre-deliberative 
agreement on a certain set of political principles ensures that appeals to those 
principles are immediately resonant. This makes reaching agreements and 
compromises easier. The upshot is that even though deliberation in party branches is a 
particular kind of deliberation, it is undoubtedly good deliberation. If this is any 
indication, then there is plenty of potential for involving these partisans more in the 
party’s wider deliberations and giving them bigger deliberative tasks. 
 Although the picture of intra-party deliberation that emerges in chapters 3 and 4 
is generally very positive, it is important to note that some of the party groups that 
were studied for this thesis proved to be less deliberative than others. Interestingly, 
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those groups provided good preconditions for deliberation, yet their actual 
deliberations displayed numerous shortcomings. Chapter 5 examines these 
shortcomings, looking closely at three types of “deliberative failure”: (a) group splits 
and defection; (b) cases where deliberation does not arise, or only seldom arises; and 
(c) polarising tendencies. The chapter also sketches a number of institutional devices 
for making deliberative failures tractable and concludes that even though deliberative 
failures will be difficult to avoid in an internally deliberative party, their most harmful 
effects can be limited through institutional design. So the fact that deliberation 
sometimes fails does not speak against a deliberative model of intra-party democracy 
as a whole. 
 Finally, chapter 6 puts all those pieces together and concludes the thesis. It 
reflects on the prospects of establishing deliberative institutional designs within 
parties as well as on directions for future research, and discusses three challenges 
facing the proposals put forward in the thesis. 
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Chapter 1 
A Deliberative Model of Intra-party Democracy 
Introduction: Parties and Linkage 
Political parties serve a number of vital functions in representative democracies. 
Connecting citizens to government is perhaps the most important one. This is how 
parties were traditionally conceived, and it continues to be the main standard 
according to which their legitimacy as representative institutions is evaluated.   7
 Intra-party democracy is instrumental in establishing and sustaining this 
connection between society and government. Internally democratic parties empower 
the members on the ground, who have privileged access to the demands of the 
constituents, and provide them with opportunities to channel these demands into 
policy decisions (for a classic statement on this “linkage” function of parties, see 
Lawson 1988). 
 In this chapter, I begin by arguing that existing models of intra-party 
democracy—which focus on candidate selection and direct participation, respectively
—are not adequate to the task of linking citizens to government. I suggest that these 
models run the risk of simply reinforcing the preferences of the party elite, thus 
weakening, instead of strengthening, the members on the ground. What is missing 
from these models are fora of discussion and debate, in which the party base can 
critically question the status quo and devise alternative positions on specific policies 
as well as the party’s more general direction. It is these fora that parties need to 
establish and empower to make internal democracy meaningful. 
 As Sartori (1976, ix) put it more than a quarter century ago, “parties are the central intermediate and 7
intermediary structure between society and government.” This understanding of parties continues to 
inform scholars’ normative judgments about parties. See, for example, Biezen and Saward (2008); 
Dalton et al. (2011); Mair (2013b).
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 With this in mind, I then outline a deliberative model of intra-party 
democracy.  At the centre of this model stand processes of preference-formation at the 8
partisan base, in particular the deliberations of local party branches. I argue first that 
these traditional sites of partisan activism provide favourable circumstances for good 
quality deliberation, and go on to examine several ways in which their deliberations 
could be connected to decisions. I also suggest a set of novel institutional designs that 
practitioners can avail themselves of if conventional channels of preference 
transmission are defective. In closing, I run through several objections to the model 
and show that they are less weighty than might at first appear. 
Why a deliberative model of intra-party democracy? 
Two models of intra-party democracy 
To see the relative merits of a deliberative model of intra-party democracy, it is 
necessary first to audit the main alternatives to it: the candidate selection model and 
the direct participation model. These are the two standard models of intra-party 
democracy. In this section I show that these models are, by themselves, inadequate. 
They bracket out processes of preference-formation, which has adverse implications 
for the capacity of parties to link citizens to political decisions.   
 Consider first the candidate selection model. In recent times, this has become 
perhaps the most popular model of intra-party democracy. The basic idea underlying it 
is that the procedures of selecting who will gain a place on the party list should be 
inclusive and give a large number of members the opportunity to voice their 
preferences (for an overview treatment, see Hazan and Rahat 2010). Some add to this 
the rider that candidate selection procedures should also be reasonably competitive 
 References to the possibility of such a model have surfaced on a few occasions in the relevant 8
theoretical literature (see Cohen 1989; Teorell 1999; Biezen and Saward 2008; White and Ypi 2011), 
but a systematic treatment has not emerged yet. Of the existing treatments, Teorell’s piece comes 
closest to a discussion of a deliberative model of intra-party democracy. Yet Teorell pays little attention 
to concrete institutional design questions, and his theoretical framework is by today’s standards 
outdated.
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and designed in such a way as to ensure that women’s descriptive representation on 
the party list is adequate. 
 This model is problematic for at least two reasons. First, for many active party 
members, it may simply not provide a sufficiently meaningful channel of 
participation. Of course, party members will generally be favourably inclined towards 
taking part in candidate selection processes, especially if these processes are the only 
opportunity for them to exercise voice. But those members who want to engage on a 
more regular basis are likely to become disenchanted when internal participation 
involves only candidate selection (cf. Invernizzi Accetti and Wolkenstein, 
forthcoming). The obvious problem with this is that it is usually these active and 
committed party members that sustain the party’s ties to the citizenry. They engage in 
door-to-door campaigning, organise events for the local community and meet 
regularly with other partisans to discuss the community’s most pressing problems, 
thus having a heightened awareness of citizens’ concerns. To connect the party with 
the citizenry in large, a model of intra-party democracy must offer its active members 
more substantial participatory opportunities. 
 The second problem the candidate selection model holds is that it treats 
members’ preferences as simply given. But I want to set aside this problem for the 
time being and return to it after outlining the second standard model of intra-party 
democracy, since this problem affects the second model as well. 
 The second standard model of intra-party democracy focuses on direct 
participation. This model of intra-party democracy operates with a much “thicker” 
conception of participation than the candidate selection model. It holds that, rather 
than indirectly influencing the party’s decision-making through selecting candidates, 
party members should be able to translate their preferences directly into decisions.  
 The most common form of direct intra-party democracy are membership 
ballots, in which policy or personnel questions (which are usually pre-selected by the 
party leadership) are referred to the members for a direct decision. Since the 
mid-1990s, parties across the democratic world increasingly made use of such ballots 
(Scarrow 2014, 181-185). Another well-known example of direct participation within 
parties are “rotation schemes” for MPs. In the 1980s, the German Greens have 
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experimented with such schemes. The idea was to limit the term of office to two years 
(two years less than the full legislative term of four years) in order to “prevent the 
estrangement of MPs from their grass roots” (Poguntke 1992, 244; also see Scarrow 
1999), and to give more people the opportunity to directly influence policy making 
processes. 
 Although the direct participation model grants party members more influence 
than the candidate selection model, it holds a number of problems that make it ill-
suited as a self-standing model of intra-party democracy. If a party adopts rotation 
system for office holders, the lack of expertise of those who have just been propelled 
into office may place disproportionate power in the hands of experts who lack 
democratic authorisation. Thomas Poguntke has noted this problem in a study of the 
German Greens: 
[A] high turnover of MPs means that the informal power of permanently employed 
parliamentary assistants, who can rely on accumulated knowledge of parliamentary 
procedures, is likely to rise. Hence, rotation may lead to the situation where functional 
oligarchies replace democratically legitimized power centres (Poguntke 1992, 243).  9
Ultimately, this of course weakens, rather than empowers, party members. 
 Membership ballots, on the other hand, may cause a problem of disaffection 
similar to the one I have highlighted in the discussion of the candidate selection 
model. The reason is that in intra-party referenda, the agenda-setter and the initiator 
are often the same actor, namely the party elite (Sussmann 2007). So the party elite 
controls both the question that is referred to the members for a decision and the timing 
of the referendum. This lack of control over the terms on which the referendum is 
held may dishearten those members who want to have more influence. Active and 
organised members might demand a right to initiate referenda themselves, for 
example. And where they already have such a right, they may want to be offered more 
channels to promote their cause. 
 This is why Kelsen (1920, 24) thought that permanently employed bureaucrats undermine democracy, 9
and that democracies, therefore, ought not permit what he called Berufs- und Fachbeamtentum.
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 Are these problems intrinsic to the direct participation model? One possible 
reply to the argument I have just put forward is that direct-democratic forms of 
participation are as good as their design. When they are designed in such a way as to 
privilege elites, of course they are normatively troubling. But when this is not the 
case, they may also prove genuinely empowering, giving the majority of party 
members direct command over the party (on this point, see Altman 2014). In short, 
the problem with the direct participation model of intra-party democracy is not that 
direct participation is per se disempowering, but the fact that the model is often 
poorly put into practice. 
 Clearly this reply has some force. Despite its poor empirical track record, it is 
certainly possible to imagine a well-designed direct participation model of intra-party 
democracy, which is not hijacked (as in the rotation model) or unilaterally controlled 
(as in membership ballots) by party elites. For example, the right to initiate 
membership ballots may be restricted to ordinary party members, who in this way 
could determine the exact question of the referendum, its timing, and how the final 
decision should be implemented.  But even if we concede that some of the direct 10
participation model’s shortcomings may be contingent on institutional design, it is 
still inadequate as a self-standing model for intra-party democracy. This is because of 
the second problem the model holds: it presumes that only the act of expressing one’s 
preferences is normatively and practically relevant. Indeed, the direct participation 
model does not valorise the process of preference-formation prior to the decision. 
Instead, people’s views and preferences are treated as simply “out there”. As I have 
mentioned earlier, this problem affects also the candidate selection model. Both 
models draw on concepts of participation which revolve around expressing 
preferences but ignore the processes through which preferences come into being 
(Teorell 2006). 
 Why exactly is this problematic? Primarily because it undermines the 
democratic potential of intra-party democracy. Democratic theorists widely criticise 
such “aggregative” conceptions of democracy, arguing that taking preferences as 
 Notice that many parties have enacted statutory reforms to provide party members with the formal 10
right to initiate an internal referendum. Again though, evidence suggests that it is far from clear 
whether awarding members those formal rights can outweigh the power of the party elite to shape the 
internal agenda (Sussman 2007; Detterbeck 2013).
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given risks cementing the existing state of affairs (Cohen 1989; Gutmann and 
Thompson 2004; Mansbridge et al. 2010). Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson 
(2004, 16) put the classic worry in this way:  
By taking existing or minimally corrected preferences as given, as the base line for 
collective decisions, the aggregative conception [of democracy] fundamentally 
accepts and may even reinforce existing distributions of power in society. 
It’s main shortcoming, they argue, is that it does “not provide any process by which 
citizens’ views about those distributions might be changed” (Gutmann and Thompson 
2004, 16). 
 To understand this point, consider the potentially problematic effect of 
involving the whole party membership, rather than just the active party members, in 
candidate selection procedures. Evidence suggests that making candidate selection 
thus inclusive ultimately buttresses the party leaderships’ power, since it strengthens 
those large groups of passive members who are “at once more docile and more likely 
to endorse the candidates proposed by the party leadership” (Mair 1997, 149).  11
Contrary to the active members, who deliberate with their partisan peers, those 
passive members are not provided with an opportunity to jointly debate and question 
the leadership’s candidate choices. As a result, they are usually more inclined 
uncritically to accept these choices.  (Notice, however, that the problem here is not 12
the candidate selection procedure’s inclusiveness per se, but the lack of opportunities 
for non-organised members to deliberate.) 
 If this is correct, it should give proponents of the standard models of intra-
party democracy pause. Intra-party democracy becomes obsolete as a means of 
bringing citizens closer to government when it merely serves to legitimise the party 
 For an in-depth empirical study of these problems in parties in Great Britain and Spain, see Hopkin 11
(2001). See also Faucher (2015) and Garland (2016, 25).
 Katz and Mair (2009, p. 759) suggest that this is in fact the party leadership’s calculus: “Although 12
the objective is a kind of party oligarchy, the means ironically (…) may be the apparent 
democratization of the party through the introduction of such devices as postal ballots or mass 
membership meetings at which large numbers of marginally committed members or supporters—with 
their silence, their lack of capacity for prior independent (of the leadership) organization, and their 
tendency to be oriented more toward particular leaders rather than to underlying policies—can be 
expected to drown out the activists.” 
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leadership’s position. This is the main deficiency of the two dominant models of intra-
party democracy and the institutions they prescribe. 
 A closely related problem is that the methods of preference expression we 
have auditioned so far—candidate selection and direct participation—hardly provide 
ways to challenge these methods themselves. In membership ballots, for example, it is 
not possible to express a preference for using a different method of decision-making 
to deal with the issue at stake (cf. Gutmann and Thompson 2004, 16-17). Perhaps 
members think that a ballot is not the appropriate way to resolve the issue: they might 
think, for instance, that a yes/no referendum on a divisive issue could undermine party 
cohesion. But the ballot itself does not provide opportunities to raise these concerns 
and propose a different decision-making process. 
 Candidate selection methods equally fail to provide a process through which 
their own configurations can be challenged. Who is included in the selectorate, for 
example, is a decision that needs to be made prior to the actual selection process. In 
practice, this decision is usually made in top-down fashion by the party elite.  13
Members hardly have a say here, thus being effectively excluded from deciding on the 
terms of the decision-making process they are supposed to participate in at a later 
stage. 
 In sum, the candidate selection and direct participation models of intra-party 
democracy are concerned only with participation qua expressing views and 
preferences, but provide no room for participation qua forming views and preferences. 
This limits their democratic potential in important ways. What we need is a corrective 
to the limitations of these models. 
Deliberation as corrective and complement 
A possible way forward is to shift the centre of gravity from processes in which 
preferences are expressed and aggregated to processes of preference formation and 
clarification. Most important amongst these processes is deliberation. Deliberation is 
 For an in-depth case study of British parties, see Mikulska and Scarrow (2010).13
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a practice that involves jointly engaging in discursive exchanges about specific issues. 
It is about finding agreements on, or getting clear about the nature and depth of 
disagreement over, these issues in conversation with others. All of this presupposes 
that people’s positions and perspectives are, at least to some degree, open to 
reassessment and revision. In this sense, deliberation is transformative in its 
aspirations: a procedure to question, rather than reinforce, the status quo. This 
distinguishes it from the forms of “preference-expressing” participation we have 
considered up until this point. 
 When we think about deliberation within political parties what naturally 
comes to mind are internal debates over ideology, policy, and personnel. We think 
perhaps also of party conferences, in which party elites give speeches and ordinary 
members respond. And possibly we think of everyday discussions among partisans, 
informal encounters where they talk about politics with their peers. Taken together, 
these and other intra-party deliberations form a complex arrangement of discursive 
interactions, a “deliberative system” in which each component performs different 
roles (on the systemic approach to deliberative democracy, see the programmatic 
statement by Mansbridge et al. 2012). Not all of the system’s components are 
connected to decision-making procedures, and the quality of deliberation they 
produce will be very different. But each component contributes to a larger deliberative 
whole. 
 The main aim of a deliberative model of intra-party democracy would be to 
coordinate the party’s internal discussions and debates in such a way that the members 
on the ground are more connected to policy decisions. It appears that three things 
must be achieved:  
• First, that members on the ground deliberate about issues of common concern, and that 
they deliberate well;  
• second, that the preferences and opinions these deliberations generate are transmitted to 
the party elite, either face-to-face or (more likely so) through democratically elected 
delegates;  
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• and third, that party elites and ordinary members engage in regular discussions where 
they explain to each other the reasons for why they think as they do, actualising what one 
may call “deliberative accountability”.  14
 Before looking at the model’s different components, several clarifications 
about the nature of this model are in order. First, the deliberative model would not 
wholly replace candidate selection processes or occasional direct-democratic 
initiatives, for these practices serve important functions in parties that deliberation by 
itself cannot serve. (It is for example a practical necessity in representative 
democracies that parties compose lists of candidates for election; and membership 
ballots can be useful in helping parties to increase the formal legitimacy of their 
decisions.) The point of the deliberative model is that it (a) corrects for the tendency 
of these practices to cement the status quo, and (b) complements these practices with 
participatory venues that emphasise discussion and debate. By offering new 
opportunities to exercise voice, it can also counteract members’ disaffection with the 
meagre opportunities for participation that the candidate selection and direct 
participation models provide. 
 The second issue that needs to be clarified concerns the main protagonists in 
the model. Why does the deliberative model of intra-party democracy centre on the 
deliberations of the “party on the ground”? Recall in this connection the linkage 
function of intra-party democracy that was mentioned in the introduction of this 
chapter. To connect citizens and government, parties ought to empower first and 
foremost ordinary members and activists, who are directly in touch with the rest of the 
society (see Lawson 1988; Michels [1911] 1989). This means essentially that 
members at the partisan base must be given adequate power to influence the party 
leadership. Although this does not preclude two-way communication between the 
party elite and the wider membership, it does involve placing limits on the discretion 
 It might be objected here that some of the just-sketched discursive interactions are already implied in 14
existing conceptions of intra-party democracy. For example, in practice candidate selection processes 
are likely to involve deliberations among members concerning the strengths and weaknesses of 
different candidates and their agendas. However, none of these interactions are recognised as 
normatively desirable or practically relevant in existing articulations of these models. It is the 
distinctive feature of a deliberative model of intra-party democracy that it is sensitive to the broader 
significance of these discursive interactions.
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of party elites. Institutional designs must aim at neutralising power asymmetries. (I 
return to this point below.) 
 Notice, however, that a deliberative model of intra-party democracy naturally 
engages a more agentive conception of linkage than is conventionally deployed. The 
traditional idea underlying linkage is, to repeat, that grassroots activists and ordinary 
members have privileged access to the demands and concerns of the party’s 
constituents, and should be empowered so as to channel these demands and concerns 
into decisions over policy or the party’s more general direction. Party members are 
meant to serve as messengers or delegates of the constituents in this view. In the 
deliberative model, by contrast, the emphasis is not only on channeling the inputs of 
citizens into the party, but also, and more strongly so, on processing these inputs 
discursively by pooling relevant arguments and specifying interpretations in 
discussions and debates. Thus party members are not merely messengers, but 
deliberative agents who jointly subject the information provided by citizens to critical 
scrutiny. 
 In the next section, I look more closely at deliberation at the party base. In a 
later section, I discuss how these deliberations can be connected to decision-making 
authority, and how decision makers can be held accountable. Before proceeding 
though, it should be mentioned that less than a decade ago the idea that parties should 
be treated as sites of deliberation would have sounded somewhat controversial to 
democratic theorists. For a long time, advocates of deliberative democracy regarded 
deliberation as incompatible with partisanship, the worry being that partisans are 
incapable of changing their minds because of their strong cognitive bias—or because 
they are in any case more interested in promoting their own sectarian interests than in 
engaging in reasoned discussion about common ends (for an overview of these 
arguments, see Muirhead 2010; for contributions that address the [limited] 
compatibility of partisanship and democratic deliberation see Gundersen 2000; 
Williams 2000; Hendriks et al. 2007). However, as deliberative theorists increasingly 
shifted the focus of their theories “from an ideal conception of the political to the 
phenomenological” (Bächtiger et al. 2010, 42; also see Young 2002; Mansbridge et al. 
2010 and Azmanova 2012), an opening for partisanship was created. 
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 There are several ways of looking at partisanship that see it as compatible with 
democratic deliberation, two of which are directly relevant for the argument put forth 
here. One stresses that partisanship is deliberative to the extent that it is “ethical”. 
Ethical partisans, writes Nancy Rosenblum (2008, 402), reject the “uncompromising 
extremism” that glorifies “intransigence as an avowed good” (also see Muirhead 
2006). They are aware that their own perspective is partial and acknowledge that 
others, even within their own party, might reasonably disagree with them. Despite 
their strong attachment to particular ideas, they defend their views with great respect 
for the other side and exhibit a disposition to listen and compromise (which 
presupposes that they relax the intensity with which they hold their views). This 
makes respectful and constructive debates possible, and facilitates reaching prudential 
and widely accepted outcomes—goals on which most deliberative democrats place 
high value (Gutmann and Thompson 2010, esp. 1134-1137). 
 A second argument holds that even if partisans do not always meet the 
standards of good quality deliberation, this is no reason for concern. For once we 
accept that a party forms a self-standing deliberative system, we also need to 
acknowledge that the failures of one of its parts to produce good deliberation can be 
compensated for by another part if the individual parts are “concatenated in the right 
way” (Goodin 2008, 186).  If, for example, a group of members at the party base 15
polarises over an issue, this is likely to be the result of bad quality deliberation, where 
views are reinforced without weighing alternative arguments. But polarisation may 
help put the demands of this group on the agenda of other party groups and party 
elites, and these can critically re-examine those demands in their own deliberations. 
So, the interaction between different deliberative agents within the party can raise the 
overall systemic deliberative quality. 
 Note that there is nothing unfamiliar in thinking about parties in “systemic” terms. Katz and Mair 15
(1993) famously distinguish “three faces” of party, casting the “party on the ground” (i.e. the 
membership base), the “party in central office” (i.e. the professionalised administrative body of the 
party) and the “party in public office” (i.e. the party in parliament) as three differentiated but 
functionally interdependent parts that interact with each other in a continuous fashion. Besides this 
more recent account, we also find references to internal functional differentiation—the basis of a 
systemic understanding of party—in the classic literature on the topic, for example in Robert Michels’ 
classic Political Parties ([1911] 1989), where the functional differentiation between party members and 
the party leadership is considered the root of internal oligarchy, or in Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks 
([1971] 2007), where it is highlighted that different elements of party have different characteristics and 
functions. Thus Gramsci says that “In analysing the development of parties, it is necessary to 
distinguish: their social group; their mass membership; their bureaucracy and General Staff” (211).
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Deliberation and the “party on the ground” 
With this preliminary outline of a deliberative model of intra-party democracy in 
place, we are now in a position to look more closely at its individual components. 
Most important amongst these are, as I have argued, the deliberations of the party 
base. But what precisely is the “party base”? Which of the numerous organisations 
and participatory venues one typically finds at the bottom of the party hierarchy 
should be included in a deliberative model of intra-party democracy? This is the first 
question I want to address in this section. 
 The answer to this question will depend first on the extent to which a given 
party grassroots organisation is connected to the wider citizenry (in the sense that it is 
not a “siloed” and self-referential association but trying actively to engage with the 
public) and second on its capacity to produce good quality deliberation. If it satisfies 
these two desiderata—connectedness to the citizenry and deliberative capacity—then 
it may be integrated into the deliberative model. To foreshadow, my contention is that 
it is only local party branches which, in virtue of their design as inclusive 
participatory institutions and their members’ commitment to discussion with like-
minded partisans, satisfy these desiderata. Alternative grassroots fora may satisfy one 
of the two, but not both, desiderata. 
 We can proceed by a process of elimination here. Milieu organisations, such as 
party academies or partisan sports clubs, traditionally played a crucial role in 
connecting parties with their supporters. They offered opportunities for partisans to 
socialise with like-minded people, thereby functioning as sites of political identity 
formation. The problem with these organisations is that they exist only in very limited 
form today. As a result of falling levels of party identification, milieu organisations 
have diminished to the point of insignificance in most Western democracies (Scarrow 
2014, 162). So regardless of whether they satisfy the desiderata—where they still 
exist, they almost certainly satisfy the connectedness desideratum—including them in 
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a deliberative model of intra-party democracy is hardly a fruitful direction. We need 
to look for more vibrant sites of partisan engagement. 
 Might the various online platforms through which parties involve their 
membership base be a good place to look for ordinary party members who are willing 
to debate? In recent times, parties have increasingly tried to offer members 
opportunities for online participation.  The target of these initiatives are partisans 16
who want to interact with a political party but commit as little as possible to it—
partisans, that is, who do not want to regularly meet on a face-to-face basis with other 
partisans, and thus look for “ad hoc engagement” with few costs and obligations 
(Gauja 2015, 94). To cite just one example of such a partisan online platform, the 
British Labour party’s consultative forum Your Britain.org.uk allows members (as 
well as non-members) to communicate their ideas on how Labour policy should look 
in the future. The format of communication are online posts, which are collected and 
thematically organised by the website’s administrators. 
 Insofar as online platforms of this kind give citizens easy access to political 
parties, they in principle have the potential to link parties and society. Thus they are 
likely to satisfy the connectedness desideratum. However, their deliberative 
credentials are questionable. This is principally because they work on a no-
commitment basis: people can vent their ideas and log off. There is no requirement to 
justify one’s statements and claims, nor will participants be inclined to respond to 
others’ concerns. Stephen Coleman (2004, 117) has observed this in Labour’s 2003 
Big Conversation online consultation exercise, the predecessor to Your Britain: 
[N]obody responds to what anyone else has said, rather like a phone-in programme in 
which caller after caller makes a short speech and then disappears into the ether. 
Online fora of this kind, he (2004, 117) concluded, “lack any scope for interactivity”. 
 Recent empirical studies reveal a considerable change of party structures. Scarrow (2014) speaks in 16
this context of “multi-speed memberships parties”, in which a range of different membership options 
are offered.
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 Thus, partisan online platforms seem ill-suited as basic building blocks of a 
deliberative model of intra-party democracy.  For like any conversation, deliberation 17
presupposes a level of interactivity. It requires people to give and hear reasons in a 
way that makes plain the respect citizens ought to have and express for one another 
even when they disagree. In this sense, deliberation is not a “no-commitment” 
activity. People must be willing to invest time and intellectual resources in 
formulating arguments and engaging with others’ viewpoints. While this might be a 
lot to ask from many ordinary citizens, for some party members it is part and parcel of 
their political engagement. The party members I have in mind are those who regularly 
engage on a face-to-face basis with other partisans, discussing politics and devising 
political proposals. It is those members that the deliberative model of intra-party 
democracy revolves around. 
 Where might those members be found? Typically they are organised in local 
party branches. In most parties (that is, in most developed democracies other than the 
U.S., where parties are quite differently organised)  local branches are the smallest 18
cells of party organisation. They consist of groups of members who meet in regular 
intervals to discuss politics and coordinate party activities in their local community, 
including door-to-door campaigning, organising party events, and providing political 
information to citizens.  The members who attend these meetings usually hold a 19
strong commitment to the party, and voluntarily spend considerable amounts of time 
engaging in grassroots politics. 
 Party branches, as I said, satisfy our desiderata of connectedness and 
deliberative capacity. First, party branches are closely linked to the local communities 
 Research on party blogs shows that committed online discussion can certainly possible occur in a 17
partisan context (Gibson et al. 2012). The problem is that participants in these discussions are almost 
exclusively partisans of the same stripe; non-partisans rarely join the debate. Thus these discussions 
they probably don’t satisfy the connectedness desideratum.
 Note that I do not mean to suggest that US parties could not draw on internal deliberative 18
institutions. Although US parties have no direct equivalent to party branches, their “county 
committees” serve similar local-level functions as party branches. Thus they might exhibit similar 
deliberative characteristics as party branches. This issue must of course be settled empirically and 
cannot be discussed more here.
 Consider how the Austrian Social Democrats (SPÖ) define the functions of their local party 19
branches: “We inform the people in our area about political changes of all kinds. Above all, the branch 
(Sektion) is a place where people who live in the surrounding neighbourhood meet, talk to each other 
and help shape their environment.” http://www.sektion.at/index.php?article_id=105, retrieved 19 
January 2015.
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in which their members are based. They are directly in touch with the local 
constituency, and have the authority to delegate representatives to hierarchically 
higher party bodies to make these concerns heard.  (I will say more about delegation 20
below.) For many aspiring party members, moreover, branches provide the starting 
gate for their politically active life. Where they exist, they are the primary contact 
point for those who want to engage in the party, allowing citizens to get to know other 
like-minded people and participate in a range of activities with them.  Thus, although 21
their vibrancy has decreased as party membership figures fell over the previous 
decades, they are still crucial for sustaining the party’s roots in society (Scarrow 2014; 
also see Clark 2004; Pattie et al. 1995). 
 Second, local party branches are, as it were, “natural” deliberative fora. 
Deliberation typically occurs at the branches’ regular meetings, where activists, 
ordinary party members, and some party officials convene to discuss local issues and 
current politics. These meetings are likely to exhibit characteristics that are typically 
thought to promote good deliberation, namely (1) a relative equality of opportunities 
to influence the deliberative process and (2) a relative diversity of viewpoints which 
ensures that issues are considered from multiple angles (on these criteria, see 
Mansbridge et al. 2010, 65-69). 
 Let me explain why I think party branches can be expected to display these 
features. First, participants in party branch meetings may enjoy relative equality 
because social status differences are typically diluted in a partisan context. 
Membership in parties can equalise status inequalities by giving people of less 
advantaged social backgrounds the opportunity to engage in politics as equals (Cohen 
1989, 31). This means not only that membership in a party gives underprivileged 
people an equal standing with their political adversaries (that too, worker’s parties 
being the obvious example here). Party membership is also a source of equality 
among allies. More particularly, it is the partisanship—the identification as part of a 
collective promoting shared political and social goals—in party membership from 
 As Clark (2004, 40) notes, “articulating interests to a local party can therefore be a way of getting an 20
issue into the forefront of debate.”
 That party branches are highly inclusive was already highlighted by Maurice Duverger ([1954] 1990) 21
in his classic study of political parties. According to Duverger, party branches are “wide open”—“you 
only need to wish to belong to be able to do so” (39).
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which a sense of equality and solidarity with fellow party members flows. Nancy 
Rosenblum advocates this view of partisanship. Partisanship, she argues, is a 
distinctive form of collective identity characterised by an “avowed connection to what 
‘people like me’ value, think, and do politically” (Rosenblum 2008, 344). It is about 
recognition for those one stands together with in the political struggle, and about a 
sense of being at home with those people. In party branches, this sense of “being at 
home” is further reinforced by the fact that members know each other well. As a result 
of their regular meetings and their joint engagement in the local community, they will 
be familiar with each others’ backgrounds and personal histories, and friendships will 
have germinated over time. 
 If all of this is correct, then deliberations in party branches are deliberations 
among “people like us”—equal, open, and empathetic. Even if there are some social 
and economic status inequalities among participants, mutual recognition and 
acknowledgement ensures that their voices have equal weight. Elements of the 
“ethical partisanship” I have mentioned in the prior section may well be palpable in 
the party branches’ deliberations. 
 Moving now to the second feature, to what extent do participants in local party 
branch meetings exhibit a diversity of viewpoints? Is it not more likely that they hold 
rather similar views? After all, they are members of the same political party and based 
in the same local context. However, this might not dramatically limit opinion 
diversity. On the one hand, most party branch members are not professional 
politicians, but politically committed lay citizens who pursue different kinds of 
professions; and their individual occupational backgrounds and corresponding 
everyday experiences are likely to result in a plurality of perspectives.  On the other 22
hand, opinion diversity may also be a consequence of age differences between the 
members. For example, young partisans who have just started their work in the party 
in the local district might enthusiastically promote new ideas, whilst older members 
may be more concerned with protecting what has been accomplished. These kinds of 
conflict are particularly likely to occur in large and established parties where the 
average age of party members tends to be higher than the average age of the 
 Compare also empirical evidence showing that party members generally become more and more like 22
members of the wider citizenry (Scarrow and Gezgor 2010).
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population in large. Empirical studies reveal that, especially in traditional parties on 
the left, older members often hold more traditional (that is, more leftist) views than 
younger members. Some of these older members even see themselves as ideologically 
at odds with the rest of their party (Haute and Carty 2011).  
  To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that all local party branches one finds 
across Western democracies will exhibit the just-described characteristics. Party 
branches are diverse and some of them may indeed have serious deliberative defects
—they may, for example, be colonised by strongly polarised party members who 
deliberately ignore facts that support alternative positions. All I am claiming is that, 
given the tendency of these groups to be socio-economically diverse, and given the 
integrative force of partisanship, party branches are overall likely to be promising 
sites of intra-party deliberation. 
 Someone might still object that the meetings of local party branches are more 
likely to produce loose everyday talk than serious political discussion. People attend 
these meetings to socialise with like-minded people, “talking about sports or having a 
summer picnic”, rather than to debate politics (Katz 2013, 52-53). But though I do not 
want to deny that some of the activities of party branches are non-deliberative (party 
branches for example often organise events for the local community, in which 
political debate often plays a minor role), it is unlikely that their members generally 
eschew political discussion. Even if some members are less politicised than others, 
their shared political commitment will prompt regular political discussions, since it 
brings with it a heightened sensitivity to particular grievances in society as well as a 
sense of responsibility for resolving them.  23
The “systemic” uptake of deliberation at the party base 
 Another point is that even if some of their exchanges do look like the reasoned deliberation theorists 23
would like to see flourishing, this might not imply that they do not contribute to deliberation in a wider, 
more systemic, sense. Evidence from empirical studies of deliberation suggests that even loose 
everyday talk can serve deliberative functions. As Conover and Searing (2005, 281) argue, it provides 
people with an opportunity to explore different arguments, try out justifications for their views and 
“develop confidence about performing in the public arena.”
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Having established the deliberative credentials of local party branches, the next 
question is how the deliberations of these groups can be connected to substantive 
decisions. This section addresses this question, looking at mechanisms of delegation 
and accountability which normally should ensure the transmission of members’ 
deliberated preferences to the party elite. The section also canvasses novel 
institutional designs to make parties more deliberative if these mechanisms are 
defective. So we now shift the focus from the party base as a site of deliberation to the 
ways in which it interacts with the other components of the partisan deliberative 
system.  
Preference transmission, delegation, and accountability 
In most political parties, the party base is indirectly linked to decision-making 
authority. Typically grassroots members delegate to representatives at higher 
hierarchical levels of the party, just like voters delegate to MPs in elections. 
Essentially, there are two modes of intra-party delegation. The first and more direct 
one is, indeed, candidate selection. How does candidate selection allow party 
branches to bring their deliberated views to bear on decisions? Mainly through 
selectorates. Those who select the candidates can influence later decisions by 
choosing candidates with whom they share views and values.  If selectorate member 24
A is also a member of a party branch—and this quite often the case, especially if the 
method of candidate selection is decentralised (Hazan and Rahat 2010, 55-63)—then 
her selection is likely to be influenced by the deliberations of her branch. In a pre-
selection meeting, for instance, the branch’s members may reach a reasoned 
agreement regarding which candidate to support, and commit A to select accordingly.  
 Furthermore, selected candidates may themselves be members of party 
branches, and correspondingly ground their decisions in their branch’s deliberative 
judgments. Undoubtedly, this is the most direct way for party branches to influence 
 Empirical studies show that selectors tend to choose candidates according to this logic. As Gallagher 24
(1988, 2) notes in a classic study of candidate selection practices, “the values of the selectorate (…) 
frequently have more impact than those of the voters.”
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policy decisions. It allows local deliberations to directly feed into the legislature. This 
is certainly not an unfamiliar scenario: in many parties the road to candidacy in 
legislative elections necessarily involves engagement at the local level, since the 
support of the local base is an important requirement to gain a place on the party list; 
thus, some elected MPs will inevitably engage in a local branch. When that is the 
case, the members of the party branch can also hold their parliamentary delegate 
accountable by demanding explanations and justifications for her decisions in the 
group’s regular meetings, thus actualising a form of deliberative accountability.  25
 The second and more indirect mode of delegation is what I call multi-level 
delegation. By this I mean that elected delegates of the party branches carry the 
branches’ deliberative judgments to various assemblies at different levels of the party 
hierarchy, where they are either channeled into decisions or, alternatively, delegation 
proceeds to higher organisational levels. Multi-level delegation is a hallmark of 
parties that adopt a territorial organisational structure comprising several hierarchical 
organisational levels. Typically this form of organisation implies that the membership 
is represented at all organisational levels by a members’ or delegates’ assembly, which 
is composed of or elected by the party membership, with the local and regional 
assemblies as well as the national party congress constituting “the supreme decision-
making organs of the party at the respective organizational echelons” (Biezen and 
Piccio 2013, 43). In these assemblies, and in the party congress, the branches’ 
judgments are again made the subject of deliberative reappraisal.  In addition, 26
delegates can be held accountable by the branch members when they return from the 
assemblies. Similarly to cases where members of party branches hold a seat in the 
legislature, they can respond to their questions and explain them why decisions played 
out as they did.  
Empirical challenges to preference transmission 
 Note that a potential shortcoming in this scenario is that a single party branch would gain 25
disproportionate influence on policy decisions compared with those party branches which have no 
elected representatives among their members.
 Compare Pettitt’s (2007) account of internal dissent at the party congresses of the British Labour 26
Party and the Danish Socialist People’s Party. 
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These are the two standard ways for party branches to link their deliberations to 
decision-making authority. To the extent that they permit communication flows 
between the party base and the decision makers in the party, they can in principle 
provide the kind of linkage I have earlier singled out as desirable.  
 Once we consult the empirical literature on political parties, however, doubts 
arise as to whether these modes of delegation work sufficiently well to perform their 
linkage function. First, if multi-level delegation is to successfully connect the party 
branches’ deliberations to policy decisions across several hierarchical levels of the 
party, it needs to proceed largely from the bottom-up.  Otherwise the party branches’ 27
deliberations are likely to be bypassed by more powerful actors in the party. In reality, 
though, parties seldom work in this way (Houten 2009). Even if party laws prescribe a 
bottom-up organisational structure (as is the case in many European countries), and 
even if the parties formally adopt such a structure, they are de facto organised from 
the top down, or indeed stratarchically, as in Katz and Mair’s much-discussed cartel 
party model (Katz and Mair 1995 and 2009). On the latter model, the relationship 
between party members and the party leadership is in fact characterised by “mutual 
autonomy”, which is to say that the party’s different hierarchical levels are effectively 
decoupled from one another. At best, real existing parties “combine bottom-up and 
top-down government”, but even in those cases the deliberative judgments of the 
party base are often overruled by party elites (Allern and Saglie 2012, 966; for 
another case study, see Carty and Cross 2006). 
 Second, parties across Western democracies increasingly adopt candidate 
selection methods that shift power away from the party branches and activists to the 
passive and uninvolved membership (and sometimes even to non-members) (Hazan 
and Rahat 2010, 39-44). I have earlier alluded to this tendency. According to one 
prominent commentator, this is “one of the most commonly distinct trends we see 
today” (Mair 1997, 149; for a restatement see Katz and Mair 2009, 759). Parties tend 
to make selectorates more inclusive, which carries the aura of greater internal 
 As I have said earlier, on my understanding this does not preclude leaving room for two-way 27
communication between party elites and ordinary members, for instance in party conferences (see 
Pettitt 2007). But certain institutional checks are necessary to restrict the discretion of the party elite, 
notably formal rules that require party elites to consider and take seriously the members’ judgments.
!45
democratisation but often diminishes the influence of party branches and their 
activists on the selection of the candidates. For example, party primaries in several 
parties in Germany, New Zealand and Finland formally incorporate all party members 
in the selectorate and thus concentrate the power over the party list in the hands of 
members who ordinarily engage little (or not at all) in the party, and in any case are 
more inclined to support the candidates nominated by the party leadership (Rahat 
2013, 138). By implication, this decreases the extent to which the deliberative 
judgments of party branches impact on election candidates. In sum, the standard 
pathways of linking the deliberations of the party base to substantive decisions appear 
defective in most contemporary parties. 
Making parties more deliberative 
The general trend I have just mapped gives plenty of reason for scepticism concerning 
the capacity of real existing parties to make their branches’ deliberations 
consequential: organisational realities appear to undermine parties’ capacity to 
provide linkage. This raises the question of how linkage could be re-established. How 
might one bring the deliberations of party branches to bear on policy decisions despite 
the unfavourable institutional environment most parties provide today?  
 One way that is consistent with the propositions laid out so far would be to 
make increased use of deliberative institutional designs within parties. Recent years 
have seen a proliferation of these kinds of institutions—examples include deliberative 
polls, citizens juries, and other types of deliberative consultative fora—and it seems 
worthwhile to consider integrating them into parties, too. Rather than merely trying to 
make candidate selection methods more democratic, practitioners could avail 
themselves of a vast array of deliberative innovations.  
 In the final part of this section, I want to point out some possible institutional 
designs. Although mainly indicative, the following three proposals highlight ways in 
which parties could draw on their internal deliberative resources to strengthen the link 
between the members on the ground and the party elite. 
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 The most obvious deliberative institutional design is what one may call a 
problem-oriented forum.  This kind of forum is a specially established assembly for 28
deliberation over one or multiple predetermined issues. Problem-oriented fora could 
for instance convene the members of several randomly selected party branches in a 
larger deliberative setting to devise a strategy for the party in a particular policy field. 
They could make tasks like drafting a party or election manifesto a more collaborative 
and interactive exercise, and its results are likely to enjoy more legitimacy than if 
such tasks are left to a small elite. 
 An innovative approach to using party branches as problem-oriented fora has 
been taken by the Australian Labour Party (ALP). In December 2011, the ALP’s party 
conference has endorsed the establishment of issue-based branches, called Policy 
Action Caucuses (PACs). PACs are established and run by party members; setting 
them up requires thirty members. Once established, they “receive financial support 
and resources from the party in the same way as a geographic local branch, and [they 
are] entitled to convene meetings, policy forums and put policy motions to 
conference” (Gauja 2015, 98). This provides party members with an opportunity to 
pool relevant knowledge relating to a particular issue and work out policy proposals. 
While the deliberative credentials of PACs have yet to be examined, it seems clear 
that issue-based fora of this kind are a vehicle of membership empowerment that is 
much in line with the institutional recommendations put forward here.  
 Second, to handle bigger deliberative tasks, single fora could also be 
“networked” (on the idea of deliberative networks, see for example Rummens 2012). 
This design bears resemblance to the way in which internal sites of deliberation would 
ideally interact in multi-level delegation. A partisan deliberative network would 
comprise a number of dispersed fora of deliberation within the party that are linked 
together. In such a network, local branches would form single nodes that address 
limited aspects of specific issues in their deliberations, perhaps with an eye to the 
demands of their local constituency. The information from each node would 
subsequently be channeled together so that their recommendations can guide decision-
 Note that this proposition differs starkly from the partisan deliberative fora Hendriks and her 28
colleagues (2007) have examined. In contrast to these “stakeholder forums”, which include 
representatives of different businesses as well as advocacy groups, the type of fora I am proposing here 
convene only grassroots members of a single political party.
!47
making in large. Upon concluding its deliberations, each branch could for example 
elect a representative to a single national forum, which in its turn could pool all the 
deliberative judgments of the party branches across the country and work out a highly 
integrative decision. 
 Note that establishing partisan deliberative networks might not require much 
institutional effort. After all, according to much recent research, parties are in any case 
best conceived in terms of networks of partisans, that is, dispersed and decentralised 
systems of interconnected partisan groups.  If this is true, then making these 29
networks more deliberative would involve simply improving the channels of 
communication that connect individual partisan groups, and coordinating their 
deliberations better. So, networked partisan deliberation might have plenty of pre-
existing resources to build on. 
 The third and final institutional design I want to sketch here is a partisan 
deliberative conference. This type of deliberative assembly differs from the problem-
oriented forum in that it brings grassroots members together with party elites, rather 
than convening the members on their own. Its chief purpose is to strengthen 
accountability by promoting face-to-face encounters between members and elites, in 
which they “ask questions and give answers, exploring whether or not they remain 
mutually aligned and whether the grounds of their alignment might have 
changed” (Mansbridge 2009, 384 fn. 57). This strong focus on member-elite contact, 
accountability and mutual justification also distinguishes a partisan deliberative 
conference from normal party conferences, where usually much less emphasis is 
placed on party leaders and ordinary members talking at “eye level” and on the 
“deliberativeness” of the exchanges (see Pettitt 2007). Moreover, partisan deliberative 
conferences need not result in immediate collective decisions. They could also only 
prepare the way for decisions that are taken at a later point in time, or be organised 
with a retrospective outlook to evaluate previously taken decisions.  
 One potential use of partisan deliberative conferences is to supplement direct 
democratic procedures. For example, the members’ conferences the German SPD 
 This topic has recently received special attention in research on party politics in the U.S., see for 29
example Desmarais et al. (2015). For a theoretical (and rather critical) statement on the “party as a 
network”, see Katz and Mair (2009, 761-762).
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organised in several federal states prior to its membership ballot on the coalition 
agreement with the CDU/CSU allowed large numbers of members and activists to 
debate the terms of the coalition pact face-to-face with the party leadership. In these 
conferences, the party leadership was compelled to explain the reasons for their 
support of the “grand coalition” and engage in two-way communication with the 
membership. While the party base in the end supported the coalition agreement, the 
initial resistance by segments of the membership (notably the JUSOS, the party’s 
youth organisation) which mobilised internal protest against the coalition, and the 
ensuing pressure on the leadership to more extensively justify the coalition agreement 
vis-à-vis the members, is indicative of the democratic potential of such conference-
style fora. 
 Readers might wonder at this point exactly how much autonomy party elites 
should be granted in an internally deliberative party. Should they have some 
discretion in the making of decisions (e.g. in parliament), provided that they take the 
outcomes of members’ deliberations as a point of orientation? Or should they be mere 
delegates of the membership, who are meant to decide in accordance with the 
deliberated will of the party members without modifying it? The answer to this 
question is that party elites should indeed be granted some discretion. The reason why 
has to do with the well-known limits of a purely delegative conception of 
representation (see Urbinati and Warren 2008, 400-401 and Guerrero 2010): without 
some “room for manoeuvre”, party elites might struggle to translate the members’ 
deliberated preferences into decisions. This is true especially when a decision has to 
be made jointly with other parties or stakeholders. When that is the case, being bound 
to act strictly in accordance with the will of the membership may undermine the 
capacity of party elites to reach integrative compromises. At worst, it can lead to 
deadlock. Nonetheless, party elites must remain accountable to the membership in the 
way I have outlined above. They must defend and justify their actions and decisions, 
and respond to the members’ concerns.  Otherwise the linkage between parties and 30
citizens could not be sustained. 
 In practice, one potential way of making this possible would be to hold deliberative conferences on a 30
more regular basis, perhaps involving only selected representatives of single branches to reduce the 
scale of the event.
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 Importantly, this means that making parties more internally deliberative does 
not involve doing away with the “division of labour” between party members and 
party officials. That would in any case be very difficult to achieve in large, complex 
party organisations. Rather, making parties more deliberative involves democratising 
the internal division of labour by introducing deliberative accountability mechanisms. 
These mechanisms not only give party members the opportunity to question the party 
officials’ decisions and demand justifications for them. They may also over time 
reinforce solidarity among party elites and party members. For if members and party 
elites engage in regular exchanges about the party’s principles and ends, they may 
come to understand better each others’ authentic motivations and so build a 
relationship of mutual trust and respect. This is bound to further enhance the 
democratic character of the internal division of labour (cf. Christiano 2012, 37-38). 
 Another question that might be asked is whether the just-proposed institutional 
designs can be adopted by any party. After all, parties come in a variety of different 
forms, and it seems likely that different organisational features and programmatic 
commitments would affect the feasibility of internal deliberative democratisation. 
Absent in-depth empirical research on deliberation within parties, however, taking a 
definitive position regarding the compatibility of deliberative designs with different 
party types is difficult. But given the variegated contexts in which non-partisan 
deliberative designs proved to work, I think it should be possible to experiment with 
such institutional designs in different kinds of parties. A minimum condition would 
seem to be that their membership is organised to some degree. 
 Of course, some parties are much less deliberative than others, which naturally 
makes it more difficult for them to enact deliberative reforms. In populist parties on 
the extreme fringes of the political system, for example, deliberation is likely to be of 
rather low quality, as members of those parties are often uncompromising and 
uncooperative due to their strong political commitments.  Making parties of this kind 31
 For example, recent psychological studies suggest that supporters of populist parties tend to score 31
low on a personality trait called “Agreeableness”, which is to say that they are likely to be “egoistic, 
distrusting towards others, intolerant, uncooperative and [to] express antagonism towards 
others” (Bakker et al. 2016, 305). “The populist anti-establishment message—accusing the political 
elite of incompetence, insubordination and profiteering at the expense of the common people—matches 
a distrusting, tough-minded, cynical and intolerant personality” (Ibid.). These personality traits are 
likely to undermine deliberation, which is based on cooperation, mutual trust and a general willingness 
to listen to what others have to say.
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more internally deliberative will, therefore, be a great challenge. While it is certainly 
possible to imagine that the deliberative capacity of these parties could rise as they 
win over more and more supporters from across society and so become more 
internally diverse, at the present moment it is difficult to see how deliberative reforms 
could be successfully implemented.  
 To be sure, there appears to be a demand for voice and empowerment among 
present members and supporters of populist parties. Ultimately, one of the reasons 
why populist parties are increasingly gaining electoral ground in established 
democracies is that they promise to give voice back to sections of the citizenry that 
were left behind by mainstream politics. Whether this demand for voice amounts to 
demand for deliberation is questionable, however. Insofar as supporters of populist 
parties endorse the standard claim of these parties that the people constitutes a unified 
sovereign with little internal divisions (see Müller 2016)—or perhaps more 
accurately, insofar as they view themselves as being part of a unified people—
probably they will in any case see little point in deliberating.  If the people stand as 32
one, there are simply no substantial internal disagreements that have to be deliberated. 
Instead, and consistent with the demands of their parties, they will “support direct 
democratic mechanisms and other strategies that allow an unmediated relationship 
between the constituencies and the leader” (Kaltwasser 2014, 479). 
Deliberative parties in the age of party decline? 
Although I have responded to a number of objections throughout the chapter, it might 
still be worried that some of the arguments I have laid out are excessively optimistic. 
The most obvious worry, which I have mentioned already in the introduction of the 
thesis, is that the near universal decline of party memberships across democratic 
countries puts the possibility of internally deliberative parties out of reach (Biezen et 
al. 2012; Mair 2013a). Absent active members, it may be said, turning parties into 
 A similar point is made by Jan-Werner Müller (2016, 55-56) in his recent book on the topic: “If there 32
is only one, clearly identifiable people’s will, which the leader or leadership can single out—what does 
one need intra-party debate for?”
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deliberative assemblies in which reasoned collective judgments emerge from the 
membership base is illusory. The membership at the local level is too thinned out and 
fragmented to be meaningfully involved in the party.  
 But whether it is inferred from this that intra-party democracy is generally 
pointless, or that parties should involve more non-members into their democratic 
procedures (for instance through candidate selection methods that include unaffiliated 
supporters), arguments of this kind lack persuasive force. Let me reiterate the two 
replies I have given earlier, in the thesis’s introduction. Firstly, from an empirical 
point of view, one should be cautious with overstating the decline of party 
memberships. Of course, membership parties are not what they once were. But their 
decline is not absolute in the sense that there are no active members left in today’s 
parties.  Secondly, and this is the more important point, bypassing existing active 33
members on the grounds that they are fewer than in the past appears democratically 
suspect: indeed, providing them with inclusive channels to participate has a moral 
claim as a way of recognising their democratic political equality (Wolkenstein, 
forthcoming). 
 A second challenge arises from what Peter Mair has called the growing tension 
between the “demands of responsiveness” and the “demands of responsibility”. 
Parties, the argument goes, are subject to increasing pressure from lobbyist and 
special interests as well as supranational or international bodies that “have a right to 
be heard and, indeed, the authority to insist”, and this makes it more and more 
difficult for them to respond to the demands of their members (Mair 2013b, 145; also 
see Bickerton 2012; White 2015). In Europe, for example, the EU level has assumed 
responsibility in a large number of policy fields, which naturally limits the scope of 
policy goals parties can realistically pursue (Rose 2014). Thus one may say that 
irrespective of what the members decide in their deliberations, party leaders lack the 
discretion to translate these decisions into policies. 
 The problem here is similar to the problem facing parties with regard to their 
voters: institutional constraints reduce the range of policies that can be offered and 
 In fact, several recent studies of party members suggest that “traditional party membership is far 33
from obsolete” (Scarrow 2014, p. 216). Although party membership figures declined in the last two 
decades, the number of politically active partisans remained surprisingly consistent (Ponce and 
Scarrow, forthcoming).
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pursued. But that does not speak against intra-party democracy. There are always 
practical limitations that make the realisation of political goals more difficult, without 
it following that seeking to attain these goals is fruitless. Indeed, even if party leaders 
are bound only to achieve partially integrative agreements in their policy negotiations, 
that they seek to represent the demands of the membership (as well as their 
constituents) would seem a minimal condition for citizens to exercise collective 
political agency. Such is in fact the rationale and justification of intra-party 
democracy, as I have argued at the outset of the chapter. 
 A third objection to the deliberative model of intra-party democracy I have 
proposed raises the issue of the slow-moving nature of deliberation. Finding 
agreements and compromises can take a lot of time when the issues at stake are 
discussed in a thoroughgoing fashion. Does making parties more internally 
deliberative thus involve sacrificing their capacity to act swiftly? If this were so, it 
would give us reason to question the desirability of an internally deliberative party. 
For oftentimes a party must act quickly so as to effectively respond to emerging 
problems, or in order not to be outpaced by its adversaries in a campaign. In these 
situations—often critical moments—there is arguably little time to sit down and 
deliberate about what best to do. 
 This objection is plausible. Deliberation is no doubt a slow-paced activity: its 
emphasis on reflection and dialogue stands in opposition to “fast thinking” (Stoker et 
al. 2016) and hasty decision-making. It is possible to temper the objection, however, 
by pointing out that the proposal of making parties more internally deliberative does 
not involve abolishing the division of labour between party members and party 
officials. On the contrary, the model leaves space for executive discretion. For 
example, while party members deliberate about (say) general policy visions (e.g. in 
partisan deliberative networks) or more concrete policy proposals (e.g. in problem-
oriented fora), party officials could take fast decisions to respond to urgent problems. 
So long as they act broadly in line with the aims and ideals that party members have 
collectively defined, and justify their decisions to the party members, ideally engaging 
in two-way communication with them (e.g. in partisan deliberative conferences), there 
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is nothing normatively troubling about this. In this way, an internally deliberative 
party can retain its capacity to respond to pressing issues.  
 So to sum up, a deliberative model of intra-party democracy faces a number of 
challenges, though none of them would seem to fatally compromise the possibilities 
of it being realised. Doubts are warranted in the light of the dire state of parties in 
Western democracies—but to see the gradual decline of parties as a reason to give up 
on their potential to bring citizens closer to government amounts to questioning 
whether democracy as such is thinkable. To be sure, when it comes to making parties 
more internally deliberative, still much depends on political will. Especially the 
implementation of deliberative institutional designs within parties would require party 
elites to renounce some of their authority and discretion, and one may reasonably 
doubt whether they would readily do so. But these are ultimately secondary points, 
none of which undermine the potential of the model suggested here. Making parties 
more internally democratic requires making them also more internally deliberative. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued for a deliberative model of intra-party democracy that 
centres on the deliberations of the organised party base. This model corrects for the 
adverse effects of standard models of intra-party democracy, and complements these 
models with additional and more empowered participatory opportunities for party 
members. I have suggested that this could help parties revive their democratically 
important linkage function and bring citizens closer to government again. 
 Whether reforming parties in terms of the model I have proposed is viable 
would seem to depend in large part on the deliberative credentials of real-world party 
branches. Demonstrating that citizens can deliberate well is an important way of 
establishing the potential of deliberative institutional designs (see Mackenzie and 
Warren 2012); so it would need to be shown that there is indeed vibrant deliberation 
within party branches. If, contrary to the expectations I have articulated in this 
chapter, it turns out that political discussion in party branches is non-deliberative—if, 
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for example, party members merely vent complaints without reflecting on each others’ 
viewpoints—then the normative claims of this chapter may be treated not so much as 
prescriptions for institutional design, but as a yardstick for measuring how much 
actual parties are failing compared with ideal ones.  Given the evidence I have 34
marshalled in this chapter however, my wager is that members who regularly convene 
in party branches do deliberate well. 
 To find out whether this is really the case, the remainder of this thesis will look 
closely at the deliberations of local party branches. I will address three broad 
questions, drawing on a small body of material collected in group interviews with 
party members in two social democratic parties in Austria and Germany. (1) Do party 
branches provide favourable preconditions for deliberation? (2) Are the political 
discussions in the branches “deliberative”, in the sense that they are marked by 
reflective exchanges of reasons? (3) And what can be done to resolve possible 
deliberative deficiencies? 
 The thesis will proceed as follows. In the next chapter, I outline the 
methodology used to study deliberation at the party base. The subsequent chapters 
look closely at different aspects of partisan deliberation, examining the empirical 
material collected for the purposes of the study. Chapter 3 addresses question (1) and 
asks whether party branches provide a supportive environment for deliberation. 
Chapter 4 addresses question (2) and examines how ordinary partisans deliberate, that 
is, how they argumentatively resolve disagreements. Chapter 5 addresses question (3) 
and discusses cases where, despite favourable preconditions for deliberation, 
deliberation fails, relating the issues raised by these “deliberative failures” to 
questions of institutional design. 
 On the distinction between “yardstick” and “prescriptive” theorising, see Valentini (2012b, esp. 660).34
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Chapter 2 
Studying Partisan Deliberation 
Deliberative democratic theory and empirical social science 
Topics of normative political theory are seldom made the subject of empirical 
research. Empirical and theoretical work tends to proceed on separate tracks, largely 
uninformed by each other. Deliberative democratic theory is an exception. Empirical 
interest in public deliberation has grown considerably over the last decade. The recent 
proliferation of empirical studies of deliberation initiated what has been called the 
“empirical turn” in deliberative democracy, the latest of the many “turns” the theory 
has taken so far (Dryzek 2012, ch.1). Theorists and practitioners of deliberative 
democracy have widely acknowledged that deliberative theory requires an empirical 
check to fully realise its potential (e.g. Bohman 1998; Mutz 2008; Thompson 2008). 
Though empirical research, as one theorist notes, “cannot be either the last or the 
leading word in deliberative democratic theory” (Chambers 2003, 320), it can help 
refine deliberative theory’s guiding principles, render more clearly how deliberative 
institutions should be best designed, and more generally demonstrate that deliberative 
ideas have a bearing on the world out there. 
 One can divide the empirical literature on deliberative democracy into three 
related families. The first deals with the effects deliberation has on citizens. Studies of 
this kind have examined, for example, how deliberation transforms individual 
preferences and perspectives, or how it contributes to the perceived legitimacy of 
decisions (e.g. Gastil and Dillard 1999; Mutz 2008; Druckman and Nelson 2003; 
Barabas 2004; Fishkin and Luskin 2005; Stromer-Galley and Muhlberger 2009; 
Niemeyer 2011; Talpin 2011). The second family is addressed to the structural 
features of deliberation. Scholars have here looked at the ways in which justifications 
are presented or the function of rhetoric in deliberation (e.g. Boltanski and Thévenot 
2006; Polletta and Lee 2006; Ryfe 2007; Black 2013). Finally, in the third family of 
literature, the focus is on the overall quality of deliberation, that is, the extent to which 
real-world deliberation reaches deliberative ideals. The principal aim of these studies 
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is to evaluate a whole range of normative criteria that are thought to be essential 
features of good deliberation in different institutional contexts (e.g. Steenbergen et al. 
2003; Steiner et al. 2004; Hangartner et al. 2007; Bächtiger et al. 2008; Bächtiger and 
Hangartner 2010; Steiner 2012; Lord 2013; Lord and Tamvaki 2013). These three 
families of literature comprise the main empirical work done on deliberative 
democracy to date. 
 Although it draws loosely on the insights of all three families of literature, the 
empirical part of this thesis is mainly concerned with the circumstances and quality of 
deliberation in a specific institutional setting, namely local party organisations. Thus, 
it belongs in the third category of studies. However, it departs from the bulk of the 
existing work in significant ways for reasons to do with methodology. In the next 
section, I explain why and how the approach taken here differs from the majority of 
studies of deliberation quality. In the subsequent sections of this chapter, I introduce 
the research design and case selection. 
Existing research on deliberation quality and its limitations 
In research on deliberation quality, the work of Jürg Steiner and André Bächtiger 
(Steiner et al. 2004; Bächtiger et al. 2008; Bächtiger and Hangartner 2010; Steiner 
2012) has perhaps had the greatest impact in recent years. Steiner, Bächtiger, and their 
collaborators have developed a Discourse Quality Index (DQI), a formal text coding 
scheme to measure the degree to which real-world talk approaches the ideals of 
deliberative theory. The DQI’s codes are based on a set of criteria of good deliberation 
that are derived from classic versions of deliberative theory. Examples include the 
level of justification (how many reasons a speaker offers in support of a claim), the 
content of justification (e.g. whether the speaker refers to the good of a part or the 
good of the whole), and different degrees of respect actors show vis-à-vis others (e.g. 
whether the speaker acknowledges others’ demands and counterarguments). The data 
generated in the text coding is typically used in statistical models to determine the 
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effect of different institutional (e.g. consensus- vs. competitive political systems) and 
sociological (e.g. age and gender) factors on the quality of deliberation. 
 The DQI is undoubtedly the most innovative tool available to empirically 
investigate democratic deliberation. Not only is its operationalisation of the 
“essentials of the Habermasian logic of communicative action” (Bächtiger et al. 2010, 
38) a paragon of making normative theory empirically useable. The fact that DQI data 
can be used in statistical models also brings deliberative democracy closer to 
empirical political science, contributing to cross-disciplinary dialogue (for two recent 
studies, see Lord 2013; Caluwaerts and Deschouwer 2013). Research of this kind is 
important for the acceptance of deliberation as a democratic ideal beyond the 
boundaries of democratic theory, and the DQI’s creators deserve credit for facilitating 
such work. 
 Nonetheless, some problems arise from studying deliberation in such a 
formalistic fashion. On the one hand, there is the methodological problem that formal 
coding bypasses the richness of phenomena pertaining to deliberation. On the other 
hand, there is a related normative problem, namely that the DQI engages a too narrow, 
and thus unnecessarily exclusionary, model of deliberation. Let us examine these 
problems in turn. 
 Beginning with the methodological problem, the DQI elides many contextual 
components of deliberation that can influence the quality of deliberation in important 
ways. One reason why this is so is that it focuses only on text. Consider the example 
of interpersonal respect. With a text-based metric we are able to ascertain disrespect 
only if it comes in the form of speech acts that explicitly degrade others and/or their 
proposals and claims. Once rhetorical devices or gestures are at play, however, this 
becomes much more difficult. These elements of interpersonal communication can be 
hard to detect in transcripts. Yet it seems clear that the respectfulness of a statement 
often depends not only on what has been said, but also on how it has been said. 
Utterances that look respectful on paper might have been made with an ironic or 
sarcastic undertone; and even physical gestures can affect a statement’s 
respectfulness. Losing track of these crucial details may generate a distorted picture of 
deliberation quality. 
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 Another reason why the DQI misses important contextual components of 
deliberation is that it draws on a relatively narrow set of evaluative criteria. Most 
importantly, the DQI evaluates the level of justification by looking at whether, and to 
what extent, an actor provides reasons in support of a proposition and links these 
reasons to the proposition. Moreover, it stipulates that at least two reasons have to be 
offered by a speaker for any proposition to be considered adequately justified (Steiner 
et al. 2004, 172-173). However, in most real world deliberations such extensive 
justification is typically not necessary because participants share enough common 
knowledge to make sense of communicative shortcuts. This is why, as Robert Goodin 
put it (2008, 88), “Rather then belabouring the point, we typically offer the merest of 
gestures towards arguments, expecting others to catch the allusions.” Indeed, we “talk 
principally in terms of conclusions, offering (...) only the briefest argument-sketch 
describing our reasoning leading us to those conclusions” (Goodin 2008, 88). And 
although “brief argument-sketches” do not meet the DQI’s criteria of good 
justification, those addressed might still view the point as sufficiently (and 
persuasively) justified. Therefore, it would seem that a minimum requirement to avoid 
distortion is that researchers are present at the actual deliberations. Researchers need 
to familiarise themselves with the context of talk and, if possible, observe the 
participants in action. This can to some extent alleviate the problem that formal 
coding strips away the context of deliberation. As we shall see shortly, however, the 
normative problem appears unsurmountable. 
 What is the normative problem raised by the DQI’s narrow evaluative criteria? 
It is that assessing the quality of deliberation with a fixed framework of deliberative 
norms pre-empts people’s deliberative capacities. Why? Because deliberative 
communication takes different forms in different social and cultural contexts, and 
there is not just one way of getting it right. As the argument of the previous 
paragraphs suggests, that forms of communication do not fit the DQI’s norms of good 
deliberation need not mean they are less deliberative. Contextually contingent speech 
conventions, norms of politeness, and group dynamics can influence the ways in 
which people address one another in discussions (Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003; on 
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groups and deliberation see also Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2007, esp. 649).  In 35
some environments deliberative processes “are formal or ritualized”, in others 
“informal, even haphazard” (Sass and Dryzek 2014, 4). In some contexts, people 
typically justify their claims with personal narratives or images, in others they may 
draw routinely on more generalisable or logic-driven evidence. In short, a variety of 
modes of talk can display deliberative characteristics. Admitting these in a model of 
deliberative democracy has a moral claim as a way of recognising what is sometimes 
called the “separateness of persons.” 
 The argument from inclusion is usually associated with the work of 
“difference democrats” like Iris Young. In their view, deliberative theory should 
respect people as concrete beings who are embedded in particular social contexts. For 
Young in particular, this is chiefly a matter of avoiding the speech norms traditional 
deliberative democrats avow. She argues that the “identification of reasonable public 
debate with polite, orderly, dispassionate, gentlemanly argument” (Young 2002, 49) 
one finds in much of the classic literature has exclusionary implications. As Sanders 
(1997, 364) provocatively put it, deliberation thus conceived ultimately privileges the 
“[w]hite male with a college degree”. To include people outside an educated white 
middle-class context (and, of course, those inside that context who simply are less 
articulate) into deliberative processes, deliberative theory should, therefore, eschew 
narrow principles of good discourse. Even if some of deliberative democracy’s ideals 
can be meaningfully asserted across different contexts, one needs to make space for 
different forms of expression, including agonistic and narrative speech, understood, 
respectively, as the spirited disputing of competing arguments and the telling of 
personal stories for justificatory purposes.  
 Notice that the normative argument against using the DQI is also more 
consistent with intra-party democracy’s aim to lend ordinary party members voice. To 
 One way of looking at different “styles” of deliberation is to see them as shaped by what sociologists 35
sometimes call “speech norms”. Speech norms are “assumptions about what appropriate speech is” that 
individuals develop and adopt in their peer groups and social environment (Eliasoph and Lichterman 
2003, 739). These norms are likely to influence what people view as good deliberation in that they 
affect what kind of speech people consider respectful, what kinds of justification they accept; and so 
on. A circle of educated middle-class deliberators, for example, might view dispassionate and polite 
talk as most respectful, while in less privileged social contexts more confrontational speech can still be 
seen as perfectly acceptable. Likewise, a group of religious deliberators will see no problem in 
accepting traditionalist arguments with references to a sacred higher order, whilst most atheists will be 
compelled to reject such reasonings. The DQI’s static framework glosses over these important details.
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recall: the principle of intra-party democracy is predicated on the idea that parties 
should permit their broader membership to have a say in internal decision-making. 
The party on the ground includes however people who are likely to not always be 
highly educated and articulate. Thus, limiting our concept of deliberation to the kind 
of rational discussion that privileges “white males with college degree” seems a less 
than promising direction; indeed, it would seem that the emancipatory potential of 
intra-party democracy would be undermined by a such narrow concept of 
deliberation. 
 The argument from inclusion has another important methodological 
implication. If people ought to be respected as concrete, situated subjects, it follows 
that researchers also should take seriously the participants’ perspective when studying 
the quality of deliberation. That is, researchers ought to acknowledge that what good 
deliberation is—that is, what good reasons are, what respectful speech means, and so 
on—can only be properly judged from the point of view of the participants 
themselves. Here again, the DQI proves problematic, for it evaluates the quality of 
deliberation from a third-person perspective and bypasses the participants’ 
viewpoints. In reducing the study of deliberation quality to a text coding exercise it 
gives the researcher the power to decide what good deliberation means without 
consulting those directly participating in it. 
 Bächtiger and his colleagues (2010, 40-41) acknowledge this shortcoming of 
the DQI but maintain that the problem of ignoring the participants’ viewpoint “presses 
less forcefully when judging the formal properties of arguments” as opposed to their 
specific content. They claim, for example, that when it comes to justification the DQI 
can “measure whether an argument is accessible to rational criticism”, and that this be 
a sound “proxy for substantive justification”. But how should accessibility to rational 
criticism be adjudicated if the DQI codes “only assess whether the speaker provides 
supporting evidence” (Bächtiger et al. 2010, 41, emphasis added)? Clearly, the fact 
that evidence is provided does not yet tell us whether that evidence is accessible to 
rational criticism. Evidence may be rational in the most profound sense of the word 
but inaccessible to those addressed, as in a scientific study whose validity can only be 
evaluated by experts. Such evidence may, to borrow a formulation from Rousseau, 
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“convince without persuading”, but it cannot be subjected to critical scrutiny by most 
speakers. So it is highly questionable whether simply providing evidence is a reliable 
proxy for substantive justification. It seems that the burden of taking the participants 
perspective into account cannot so easily be avoided. As we shall see in the next 
section, adopting an interpretative approach is a promising alternative. 
 Before proceeding, though, let us summarise the above discussion. Taken 
together, the arguments examined in this section strongly suggest we should look for 
alternatives to the DQI when studying the quality of deliberation. Although the DQI 
has its merits as a tool that facilitates dialogue across sub-disciplines, its shortcomings 
(which, it should be noted, the DQI’s creators are largely aware of) ultimately 
outweigh its advantages. From a methodological point of view, coding the formal 
properties of deliberation is problematic because it misses important contextual 
factors on which the quality of deliberation often depends. From a normative point of 
view, the DQI’s rigid framework of deliberative principles proves exclusionary vis-à-
vis many different styles of communication that can perform a deliberative function. 
This point weighs especially heavy in light of intra-party democracy’s emancipatory 
aims: to make parties more inclusive and participatory, we ought not limit deliberation 
to forms of speech that ultimately privilege an educated few. At the very least, we 
must acknowledge that different forms of communication can be deliberative. 
Understanding these forms of communication requires us to pay close attention to the 
viewpoints of those participating in deliberation. So even if one thinks that 
insensitivity to context is a price well worth paying for methodological rigour, 
theoretical consistency requires that we take a different approach. 
An interpretative approach to partisan deliberation 
It seems clear now that an appropriate methodology to study deliberation at the party 
base must be particularly sensitive to intersubjective and phenomenological 
considerations. This points naturally to methods that are traditionally classed as 
interpretative. Interpretative approaches, a hallmark of anthropology and qualitative 
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sociology, concentrate on “beliefs, and discourses, as opposed to laws and rules, 
correlations between social categories, or deductive models” (Bevir and Rhodes 2006, 
70). Scholars in the interpretative tradition hold that the meanings of these beliefs and 
discourses can be accessed through interpretation (for a classic treatment, see Taylor 
1971). This means that the researcher needs to draw on his or her own resources 
rather than trying to abstract from them to achieve scientific rigour. The aim is not to 
arrive at generalisations about social behaviour that are divorced from the particulars, 
as in the dominant quantitative tradition of social-scientific inquiry, but to make sense 
of the specific meanings that constitute people’s actions and practices and explain 
phenomena and events “in terms of actors’ understandings of their own 
contexts” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 52).  
 Interpretative approaches typically engage such research techniques as in-
depth interviews, focus groups, discourse analysis, and participant observation. And 
most of these techniques have also been previously used in empirical research on 
deliberative democracy (e.g. Hendriks 2006; Ryfe 2007; Landwehr and Holzinger 
2010). So although there is clearly a growing tendency to study deliberation with 
quantitative methods, there is nothing unfamiliar in taking an interpretative route. In 
fact, echoing some of my concerns with the DQI, much of the motivation underlying 
scholarly support for interpretivism in research on deliberative democracy derives 
from dissatisfaction with the abstractness of quantitative approaches and their 
disconnectedness from the politics on the ground. As Ercan and her colleagues (2015, 
6 and 12) argue in a recent paper, the virtue of interpretative methods is that they can 
“capture the perspectives of participants in the deliberative process” and so provide 
insight into the “lived experiences … and complexities of public deliberation.”  For 36
more practically-minded scholars like Gastil and his colleagues (2012, 222), 
interpretative methods are simply a “pragmatic” choice of method insofar as “the 
meaning of texts [i.e. transcripts of deliberations] can be revealed only by attention to 
the particular context in which it is embedded.”  
 Ercan et al. (2015) list a range of advantages in their paper that I do not mention here. This is 36
because many of the benefits they note refer specifically to the empirical study of “deliberative 
systems”, an approach to deliberative democracy that understands deliberation as occurring in multiple 
spaces at once (such as living rooms, coffee shops, or social movements), and are not directly relevant 
for the methodological propositions put forward in this chapter.
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 A common worry, one that needs to be addressed here, is that interpretative 
methods give the analyst too much latitude for interpretation, at the expense of 
methodological rigour. This worry is usually expressed by those who think that that 
quantitative approaches, which carry the aura of hard science, provide the gold 
standard of social-scientific rigour. Dryzek (2005, 198), for instance, who is generally 
favourably disposed to interpretivism, objects that in much interpretative research 
“too much has to be taken on trust.”  Interpretation, in his view, is eventually 37
“inescapable” in the study of deliberative democracy—but it is “potentially 
deadly” (Dryzek 2005, 198). But the fact that interpretative methods rely on the 
researcher’s situated judgments does not imply that interpretation is completely 
impressionistic and unsystematic; rather, since interpretivism is predicated on 
different ontological and epistemological assumptions than quantitative approaches, 
different standards of rigour apply. Briefly, quantitative methods start from the 
presumption that there is an observer-independent world about which facts can be 
discovered with scientific methods, and correspondingly holds that rigour requires 
subjecting hypotheses to empirical testing. Interpretivism, on the other hand, rejects 
the assumption that there exists an observer-independent world (or at least that such a 
world can be accessed by humans), and looks instead at the ways in which people 
invest the world with meaning by carefully interpreting what they say and do.  38
Interpretative researchers can achieve rigour, then, by saturating their instruments 
with theory and being reflexive and transparent about their approach. In this way, they 
can avoid the pitfalls of unconstrained interpretation. 
 Now, which interpretative research techniques are best suited to study 
deliberation at the party base? Ethnographic approaches certainly provide the greatest 
level of detail and nuance. Recent empirical work based on observation and 
 Dryzek (2005) argues that mixing methods (combining surveys and focus groups, for example) can 37
correct for the weaknesses of individual interpretative methods. But one should be cautious with such 
moves, especially when these involve mixing interpretative and quantitative methods. Different 
methods ultimately rest on different philosophical assumptions, and compounding methods can result 
in philosophical inconsistency. As Ahmed and Sil (2012, 936) rightly note, claims emphasising mixed 
methods’ “ability to reduce error and deliver cross-validated findings are viable only for methods 
predicated on sufficiently similar ontologies and sufficiently similar conceptions of causality.”
 Note that treating the world as a social construct is also more consistent with the idea of deliberation. 38
Deliberation is about exchanging observer-dependent viewpoints, and such an exchange would be 
pointless if it were possible to discover that any of those viewpoints corresponded to an ontological 
‘fact’ in an observer-independent world (see the discussion of inter-subjectivism in Reckwitz 2002).
!64
immersion has proven to afford a crucial insight into the lived experience of 
deliberation (e.g., Baiocchi 2005; Talpin 2011; Doerr 2012). But though this work is 
indicative of the great potential of ethnographic methods in the study of deliberative 
democracy, a purely ethnographic approach appears unsuited for studying the 
deliberations of local party groups. Ethnography is best suited, and usually used, to 
address one case in maximal depth. Rather than aiming at overview or comparison, it 
serves to “chronicle aspects of lived experience” through “immersion in the place and 
lives of people under study” (Wedeen 2010, 257). It seems, however, that we need to 
include some variation in our case selection to meaningfully explore the potential of a 
deliberative model of intra-party democracy. Recall that the party groups we shall 
examine in this study not only exhibit considerable variation regarding the 
sociological composition of participants but also convene with different frequency 
and debate different topics. Because of these differences, taking an ethnographic 
approach and focusing only on one or two groups over extended time is likely to leave 
us with an overly partial picture.  39
 More appropriate research techniques may be found in research with similarly 
exploratory goals as the present study. In her study of the support for public 
deliberation by actors with vested interests, for example, Carolyn Hendriks (2006) 
draws on in-depth interviews and document analysis. Donatella della Porta’s (2005) 
study of deliberation in social movements also uses in-depth interviews, in 
combination with document analysis and focus groups, while Pamela Johnston 
Conover and Donald Searing (2005) use focus groups to enrich survey results and 
content analysis data in their work on the deliberativeness of everyday political talk. 
Like the present study, these studies sought to map uncharted terrain, so to speak. And 
although their results are not generalisable in the strict sense of being statistically 
representative, there is certainly room for some more general conjectures. (When, for 
example, no new information emerges after conducting a number of group interviews 
one may—tentatively and preliminarily—assume that the findings reflect more 
general realities.) 
 I am by no means suggesting that such an approach would not be per se worthwhile. An 39
ethnographic study of activism the party base would be a welcome addition to the bulk of quantitative 
studies of the decline of membership-based politics, and could generate novel insight into citizen 
engagement at the party-public nexus.
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 So, what research techniques should we opt for? Given that the present study 
is addressed to group discussion at the party base, drawing on the insights of focus 
group research naturally suggests itself. Let me first explain in a bit more detail what 
a focus group is and then discuss whether the logic of focus group research can be 
applied to local party groups.  
 First, focus groups are typically understood as moderated thematic group 
discussions that revolve around a specific topic. Ideally people speak openly and in 
their “own language”, with relatively little control imposed by the researcher. In other 
words, focus groups are “artificial deliberations”: insofar as people interact and 
influence each other in discussion, they can “echo the social context within which 
people discuss public affairs” (Johnston Conover and Searing 2005, 273). Their 
scholarly value is two-fold. On the one hand, they allow researchers to investigate the 
meaning of arguments and concepts as people understand them. (Although the 
researcher tends to keep a low profile in a focus group discussion, he or she can 
always ask participants to clarify their statements and elaborate how they arrived at 
their viewpoint.) On the other hand, focus group discussions admit an insight into the 
particular ways in which people discuss. They enable us to gain an understanding of 
what one may call discursive practices, that is, routinised patterns of talk. In short, 
focus groups are not only particularly suited to examine how people reason together, 
but also to study collective discussion from the point of view of the participants 
themselves. 
 If this is so, can we meaningfully draw an analogy between focus groups and 
local party groups? Although local party groupings clearly resemble focus groups, 
they also differ from focus groups in several ways. The most obvious difference is 
that party groups are not designed by researchers. First, typically researchers recruit 
focus group participants according to a specific socio-demographic profile. They 
determine the topic and timeframe of discussion, as well as the number of 
participants. In local party groups, by contrast, participants come from different social 
backgrounds and age cohorts. Discussion topics vary, and the number of participants 
differs from group to group. Second, focus groups are usually discussions among 
people who meet for the first time. Local party meetings, on the other hand, are 
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regular exchanges among people who are acquainted with one another. That party 
groups meet on a regular basis furthermore means that they are likely to exhibit what 
Eliasoph and Lichterman (2003, 739) call a “group style”, that is, they may share 
assumptions about “what the group’s relationship (…) to the wider world should be”, 
“what members’ mutual responsibilities should be while in the group context”, and 
“what appropriate speech is in the group context”. 
 But while it is important to be aware of those differences, the fact that party 
groups have not been designed by researchers certainly does not speak against treating 
them as focus groups. We may here adopt what David Morgan calls an “inclusive 
approach” to focus group research and view focus groups simply as “a research 
technique that collects data through group interaction” (Morgan 1997, 6). On such a 
perspective, informality is one of the core strengths of focus group research. Rather 
than establishing formal criteria of what qualifies as a focus group and what doesn’t, 
methodological restrictions should relate to the researcher’s specific goals and the 
nature of the research topic. So even if the suggested analogy is imperfect in some 
way, party groups can reasonably be treated as focus groups. Of course, we need to 
bear in mind that doing so implies altering the normal course of discussion in these 
groups in significant ways, since in focus group discussions the researcher remains 
foreign to the group, and his or her presence will likely be felt by the participants. 
Thus the researcher cannot simply take the role of an observer. Usually he or she 
needs to ask some introductory questions, breaking the ice, as it were, before the 
discussion can take a more natural course. Moreover, sometimes the researcher will 
be required to intervene in the discussion and remind participants to keep to the point, 
or ask them for clarification (see for example Duchesne and Haegel 2006, 12-13).  40
Outline of the study 
 The researcher’s prominent role in focus group research may lead one to draw analogies to designed 40
deliberation. In designed fora moderators usually have been trained to encourage a deliberative 
discourse. However, in the focus group the researcher’s role is not to ensure that people argue well; 
rather, interventions are generally made to keep the discussion going, and to keep it within the 
boundaries of the theme of interest.
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With these methodological preliminaries in place, I will now elaborate the research 
design of this study. The research with which I examined the deliberative potential of 
local party branches involved using these groups as “natural” focus groups. The group 
discussions that were conducted revolved around two sets of themes. The first, and 
the starting point of each discussion, concerned the group members’ motivation to 
engage in the party, and their experience participating in the party branch’s meetings 
and activities. The success of deliberation depends on the extent to which participants 
(individually and as a group) exhibit traits that are conducive to deliberation, so it is 
crucially important to gain an understanding of the participants’ self-conceptions and 
the reasons for their engagement. For example: Were participants driven by normative 
commitments, or did they join the party for other reasons? And if the former is the 
case, are they highly ideological in their outlook or ready to accept and discuss 
different viewpoints in a critical fashion? Moreover, since group dynamics can affect 
the quality of deliberation, specific attention must be payed to the views participants 
hold concerning the party group and their role in it. Do participants feel themselves to 
be equals in the group? Are there individuals who assume specific roles that might 
affect deliberation, as in dominant or especially articulate characters? 
 The second and more important set of themes the group discussions concerned 
the group’s internal disagreements. Disagreement is usually thought to be a necessary 
condition for deliberation to arise. As one author puts it, “Some basic disagreement is 
necessary to create the problem that deliberative democracy is intended to 
solve” (Thompson 2008, 502). Addressing disagreements served two functions in this 
research. The most obvious is that it made participants talk about past disagreements 
and how they recall resolving them. This not only provides an insight into how 
participants evaluate their own deliberative experience. It also points towards the 
nature and depth of their disagreements, as well as to the quality of their past 
exchanges. At the same time, drawing attention to disagreements in the group also 
proved to make participants take up some of these disagreements and start 
deliberating over them again. It thus created an opening to analyse the actual process 
of deliberation at the party base. The focus was specifically on the argumentative 
repertoires of party members and the fashion in which they address one another (e.g., 
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Are participants disposed to offer one another reasons and to evaluate and respond 
properly to the reasons they are offered?) as well as on the proposals that emerge from 
their giving and hearing reasons. The specific terms of analysis are further explicated 
throughout the empirical chapters of the study. 
 The study focuses on local party groups in social democratic parties in 
Germany and Austria. The choice of countries corresponded to the so-called logic of 
diversity: the two countries are similar on many dimensions, but differ in one 
important respect relating to the potential quality of intra-party deliberation. To start 
with, Germany and Austria are similar in that they are both consensus systems with 
multi-party structures, and tend to have grand coalitions. Since this institutional setup 
presupposes a “spirit of accommodation” (Lijphart 1968), both countries are generally 
likely to exhibit a compromise-oriented Gesprächskultur (talk culture) (Steiner et al. 
2004, 3-4). On the other hand, Germany and Austria differ considerably when it 
comes to the level of what Daalder (1966) calls “party permeation”, that is, the extent 
to which parties reach into the state and into institutions that are formally non-
partisan. Party permeation mainly refers to political patronage exerted by parties, not 
only in the sense of clientelism (i.e. an exchange of such goods as subsidies, access to 
public housing, and jobs for political support) but also in the sense of it being an 
organisational resource. On this latter understanding, patronage represents a form of 
“institutional control or (…) institutional exploitation that operates to the benefit of 
the party organization” (Kopecký and Mair 2012a, 7). 
 Let us briefly zoom in on these differences and then consider how they affect 
the deliberative capacity of party members. In Germany, party patronage performs 
mainly a recruitment function at the top level of the federal architecture (in minister’s 
cabinets, for example). Even at the elite level, however, patronage “it is not always 
party patronage in a narrow sense” since “professional qualification is essential”, and 
has grown in relevance over time (John and Poguntke 2012, 141). Moreover, because 
of their relative ideological and regional fragmentation, German parties typically do 
not coordinate in strategically appointing their members to positions in the civil 
service. In Austria, by contrast, party patronage has been a “mass 
phenomenon” (Treib 2012, 48) in the post-war era up until the 1980s. While 
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patronage used to include a wide range of clientelistic practices, today it serves 
mainly as an organisational resource, subjecting many state-owned enterprises and 
semi-public institutions to partisan control.  However, despite the apparent decrease 41
of clientelism since the 1980s, levels of patronage remain high in Austria in 
comparison with most EU countries, and there is no evidence that patronage palpably 
declined in Austria in the last two decades (Kopecký and Mair 2012b; Ennser-
Jedenastik 2013).  
 One way of putting the point is to say that Germany has a less developed 
“culture” of party patronage than Austria. Whereas patronage is a crucial structural 
feature of the Austrian political system, and widespread across parties’ organisational 
levels (Müller 1989), in Germany it is predominantly exercised by party elites. To be 
sure, in Germany parties control virtually all political offices, and many civil servants 
and public sector employees are party members. But not only did German parties 
never exercise control over formally non-partisan institutions and organisations to the 
same extent Austrian parties did. In sharp contrast to Austria, German parties also 
appear to gradually lose their influence in formally non-partisan domains. This loss of 
influence is traceable in particular at the federal state and local levels—the focus of 
the present study—where “the practice of party patronage has declined because 
privatization has simply removed organizations with very considerable manpower 
from political control” (John and Poguntke 2012, 140). The different levels of party 
permeation in Germany and Austria are also reflected in stark differences in party 
membership size: 17.27 per cent of the Austrian electorate are party members (as of 
2008), compared with 2.3 per cent (as of 2007) in Germany (Biezen et al. 2012, 28).   42
 Why does the degree to which parties reach into state and society matter for 
the quality of deliberation within parties? In Austria party membership is a crucial 
requirement for career advancement and career maintenance in many job fields, 
particularly publicly owned enterprises and the state bureaucracy. So a significant 
 Note though that clientelistic practices have not disappeared in Austria. For example, a recent report 41
in the newspaper Kurier revealed that party membership remains a crucial factor to gain a job with one 
of the federal state’s main gas providers. Even at the level of low-income technicians, party 
membership and/or “referees” within the party were here a crucial prerequisite to gain a job in the 
company. See ht tp: / /m.kurier.at /wirtschaft /wirtschaftspoli t ik/wirtschaft-von-innen-
postenbesetzungen-81-fuer-die-spoe/59.321.018, accessed April 7, 2014.
 By comparison, according to Biezen et al. (2012, 28) the EU (27) mean is 4.65 per cent.42
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number of party members are likely to initially have joined the party to obtain career 
support, rather than to promote specific political ends or give expression to their 
social identity. Career-seeking party members, however, will probably be poor 
deliberators. Not only will they care less about many political issues and thus be 
inclined to be passive when it comes to talking politics. Since other party members 
may be seen as competitors in the struggle for patronage they may also lack the 
empathic outlook towards others that is a prerequisite for good deliberation. Of 
course, career-related reasons for party membership are not wholly apolitical in the 
sense that people will tend not to join parties they find objectionable as a whole. But 
becoming a party member in order to receive political patronage is clearly quite 
different from becoming a party member for reasons to do with political commitment: 
even people who are not initially much interested in politics may join a party if it 
brings with it a significant structural advantage for their career development. 
 Conversely, since German parties exercise patronage mostly at the elite level, 
and since party networks are relatively thin due to the regional and ideological 
fragmentation of parties, incentives to join parties for career advancement are 
altogether smaller. Career-related incentives for party membership certainly exist for a 
number of aspiring public sector employees—but not for the majority of party 
members (John and Poguntke 2012, 142). Especially at the local and federal state 
level where parties lost much of their control over formally non-partisan domains 
party membership will help less for career development than other qualifications. 
Party members in Germany are, therefore, more likely than in Austria to have joined 
their party becomes of genuine political commitment. And party members who are 
driven by political commitment are generally likely to be good deliberators—at least 
much better deliberators than those who are only motivated by career-related 
considerations. Party members who are driven by their political commitment will be 
more dedicated to the deliberative process and more appreciative of the force of the 
issues under deliberation; they will be more aware of the arguments at stake and more 
capable of justifying their position vis-à-vis others and the general public.  
 In sum, because the quality of intra-party deliberation hinges on the extent to 
which people join parties for career-related reasons, we can expect the quality of 
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intra-party deliberation to be lower within Austrian parties than within German 
parties. If the argument I have outlined is correct, Austria indeed presents a hard case 
for any study of deliberation within parties. In a context where disenchanted 
motivations for partisan engagement are likely to prevail, deliberation will 
presumably be rare. If deliberative tendencies can be shown across these country-
specific divides, on the other hand, we have all the more reason to believe that a 
deliberative model of intra-party democracy is a workable ideal. I will return to this 
point several times in the next chapters. 
 One objection facing this case selection rationale is that those party members 
who are willing to invest much of their time (and other resources) in regularly 
participating in local meetings—the subjects of this research—are generally unlikely 
to be driven by career-related incentives. Rather than being dispassionate and 
calculative career-seekers, party members who voluntarily engage in low-profile 
partisan activities of this kind will probably be the most committed party members. In 
light of the apparent disconnect between ordinary party members and party elites in 
today’s parties (Katz and Mair 2009) it seems in fact that one must be hopelessly 
idealistic to engage at the the party base.  
 But this objection is less weighty than might at first appear. As the empirical 
material examined in the subsequent chapters shows, it is certainly possible to find 
highly committed activists at the party base—but given that local party groups are the 
entry point to the party for most people, even those who merely join in order to 
improve their career prospects will often need to get more deeply involved. They will 
have to acquire visibility within the party, and this usually requires engaging first at 
the local level. 
 This reply seems to weaken the force of the objection without entirely 
rebutting it. It shows that a culture of extensive patronage will also affect the party 
base, but it does not resist the claim that there are many local party activists who are 
actually highly committed to the party’s principles and objectives. Yet to say that in 
Austria more party members will be driven by career-related motivations than in 
Germany is not to say that all party members in Austria will be career-seekers, or 
conversely that career-seeking partisanship is non-existing in Germany. The argument 
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advanced rather describes a general trend within party memberships in the countries 
in question, without ruling out that the motivations driving people’s engagement at the 
party base can be diverse. So I do not exclude the option that some party groups are 
unaffected by the tendency described, but assume that these would be exceptional 
cases. Thus the general point holds that the quality of intra-party deliberation can be 
expected to be lower within Austrian parties than within German parties for reasons to 
do with the pervasive presence of career-related motivations for party membership in 
Austria. 
 Next, social democratic parties were chosen because they were traditionally 
parties with large memberships and some commitment to sustaining a broad 
membership organisation. In fact, party branches—our main object of analysis—have 
originated in socialist and social democratic parties. It is worth quoting Maurice 
Duverger ([1954] 1990, 40) at length here: 
The branch is a Socialist invention. The Socialist parties which became organized on a 
purely political basis and direct structure naturally chose it as the fundamental unit in 
their activities. (…) The choice of the branch by Socialist parties was perfectly 
natural. They were the first to try and organize the masses, to give them a political 
education, and to recruit from them the working-class élites. The branch corresponded 
to this tripe requirement. In contrast to the caucus, the middle-class organ of political 
expression, it seemed the normal organ of political expression for the masses.  43
 Now of course social democratic parties underwent considerable changes in 
the course of the last century. With the waning relevance of class-based membership, 
they transformed into strongly hierarchical “catch-all” parties, and indeed increasingly 
resemble professionalised and stratarchical “cartel parties” (Katz and Mair 1995; also 
see Bartolini 2007). (I take no position here regarding the most appropriate ideal type, 
though I would not be surprised if most social democratic parties could best be 
 Duverger also notes that even though branches were “invented” by socialist parties, they generally 43
provided a successful model of party organisation. Since the masses “did not all accept Socialism”, 
“various middle-class parties tried to attract them in their direction by the very methods that were 
making the working-class parties so successful. In many countries the parties of the Centre and even of 
the Right changed their organization and replaced the caucus by the branch as a basic element. Almost 
all the new parties have followed these tactics, but many old parties as well: this is an interesting 
example of contagious organization.”
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classed as hybrids with both catch-all and cartel party features.) But most social 
democratic parties still exhibit one important feature of the mass party model: their 
grass-roots organisations form a core component of the party and tend to be relatively 
densely organised, at least compared with other parties. And even though party 
branches have become less vibrant (some of them have even disappeared), they have 
not altogether vanished (cf. Scarrow 2014). 
 The party branches were recruited with the help of party insiders, notably 
academics who themselves engage regularly at the party base. This strategy was 
chosen because a considerable number of groups at the party base are rather passive in 
Austria and Germany; some in fact exist “only on paper.” Although there is not much 
reliable data available on the activities of local party groups in German and Austrian 
social democratic parties, there is ample evidence suggesting that levels of activity are 
generally low. For example, a 2010 members’ survey by the German SPD found that 
almost half of the responding local party organisations (only 44 per cent of the SPD’s 
4234 local party organisations even responded to the survey) convene only on a bi-
monthly basis, or even less frequently (Butzlaff and Micus 2011, 17). Similarly, recent 
calculations reveal that only 2522 (76 per cent) of the 3312 formally existing local 
party organisations in the Austrian SPÖ exist in reality, notably because smaller 
groups have merged or dissolved as a consequence of falling and ageing 
memberships.  Identifying more active groups therefore requires assistance from 44
people who possess in-depth knowledge of the respective party organisations. The 
general aim was to target groups that convene at least once a month.  
 Cross-regional variation was included with presumed diversity in mind. In 
Austria, two group discussions were conducted in Vienna (SPÖ Sektion Sandleiten 
and Sektion am Wasserturm), one in Linz (SPÖ Sektion Innenstadt-Mitte), and one in 
Gampern (SPÖ Ortspartei Gampern). Vienna is the largest city in Austria, the 
country’s capital, and the SPÖ’s prime stronghold (Micus 2011, 43)—hence two 
groups—while Linz is a medium-sized city and the capital of the federal state of 
Upper Austria. Gampern, finally, is a small rural town in Upper Austria. In Germany, 
one interview has been conducted in Berlin (SPD Abteilung Berlin Mitte), the capital 
 See http://www.spoe-urabstimmung.at/daten-fakten-zur-urabstimmung/#more-428, accessed March 44
31, 2014.
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of and largest city in Germany; one in Bonn (SPD Ortsverein Beuel), the former 
capital and a medium-sized city in North Rhine-Westphalia; and one in Theilheim 
(SPD Ortsverein Theilheilm), a small community close to Würzburg in the southern 
state of Bavaria. This selection of groups follows a similar pattern: one large, one 
medium-sized and one small city. The reason why more interviews were conducted in 
Austria than in Germany is that the SPÖ has a proportionately much higher degree of 
organisation than the SPD (the total numbers of party branches cited in the previous 
paragraph bear testimony to this).   45
 A major challenge in recruiting the party groups was that only very few of the 
groups that were identified as active by the party insiders responded to my initial 
contacting attempts. Many emails and calls remained unanswered, and in some cases 
the party insiders had to intervene on my behalf to make the groups respond. Those 
who eventually responded responded relatively slowly. And about one third of the 
responding groups declined participating in the study for reasons such as members 
being unwilling to have their statements recorded on tape. Those groups which were 
principally willing to participate suggested to make “participating in a social-scientific 
study” an agenda item for the next branch meeting, which members were supposed to 
vote for or against. So in each case, the question of whether or not they want to 
partake in the study was referred to the members of the branch for a majority decision. 
One consequence of this admirably democratic approach was of course that a fair bit 
of time passed from the first contact to the actual interview: on average about six 
months. This considerably slowed down the research process. 
 Given that potentially active party groups were pre-selected by party insiders, 
and given that of these selected groups only a handful was willing to participate in the 
study, the final selection of groups is of course far from perfect. Two obvious 
shortcomings must be made explicit. First, the local distributions of power within 
which the party branches operate are not comparable across all cases. In Berlin and 
Vienna, and in Theilheim and Gampern, distributions of power are largely similar. In 
the two capitals, the respective social democratic parties are the strongest parties in 
the state parliament. In the small rural towns, the social democrats are in opposition, 
 Note: The interviewees’ names were not changed unless they withdrew consent to use their real 45
names.
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facing a dominant conservative party. In Bonn however the SPD is weaker than the 
CDU/CSU—that is, in terms of seats in the city council (Stadtrat), though Bonn’s 
directly elected mayor is a social democrat—while in Linz the SPÖ is by some 
distance the strongest party in the city parliament. Variation of this kind can in 
principle influence deliberation in the party branches. The party’s relative strength in 
the local parliament or council may have an effect on the topics and proposals that are 
being discussed, and possibly on the enthusiasm with which they are discussed. 
Second, the selection of German party branches does not include East-West variation, 
which would seem important given the political differences between the Länder of the 
former East and those of the former West. It is likely that social democratic parties 
face other problems in the East than in the West (for example high levels of 
polarisation over the topic of immigration) as well as other political adversaries (for 
example the radical right-wing party NPD). The case selection controls for neither of 
these shortcomings. 
 Yet although the selection method and the de facto selection of party branches 
is far from perfect in terms of standard case selection practices, a more positive 
interpretation of the case selection rationale can be given. This is that the most vibrant 
groups of party members have self-selected into the final cluster of party branches, 
whereas the more passive and inward-looking groups did not respond to my 
recruitment attempts in the first instance. If this assessment is accurate, then the party 
branches that agreed to participate in the study are likely to represent precisely those 
committed partisan groupings the “deliberative model of intra-party democracy” 
proposed in chapter 1 invests its hope in: small collectives of activists, who seek 
actively to shape policy, and promote their commitments within the party and in the 
local community. The empirical material analysed in the subsequent chapters offers 
much to corroborate this presumption. Thus, even if there are some potentially 
problematic selection biases, the interviewed groups may be seen as paradigmatic 
examples of those local partisan associations that need to be empowered in order to 
revive the capacity of parties to link citizens and government if the arguments laid out 
in the previous chapter are accepted. 
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 Some readers will be inclined to think that this potentially stands in tension 
with the country-selection rationale, which is that there are differences in deliberative 
quality in Germany and Austria due to different levels of political commitment among 
party members. For if the participating party groups are very committed, then they 
might be completely unaffected by the identified differences between the countries. 
But this is not necessarily true. First, in order to obtain party patronage, career-seekers 
will arguably have to join active partisan associations, which are connected to or 
visible for party elites. In passive and disempowered organisations, their efforts use 
the party as a career springboard will likely remain fruitless. Second, even if the 
majority of the selected branches’ members have joined the branches for political 
reasons, some of them might still be involved for patronage-related reasons. This 
might be only a small minority of party members, but they could nonetheless impact 
on the branches’ deliberations. 
Table 1: Overview of group characteristics 
 Table 1 briefly summarises the main commonalities and differences between 
the party branches that were studied for this thesis. Two things most branches share in 
common are (1) the frequency with which their meetings take place and (2) the 
activities in which they engage in their local communities. Most groups meet once a 













































































month, and focus on organising public events of some kind—ranging from talks with 
local-level politicians to children’s parties for the kids of local residents—as well as 
on campaigning and promoting the party’s agenda in the local community. A deviant 
case is the SPD branch in Berlin, which concentrates only on organising public talks 
and does not engage in any other political activity. Where the groups differ most is 
with regard to the socio-demographic composition of their membership, though these 
differences say little about how politically active and committed members are. 
Members of the Berlin and Gampern groups are predominantly young, whilst the 
Theilheim and Vienna Wasserturm groups are dominated by older party members. The 
remaining branches have a very mixed membership as far as age is concerned. 
 Notice furthermore that the members of the branches generally enjoy limited 
access to the party’s higher hierarchical echelons. Exceptions are the Berlin, Bonn and 
Gampern groups, albeit each for different reasons. In the Berlin Mitte group, MPs, 
members of Berlin’s federal state parliament and members of Berlin’s city 
government (Berlin is both a city and a federal state) frequently take part in branch 
meetings. This is first because the branch provides an opportunity for party elites 
easily to get in touch with the party base, and second because party elites are often 
invited to speak at the branch’s public events. In Bonn, on the other hand, contact with 
party elites accrues from the group’s high level of intra-party activity: members 
continually try to exercise influence on decisions that are taken at higher hierarchical 
levels of the party and therefore proactively approach party elites (for example by 
making use of their right to put forward motions to the national party conference 
[Bundesparteitag], a right granted to all branches in the SPD). Moreover, Bonn’s only 
directly elected MP in the Bundestag, Ulrich Kelber, is a member of the Beuel branch, 
which provides the group with a more direct link to the party’s “power centres.” The 
same is true of the Gampern branch, whose chairwoman, Daniela Holzinger, holds a 




In this chapter, I have argued for an interpretative approach to studying partisan 
deliberation, and outlined the research strategy used in the empirical study conducted 
for this thesis. We are now in a position to proceed to the analysis of the data 
generated in the group discussions with party branch members. The following 
chapters explore three different aspects of deliberation in party branches: whether 
party branches provide favourable preconditions for deliberation (chapter 3), how 
partisans deliberate in situations of disagreement (chapter 4), and why sometimes 
deliberation fails despite favourable preconditions (chapter 5). Examining these 
aspects will allow us to see whether a deliberative model of intra-party democracy is a 
viable prospect, and help us better understand the specificities of partisan deliberation. 
Understanding what is particular about the political talk partisans engage in also 
promises to provide leads for us to refine the deliberative model of intra-party 
democracy that was sketched in chapter 1.  
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Chapter 3 
The Circumstances of Partisan Deliberation 
The first foray into partisan deliberation 
In the “deliberative model of intra-party democracy” outlined in chapter 1, the 
deliberations of local party branches are the focal point of membership activity. I 
suggested that empowering these deliberations can strengthen the capacity of parties 
to connect citizens to government and offset the potentially adverse implications of 
non-deliberative mechanisms of intra-party democracy, notably the tendency of these 
mechanisms to reinforce the will of the party elite. My argument was first, that in 
deliberative exchanges, branch members can scrutinise the plans and presuppositions 
of the party elite, and develop positions of their own; and second, that, because 
members of party branches are directly in touch with the citizens on the ground, their 
deliberations are likely to be informed by the demands of the local constituency, thus 
bringing citizens’ preferences to bear on a partisan agenda. 
 So far, so normative. In this chapter, I want to shift the focus to the empirics and 
turn to the interviews with members of local party branches that were conducted for 
this study. The task ahead is to examine what deliberation in party branches looks like 
in practice, analysing both the quality of partisan deliberation and it specificities. 
What I want to look at here, under the heading of the “circumstances of partisan 
deliberation”, is whether party branches provide favourable conditions for 
deliberation. This is an important indicator of deliberative quality, for two reasons. 
The first is theoretical: ever since Jürgen Habermas suggested the possibility of an 
“ideal speech situation”, in which speakers are completely free of coercive influences 
and motivated by the aim of achieving rational consensus, it is assumed by most 
deliberative democrats that good deliberation requires certain enabling conditions (for 
a review of the more recent literature, see Steiner 2012, ch. 9). But even more 
pertinently, I conjectured in chapter 1 that party branches ordinarily provide a 
supportive environment for deliberation. Specifically I argued that branch meetings 
are likely to be marked by a relative equality of opportunities for participants to 
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influence the discussion, and a relative diversity of viewpoints among participants, 
which ensures that issues are considered from multiple angles. In what follows, I want 
to investigate how much these expectations are borne out by the data collected for this 
study, and explore what equality and diversity means in a partisan context. 
Do party branches provide favourable conditions for deliberation? 
If we want to explore whether party branches provide favourable conditions for 
deliberation, this of course raises the prior question of what it means to say that 
“favourable conditions” for deliberation are present in a deliberative setting. What 
exactly are favourable conditions for deliberation, and why would it matter that such 
conditions are given? Let me take the questions in reverse order, since if we do not 
know why good deliberation requires some preconditions, we need not get into the 
intricacies of determining what exactly these preconditions are. To understand why 
deliberation requires a supportive environment, consider what I have said about 
deliberation in chapter 1: it is a very demanding democratic practice, requiring people 
to invest time and intellectual resources in formulating arguments and engaging with 
others’ viewpoints in a respectful and reflective manner. Thus, deliberation would 
seem to require several things to “fall into place”. Citizens ought to display an 
unusual willingness to give thought to the arguments they give and hear.   46
 The question then becomes under what circumstances citizens “display an 
extraordinary willingness to give thought to the arguments they give and hear.” What 
properties must a group of people exhibit for their discussions to become 
“deliberative”? In chapter 1, I suggested that some commitment to discussing politics 
is essential. This is why the deliberative model of intra-party democracy focuses on 
those party members who generally devote themselves more to the party, and actively 
 Note that even though I speak of deliberation being “demanding” and requiring citizens to be 46
respectful vis-à-vis each other, I am not asserting a universal standard for good deliberation here. That 
is, I am not suggesting that there is only one way of expressing mutual respect (for example), and that 
whether participants to deliberation treat each other with respect is, therefore, immediately clear to a 
third party (such as a researcher). Consistent with what I have argued in chapter 2, I think that all the 
demands of good deliberation can find different expressions in different contexts. Thus, the 
“deliberative experience” of citizens is more important than the researcher’s third-party perspective if 
we want to find out whether deliberative demands are met.
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participate in local branches, rather than, say, those who participate only in low-
commitment activities such as discussion in unmoderated partisan online fora. The 
reason why commitment matters is that committed deliberators are willing to engage 
closely with each others’ arguments and that they put special effort into the soundness 
of their argumentation (Fung 2003, 345). 
 But there are several other preconditions for deliberation that appear relevant. If 
we follow the larger part of deliberative theory, we find that two prominent features of 
deliberative fora are typically identified as favourable conditions for deliberation. The 
first is that a diversity of viewpoints is represented in a deliberating group (see e.g. 
Barabas 2004, 689; Jackman and Sniderman 2006; Mutz 2006; Hendriks et al. 2007; 
Thompson 2008, 502; Sunstein 2009, 145-148).  The second is that group members 47
enjoy a relatively equal standing (see e.g. Cohen 1989; Young 2002, 24-25; 
Thompson 2008, 501; Mansbridge et al. 2010, 65-66; Morrell 2010). Scholars of 
course acknowledge that identifying the right preconditions for deliberation is 
difficult since deliberation is a multi-dimensional and sequential phenomenon (see 
Goodin 2008, ch. 9). But it is uncontroversial that an equal standing among 
participants to deliberation and a relative diversity of viewpoints among deliberators 
are key. Thus, I will take these requirements as the baseline for assessing whether 
party branches provide favourable conditions for deliberation. I will refer to them in 
the following as the diversity desideratum and the equality desideratum.  
 If these desiderata sound familiar, it is because I have argued in chapter 1 that 
party branches are likely to satisfy both of them. My point was, first, that the 
integrative force of partisanship can establish a sense of equality among partisans, and 
second, that because members of local party branches are usually voluntary activists 
who pursue a range of different (non-political) careers and come from different age 
groups, it is likely that a broad diversity of viewpoints will be represented in the 
branches. In the remainder of this chapter, I will look at whether these expectations 
are supported by the empirical data collected in the group interviews, and, perhaps 
more importantly, examine what equality and diversity mean in a partisan context. I 
will take diversity and equality in turn, expounding first on their theoretical 
 Scholars use different terms for this, e.g. “cross cutting exposure” (Mutz, 2006) or simply 47
“disagreement” (Thompson, 2008: 502).
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significance and then considering relevant text passages relating to each desideratum. 
Since my concern is with capturing the perspectives of participants in the deliberative 
process and providing insights into the lived experience of partisan deliberation, I 
draw here mainly from the first part of the group discussions, where participants 
discussed their experience of engaging in party branches, paying particular attention 
to the references evoked to describe the regular debates and discussions in the group.  
Diversity 
In deliberative theory, there are at least two arguments for why participants to 
deliberation should exhibit a diverse cross-section of views. Both are essentially 
pragmatic. The first and more fundamental argument is that disagreement among a 
group of people is a necessary precondition for deliberation to arise. Without 
disagreement, there would be nothing to deliberate about; and disagreement 
presupposes that participants hold different views and opinions. Dennis Thompson 
(2008, 502) puts the point in this way:  
If the participants are mostly like-minded or hold the same views before they enter 
into the discussion, they are not situated in the circumstances of deliberation. They do 
not confront the problem that deliberation is intended to address. 
 The “problem” Thompson talks about is that a group of people have to take a 
collective decision on an issue they all disagree on. Deliberation can solve this 
problem insofar as exchanging arguments for and against certain courses of action can 
produce an agreement about how to decide. Or, perhaps more realistically, 
deliberation can yield what Alfred Moore and Kieran O’Doherty (2014) call 
“deliberative acceptance”, understood as a “deliberative agreement to let something 
stand as the position of the group even if its is not fully shared by every members of 
the group” (303). But again, all of this presupposes that participants to deliberation 
disagree on some particular matter. There is not much point in deliberating if there 
exists a pre-deliberative agreement in the group as to how to decide.  
!83
 Of course, there are different types of agreement not all of which threaten 
deliberation: to be in the “circumstances of deliberation”, participants to deliberation 
do not have to disagree on every level. Quite the opposite is the case. Consider 
Dryzek and Niemeyer’s (2006) distinction between normative, epistemic and 
preferential agreement—agreement, that is, about values, facts or preferences. 
Agreement on one of these dimensions can facilitate finding agreement on another. 
For example, like-mindedness concerning the values that should predominate in a 
decision might be an enabler of deliberative decision-making, since it generates a 
sense of equality among speakers and renders appeals to shared ideals immediately 
resonant. I will say more about this later in this chapter and in the next chapter. So, the 
relationship between disagreement and successful deliberation is not linear but 
complex and multidimensional. Thompson’s point is in principle correct but 
simplifies matters too much. Our takeaway point is therefore simply that deliberation 
requires disagreement at some level. Otherwise discussion would hardly arise and 
people would not be put in a position where they are confronted with competing 
arguments about issues that matter to them. 
 The second argument for diversity in deliberative fora contends that a diversity 
of perspectives “ensures that the issue under deliberation is considered from multiple 
angles” (Hendriks et al. 2007, 366). This makes deliberation at once a learning 
experience for its participants, since exchanging differently situated knowledge 
broadens the perspective of all the participants, and improves the quality of decisions, 
since such an “enlarged view” enables participants to find better solutions to 
collective problems (e.g. Gastil and Dillard 1999; Young 2002, 115-118; also see 
Landemore 2012, ch. 4). In addition, diversity is typically said to reduce the 
likelihood of group polarisation, where views are strengthened, perhaps even 
radicalised, rather than questioned and refined (Sunstein 2002 and 2009). The point is 
that insofar as people are confronted with views that are different from theirs, they are 
less prone to overestimate their own moral and factual justness and shift to extremes. 
Notice, however, that even if this looks prima facie like a desirable effect of group 
diversity, it is not so clear whether polarisation is actually something to embrace or to 
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avoid.  As Lea Ypi (forthcoming, 23) notes, whether polarisation is always a bad 48
thing ultimately depends “on the nature and value” of the commitments at stake “and 
on whether there are good reasons for cultivating and seeking to protect and uphold 
specific political projects.” I take no position here on when polarisation is desirable or 
not. Readers can choose for themselves whether they want to take sides in this matter. 
All I want to do is draw attention to the issues raised by this further argument for 
group diversity. 
 These are the main normative arguments in favour of group diversity in 
democratic deliberation. Now, how internally diverse are the party branches that were 
studied for this research?  One of the first notable things about diversity is that, 49
across the different groups, participants repeatedly point to the fact that their group is 
rather heterogenous. Most groups are very diverse in terms of age and social and 
occupational backgrounds, and it is the latter—members’ different occupational 
backgrounds—that participants most commonly identify as the main “source” of 
diversity in the group. Daniela from the Gampern group is not atypical when she 
stresses that “it was not a circle of friends that got together because one shares 
hobbies in common. Rather it’s a ragtag crowd [engaging in the party] in our 
municipality; from social pedagogues to locksmiths…to students.” This connection 
between occupational diversity and a diversity of viewpoints is repeatedly drawn 
when speakers reflect on group composition. Georg in Linz similarly makes a clear 
link to the different professions of the participants: “I think we have a rather exciting 
cross-section [of people] from different domains of society. We all work in different 
fields, and when we discuss together one is being exposed to different points of view.” 
Notice the positive overtone: diversity of job backgrounds is “exciting”; it enriches 
debates. 
 Different views about diversity are found in the Vienna Sandleiten group, where 
participants generally seek to avoid disagreements, and the Berlin group, whose 
members purport to agree with each other to the extent that discussion is unnecessary
 Political scientists tend to disparage polarisation effects, see Hetherington (2009) for a review of the 48
literature.
 A note on the presentation of the empirical material: the symbol ‘[. . .]’ indicates where the text has 49
been abridged; ‘. . .’ indicates where a speaker pauses or trails away.
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—a claim that runs counter to their reports of intra-group disagreements, as we shall 
see shortly. We will return to these two groups in chapter 5, in which we consider 
“deliberative failures” in party branches. 
 A second source of diversity participants single out is age differences. These are 
however not explicitly mentioned as a feature of group composition, but alluded to in 
an entirely different context: as the root cause of recurring disagreements that are not 
enriching but tiresome. Indeed, while participants often explicitly attach positive 
value to differences of opinion that arise from different occupational experiences, 
where present references to age differences tend to conjure an image of avoidable, 
sometimes annoying, conflicts between younger and older participants. An example 
that is mentioned in this connection by both the Berlin and Vienna Wasserturm groups 
are arguments over cycling policy. In both cities, this is a central urban policy issue, 
and there is a natural age gap between supporters and opponents of more space for 
cyclists. The following statement from Julie in Berlin brings out the problem at stake: 
This is an “everyday topic” for me. And it is also a topic that annoys me massively in 
our party … and [it is a topic] where the difference is very big between the younger 
people, who cycle a lot, because that is their means of transportation, and the older 
[people], who never cycle, who also know this from the viewpoint of pedestrians … 
and [complain] ‘again one of them almost knocked me over’. And this often leads to 
… really … these discussions can sometimes get out of control. 
 Julie is a young partisan (she turned 29 shortly before the interview) and 
strongly in favour of making Berlin more “cyclist-friendly”. From her point of view, 
the intransigence of the older generation is hard to understand. She regards the 
antithetical interests and experiences of the younger and the older members as the 
origin of this perennial disagreement, and explains, not without frustration, that in the 
debates about the rights of cyclists basic norms of mutual respect are sometimes 
transgressed. What is interesting is that even though the majority of the Berlin group’s 
active membership is young, once older members attend the meetings these conflicts 
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arise time and again. Participants suggest that this is because of the contentiousness of 
the cycling topic, trivial though it may appear to outsiders.  50
 Speakers in the Vienna Wasserturm group express similar annoyance with 
arguing over the cycling issue. Michaela notes for instance that “one definitely can’t 
reach agreement” on this issue. “Some [members] say ‘the cyclists are all mad and I 
open the door [of the car] whenever I want.’ And when I hit one [with the car] I run 
him over! And the others perhaps want to cycle a bit in the city. And perhaps have a 
few more cycle lanes in the district.” In short, the debate has become too emotional 
and any progress seems out of reach. At best, one can agree to disagree. (As Michaela 
finishes the sentence, Annemarie, one of the older group members intervenes, “No, 
we had enough cycle lanes!”, reigniting the discussion.) Such perceptions intensify 
the negative connotation of the relationship between age differences and diversity of 
viewpoints in some of the groups. 
 However, even if participants look with discontent to those specific conflicts, 
they generally embrace the diversity of viewpoints available in the party branches and 
the disagreements triggered by it. To put it simply, repeatedly arguing with elderly 
members about the appropriate infrastructure for cyclists in a modern city may be 
exasperating, but exchanging viewpoints and hearing different perspectives is 
generally valued. Maxim in Bonn is not the only participant to welcome the perennial 
disagreement in the group: “a party is actually not a place where I look for harmony. 
It is not a place where I look for consensus, but where I want to [engage in order to] 
bring positions ‘out on the street’. […] Disputes are part of the trade; disputes are 
important … it is important that we argue.” So disagreement is widely seen as fruitful 
and productive, as something the groups profits from rather than a reason for 
despondency. 
 To sum up: the dominant pattern across the party groups is that participants 
perceive groups as being characterised by a diverse cross-section of perspectives. This 
diversity is rooted in participants’ different occupational backgrounds, on the one 
hand, and age differences, on the other. So it would seem that the party groups studied 
 One potential explanation for why participants in the Berlin group claim that there are hardly any 50
arguments within the group is that they only refer to the “core team” of young activists, disregarding 
the wider membership of the branch with whom there is plenty of potential for conflict.
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in this research satisfy what I have called the “diversity desideratum”. To be sure, the 
two sources of diversity we have identified have notably different connotations. But 
although disagreements arising from age differences tend to be seen as avoidable and 
tiresome, differences in opinion are not generally regarded as problematic; rather, 
diversity is widely celebrated as enriching the group experience. In the next chapter, I 
will look more closely at the content of participants’ disagreements, that is, what 
precisely they disagree about. At the present stage I am simply trying to explore 
whether the party branches that were studied for this thesis are internally diverse, and 
how their members relate to diversity. 
Equality 
In contrast to the diversity desideratum, the justification of what I have called the 
equality desideratum is not primarily empirical.  On the contrary, this second 51
desideratum derives mainly from a general principle of equality which, in the eyes of 
most democratic theorists, constitutes the bedrock of any plausible account of 
democracy (for a classic treatment, see Dahl 1989, ch. 6).  So it is principled in 52
nature, but it does not require us to endorse a controversial ideal that might fail to 
secure support in our reflective equilibrium. In essence, the equality principle holds 
that democratic politics “requires some form of manifest equality among 
citizens” (Cohen 1989, 69), that is, citizens should enjoy an equal standing in 
democratic procedures. This is instinctively familiar in the context of voting: 
everyone ought to count for one. But what exactly does it mean in the context of 
deliberative procedures? 
 When asked how one should conceive equality in a deliberative procedure, 
deliberative theorists usually insist it involves participants treating each other with 
 Notice though that it can in principle be justified in empirical terms, in that it is quite 51
commonsensical that the demands it triggers produce better discussion in virtually any imaginable 
context. But it would be inappropriately reductive to strip down the justification of equality in 
deliberation to such factual claims. There is a deeper moral dimension to equality.
 Some deliberative theorists operationalise this principle in terms of reciprocity (e.g. Gutmann and 52
Thompson 1996 and 2004; Thompson 2008).
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“mutual respect and equal concern” (Mansbridge et al. 2010, 65-66), though there is 
considerable disagreement about what this entails. Some suggest it requires that 
participants to deliberation listen to each other empathically and try to take seriously 
each others’ concerns (Morrell 2010). Others argue that speakers ought to refrain from 
asserting “their own interests above all others’” or insisting “that their initial opinion 
about what is right or just cannot be subject to revision” (Young 2002, 24-25). 
Ultimately, writes Thompson (2008, 506), “most [deliberative theorists] agree that the 
more the deliberation is influenced by unequal economic resources and social status, 
the more deficient it is.” In what follows, I shall thus employ a deliberately broad 
standard of deliberative equality qua discussion unaffected by status and resource 
inequalities. This is likely to involve empathy, mutual respect, equal opportunities to 
participate in the deliberative process and openness towards others’ arguments, but it 
cannot be reduced to any one of those things. 
 Notice that partisans of the same stripe might be better able to reach the ideal 
of deliberative equality than ordinary citizens. This is because they hold a shared 
commitment to a specific political project, which generates a special connection 
between them that can eradicate obstacles to deliberative equality (such as differences 
in socio-economic status). It is worth recalling a passage by Nancy Rosenblum (2008, 
344) I quoted in chapter 1, in which she argues that partisanship is a particular form of 
“collective identity”, and marked by an “avowed connection to what ‘people like me’ 
value, think, and do politically.” “People like me” refers here not so much to shared 
socio-demographic characteristics like a similar job background, but to similarities of 
belief in the worth of particular ideals, aims and policies. This is why partisanship can 
have integrative force independent of people’s material circumstances. Partisans are, 
to use a term that has become popular in the recent political theory literature on 
parties, political friends (Muirhead 2014, ch. 5; Ypi forthcoming). Moreover, in the 
local partisan groups we concentrate on members will know each other personally, 
and sometimes even be friends outside the arena of political activism. This adds 
another layer of familiarity and equality. For all these reasons, these groups could 
provide especially favourable conditions for the kind of equality deliberative theorists 
would like to see instantiated in political discussion. 
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 How far are these expectations borne out in the group interviews? Overall, 
members describe their meetings as marked by equality and mutual respect. While no 
group of participants describes their group dynamics in the same way, references to 
the fulfilment of different requirements of deliberative equality (e.g. empathic 
listening, mutual respect) were considerably more common than references to their 
non-fulfilment. Sometimes even an explicit connection between norms of equality and 
democracy as a normative ideal was established. An emblematic example of this is a 
statement by Meo from the Linz group, in which he explains that the disposition to 
“put oneself into the position of other members and view things from their point of 
view” is widespread among the members of the group, and goes on to suggest that 
empathic perspective taking is “simply part of democracy”. But though the data 
contains a number of references to aspects of deliberative equality which involve a 
link to democracy or democratic values, such references are altogether rare. That a 
connection between democratic ideals and equality is drawn specifically in the Linz 
group might be because the members of that group are disproportionately educated. 
Some have backgrounds in the social sciences or humanities, and might promote an 
awareness of philosophical arguments for democracy and justice within the group. 
 More frequent than such high-minded statements about equality were 
references which see it expressed in the equal weight that is given to everyone’s 
opinion in the group. Participants generally note that they consider the branch 
meetings a forum in which they can speak their mind and will be taken seriously by 
others; “everybody is entitled to an opinion here”, as one participant in Bonn puts it. 
The data is replete with references of this kind. “It wouldn’t be democracy if we were 
not allowed to state our opinions”, says a participant in the Linz group. Similarly a 
member of Vienna’s Sandleiten group: “We tell our opinion to each other’s faces, and 
we say what we think and everyone accepts that…and nobody imposes anything on 
others.” However, it is also often pointed out that the deeper purpose of speaking 
one’s mind is contributing to the formation of a shared position on a political issue. 
Venting opinions is not an end in itself, a therapeutic exercise in which participants 
“blow off steam”. Rather, participants make efforts to persuade one another of the 
rightness of their point of view, and are ready to be persuaded by others. For Markus 
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from the Gampern group, for example, “the best point of view crystallises when one 
can really convince the others, or when one lets oneself be persuaded that one has 
oneself … thought, as it were, in the ‘wrong direction’, or that the direction in which 
one thinks doesn’t receive the support of the majority in the party group”. 
Dispositions of this kind are palpable across the groups. They become even more 
apparent in the deliberative exchanges that were analysed for this research, some of 
which are presented in the subsequent chapter. 
 If participants freely speak their minds in their regular party branch meetings, 
this implies plenty of potential for conflict, not least because of the diversity of 
viewpoints represented in the groups. But though disagreement is indeed mentioned 
as persistent across groups, it is never seen as undermining the unity of the group. 
Instead, perhaps with the exception of the above-mentioned debate over cycling 
policy, even heated debates are generally described as being marked by the kind of 
good cheer that typically characterises minor squabbles among friends. Maxim in 
Bonn for example stresses with collective approval that “it’s great fun […] when we 
get on to [talk about] concrete topics and rant at each other [sich anschnauzen] in the 
end. And […] we hit the table with the flat of our hands. And in the end we get along 
again…this is how I envisage politics, this is how I envisage discussing, this is how I 
envisage opinion-formation [Meinungsbildung].” Such statements signal that even a 
confrontational style of debate is not seen as violating mutual respect. Participants 
know each other, and generally know their limits. They know that even if debates 
become heated, others will not take it personally if an adversarial tone is struck. 
 There are, however, clear ethical boundaries within which the discussions 
proceed. This emerges most clearly in Vienna’s Sandleiten group, which operates in 
the conflict-laden environment of a large municipal building in which people with 
immigrant backgrounds, and citizens who work in low-income jobs or are 
unemployed, live side by side. In this context, explain the group’s members, treating 
others with equal respect is of paramount importance—and indeed can have a de-
escalating effect. Treating others unequally, on the other hand, is unacceptable: it jars 
with social-democratic ideals. The group’s objective is to set an example, not out of 
necessity but out of moral conviction. Equality in the group means, then, that the 
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background of individuals ought not influence the way in which they address each 
other in political discussion. Bojan, who throughout the discussion emphasises his 
own immigrant background, having moved to Austria from former Yugoslavia as a 
child, explains that this basic rule has never been broken thus far: 
Erik [another member of the group] and I often disagree for example…and we never 
had any conflict. That he would say, ‘you are a Yugo [chiefly derogatory expression 
for people of “Yugoslav” origin], you have no idea’, or that I’d say to him ‘who do 
you think you are, Austrian?’ - that never happened … I never heard anything 
discriminatory from Erik! We always found a compromise. He states his opinion, then 
I explain why and how [I disagree]. But I never heard anything disrespectful from 
Erik. 
 But of course, equality means not only that different countries of origin do not 
play a role in the participants’ interactions. Other salient socio-economic differences, 
such as different educational backgrounds, are also irrelevant, in the sense that those 
who are more educated do not use their education to overrule those with a different 
background. “I never heard Elisabeth [the group’s chairwoman, who is the only 
member of the group who has a university degree] say ‘I am a university graduate and 
you [the other group members, who are on average much less educated] don’t know 
what’s going on’”, Bojan goes on. “On the contrary!” In short, deliberative equality 
qua discussion unaffected by status and resource inequalities is clearly palpable here. 
 The sources of mutual respect in particular and the equal standing participants 
enjoy in general are rarely rendered explicit in the discussions. Only in the Linz group 
do references to a “source” of equality emerge: participants single out their joint 
commitment to the party as the “foundation” on which their discussions proceed. A 
shared sense of dedication to a collective political project is seen by participants as 
exercising a more general enabling and constraining effect on their interactions, 
shaping the way in which they relate to each other. But perhaps the fact that 
participants in other groups do not make explicit what exactly it is that promotes 
equality among them reflects that they take some sort of “common foundation” for 
granted. Perhaps they presume (ex hypothesi) that those with whom they deliberate in 
the branch meetings are driven by similar concerns simply because they engage in the 
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same political party. Lending support to this interpretation is that in each group 
participants record a strong commitment to the party as the principal reason for their 
political engagement. Participants are unequivocal that they widely seek to promote 
similar normative commitments, and the value of these commitments is assumed 
without discussion. To cite just two illustrative examples, while Gisela in Bonn 
stresses that she joined the SPD “out of my political conviction … my concerns were 
always: peace, social justice and gender equality”, Markus in the Vienna Wasserturm 
group notes “the belief in, and struggle for, a better, more solidaristic society” as his 
main motivation to engage in the party.  
 There is of course a great deal of indeterminateness in these statements. But 
perhaps this is part of what it means to be a partisan. As Nancy Rosenblum has 
recently argued (2008, 340), party identification is “based on a voter’s mental image 
of who partisans are, of the party as a social group”, and “partisan self-conceptions 
much more closely resemble ethnic or religious self-conceptions than they do 
evaluations of political leaders, opinions about party platforms, or voter intentions.” If 
this is correct (I believe it is), then it is no surprise that participants have very personal 
reasons to why they identify as partisans and what the party means to them. In a 
sense, partisans’ shared normative commitments involve what is sometimes called 
“incompletely theorised agreements” (Sunstein 1998). Partisans, that is, may invoke 
many different grounds for their shared beliefs about what the party stands for and 
what aims it should pursue. 
 The flip side of having shared normative commitments is having common 
adversaries, and the data contains material suggesting that this also strengthens 
equality among branch members. Rival parties, rival partisans, and indeed non-
partisan agents who pursue goals that are seen as being at odds with those of the party 
(sometimes a whole organisation, sometimes specific individuals) are identified as 
adversaries in the Theilheim, Bonn and Vienna Wasserturm groups. And where 
adversaries are identified, participants often make explicit that their presence 
buttresses group unity, in terms of fostering a sense of being “equally committed to 
prevailing over one’s rivals” among the members of the group. The rival parties or 
partisans who are singled out as adversaries are mainly the other large “people’s 
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parties” in the two countries—the CDU and CSU in Germany, and the ÖVP in Austria
—and specific members of these parties.  Non-partisan agents that are mentioned as 53
pursuing conflicting, sometimes even repugnant, political goals include lobbyist and 
special interests. In the eyes of many participants, for example, transnationally 
organised business interests seek to impose the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) onto European countries, which undermines the ability of those 
countries to effectively regulate big firms and enforce standards of product quality 
and social protection. To be sure, references to such actors often remain vague: who 
exactly those adversarial actors are is left open. But insofar as participants define their 
own position against the position of these actors, there can be no doubt that these 
“indeterminate adversaries” perform the same unifying function as more concretely 
identifiable rivals. 
 As one would perhaps expect from activist groups at the party base, moreover, 
some participants also view the party leadership as rivals, in the sense that they accuse 
them of ignoring the party base and promoting policies that run counter to the party’s 
lead principles. Bernd in Theilheim is only one of many participants across the groups 
who complain that “the party base is simply being ignored…and that entails that the 
party ‘overtakes’ the base on the right [rechts überholen, figuratively for being more 
right-wing in one’s political views than someone else].” But such views are never 
shared by all the members of the group. In each group, some participants vocally 
endorse the party’s general direction. So even if a number of participants define their 
own positions as incompatible with those of the party elite, the party elite is not one of 
the “shared adversaries” that strengthen equality among members. In fact, given that 
many groups perceive a considerable distance between themselves and the party 
leadership one would expect the motif of the party elite as adversary to be much more 
prominent. 
 Sometimes participants overdraw the unifying effect of common adversaries. 
Asked whether the group experiences internal disagreements, for example, Marita in 
the Theilheim group responds, “not at all.” Bernd, in turn, adds that this is because of 
“our common ‘bogeyman’”, meaning the town’s mayor, whose politics they 
 These parties are identified as adversaries despite the fact that the social democrats are in a coalition 53
government with them at the state level in both countries. 
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passionately oppose. By and large, however, there is little evidence in the data that the 
existence of common adversaries can eradicate internal disagreements. It is of course 
important to recall here that the Theilheim branch operates in a rather hostile political 
environment, where a rival party (the conservative CSU) holds the absolute majority 
of seats in the local council and thus significantly constrains the social democrats’ 
ability to shape local politics. So what might lead participants to overstate the 
“enemy-character” of those wielding political power in their community is their own 
inability to influence local politics. But even in Theilheim the divisions between 
different parties are barely as severe as the just-cited passage suggests. At a different 
stage in the interview Marita emphasises that in small municipalities like their own 
“one should seek to jointly work for the good of the community” and “put ideological 
conflict to one side.” Thus in spite of deep-seated rivalries some participants exhibit a 
belief in the worth of cooperation across party lines. 
 In short, it seems that there is an inclusionary and exclusionary side to having 
and upholding shared normative commitments. We may say, with Nancy Rosenblum 
(2008, 358), that there is always a partisan “we” that “aspires to be as inclusive as 
possible” while “casting the partisan ‘other’ as sectarian, narrow, and few.” This 
relationship between “partisan we” and “partisan other” shapes the way in which 
equality manifests itself within the partisan groups. Participants stand for something, 
and this standing for cultivates a sense of equality among partisans that is not 
reducible to any prior identity participants share. And they also stand against 
something else, and reminding themselves of who their adversaries are (and of why 
they are adversaries) in its turn reinforces the feeling of jointly standing for 
something. 
 Accepting this reading of the material, can it be said that the party members’ 
experience of equality in their group meetings satisfies the demanding equality 
desideratum? I think yes. What emerges from the above discussion is certainly a 
complex picture: equality among participants takes different forms across the groups, 
and it can hardly be said that one particular manifestation of equality is dominant. But 
regardless of this variation, the evidence examined suggests that participants face a 
relatively “level playing field” in their regular deliberations. They can freely speak 
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their minds, and can expect others to listen respectfully, possibly even empathically. 
Sustained and enhanced is this basic sense of equality by a pre-deliberative agreement 
on certain political commitments, on the one hand, and by the corresponding 
awareness of common adversaries, on the other. Interestingly, although there exist 
personal friendships among participants (as many of them acknowledge during or 
after the interviews) they make no mention of them as a potential source of equality in 
the groups. Nor is there any evidence suggesting that tacit knowledge of friendships is 
pertinent to the equal standing participants enjoy. What establishes and sustains 
equality seems to be the shared commitment to certain ideals, aims and policies. 
Discussion 
Table 2 summarises the observations of this chapter, highlighting the relevant patterns 
that have emerged from the empirical analysis that was carried out. Divided into four 
boxes, the table recapitulates both what diversity and equality mean in the context of 
the partisan groups, and where diversity and equality flow from. One striking 
discovery is the generally positive view of difference and diversity. Participants 
regard the plurality of perspectives present in the groups as widening their own 
perspective and so making the discussions more rewarding. With the exception of 
some age-difference related disagreements, they appear to thrive on disagreement and 
debate. One may say that this reflects a highly “deliberative attitude” in the sense that 
it signals that participants are willing to reflect on their own standpoints and 
preferences in light of arguments put forward by their peers. This lends credence to 
the first chapter’s claim that, in intra-party deliberation, partisanship is not an obstacle 
to deliberation but may in fact be conducive to it. 
 If one presumes that those who actively engage at the party base are the most 
dogmatic and intransigent partisans, as both the ordinary folk understanding of party 
politics and mainstream political science tend to do, this is certainly an unexpected 
finding. If we follow John May’s still much-cited “Law of Curvilinear 
Disparity” (1973), for example, we should expect members of party branches to be 
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not reflective but uncompromising with respect to their own standpoint. We should 
expect them not to relish disagreement but to be overly concerned with group unity 
and sceptical of division. However, none of this is the case in the groups that have 
been studied for this research; quite the opposite.  The idea that active party members 54
are naturally unyielding zealots might have intuitive appeal, but this research finds 
little evidence in support of it. This also means that empowering the active party 
members would not result in them imposing vote-losing policies on the party because 
of their extreme views. We can confidently discard this worry. 
Table 2: Preconditions for deliberation in party branches 
 This leads to the—perhaps also surprising—expectation that deliberation 
among partisans has the potential to reach a high quality. Contrary to the presumption 
of classic deliberative theory that partisan commitments pose an obstacle to good 
deliberation (I have touched on this in the introduction and briefly in chapter 1), and 
contrary to the slightly more favourable recent assessment that deliberation among 
partisans merely “fails to rise to the level political philosophers model or democratic 
theorists organize in actual experiments” like deliberative polls but still “conforms to 
a latitudinarian view of argument and evidence employed in the process of negotiating 





equality mean in 
the context of 
party branches?)
Different viewpoints in the group enrich 
debates and make them more rewarding; 
disagreement is a part of the political process, 
and one to be embraced.
Variation: Disagreements are avoided in the 
Vienna Sandleiten group.
Being able to speak one’s mind, be heard and 
taken seriously.
Being considered equal regardless of socio-







Connotation: positive, contributing to an 
overall broader perspective on issues
Age differences
Connotation: primarily negative, resulting in 
unnecessary and unresolvable disagreements 
Tacit: agreement on shared principles, aims 
and policies.
Explicit: common adversaries, i.e. rival parties, 
partisans or non-partisan agents pursuing aims 
contrary to the party’s
 Note that there is some evidence suggesting that the Law of Curvilinear Disparity is empirically 54
groundless (Norris 1995; Scarrow and Gezgor 2010; Scarrow 2014). However, none of these studies 
look in detail at the political views and ethics of party activists, drawing instead only on large-N survey 
data. This leaves open many questions concerning the ideological dispositions of party activists.
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and compromise” (Rosenblum 2008, 361), partisans might turn out to be model 
deliberators—if not in the sense that their discussions exhibit all the features theorists 
ordinarily wish to see present in political discussion, then at least in the sense that 
they are better than ordinary citizens at discussing respectfully in circumstances of 
disagreement.  The requisite preconditions are certainly in place. 55
 Another notable observation relating to participants’ deliberative capacity 
concerns the tacit agreement on shared principles that shapes the way in which they 
relate to each other (and to the world outside the group and the party). Insofar as this 
agreement exercises an enabling and constraining effect on participants’ interactions, 
it forms a central pillar of what sociologists sometimes call “group style”, that is, a set 
of shared assumptions among members of a group about “what the group’s 
relationship (imagined and real) to the wider world should be”, “what members’ 
mutual responsibilities should be while in the group context”, and “what appropriate 
speech is in the group context” (Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003, 739). This has 
implications not only for how equality is practiced in the group (whether people can 
speak their minds; be taken seriously by others; and so on). It plausibly also 
influences participants’ justificatory practices (how they present their arguments so as 
to render them acceptable to others in the group). This is because an implicit 
consensus on “what appropriate speech is in the group context” entails not only that 
(for example) certain forms of explicit disrespect are ruled out but also that there 
exists an understanding among participants as to what kinds of argument will carry 
persuasive force. Discursive exchanges will therefore be more successful in the sense 
that agreements on contested issues can more easily be found. If this is correct, then 
we have another argument in hand for why deliberation among committed partisans 
may be especially fruitful. 
 Finally, it is important to mention that contrary to expectations, the evidence 
examined in this chapter does not reveal noticeable differences between the two 
countries under study. Recall that in the previous chapter I have hypothesised that 
German parties are likely to be more “deliberative” than Austrian ones, since in 
 Obviously, we are here looking only at deliberation among fellow partisans, and not at deliberation 55
across party lines. Inter-party deliberation is likely to look very different from intra-party deliberation, 
even if the latter is of high quality. But this is not the focus of this study.
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Germany party membership is less often motivated by career-related considerations 
than in Austria. This expectation has not been borne out here. One possible 
explanation for this is that those members who only joined the branches in order to 
obtain patronage or other career benefits have remained quiet during the interviews 
(in each group, some participants did not speak up), or simply chose not to participate 
and abstain from the group’s meeting when the interview took place. Alternatively, it 
might be the case that career-seeking members seldom join active and politically 
committed party branches of the kind that was studied for this thesis. Given that it is 
hard to ascertain on the basis of the available evidence why the presumed differences 
between the two countries did not reveal themselves, however, I shall take no position 
on which of these explanations is more plausible. The point to note is that there is a 
significant mismatch between expectations and evidence in this particular respect. 
This is arguably a good thing: if party branches provide a supportive environment for 
deliberation even in contexts where career-related motivations for party membership 
are likely to prevail, we have all the more reason to see the realisation of a 
deliberative model of intra-party democracy as something that is not contingent on 
contextual factors. At the very least, we should not think of the context in which party 
members deliberate as exercising a deterministic effect on their deliberative capacity. 
The subsequent chapter corroborates this conclusion. 
Conclusion 
The introduction of this chapter poses a question: do party branches provide 
favourable preconditions for deliberation? To find out, I have explored whether the 
two basic desiderata of equality and diversity are satisfied by the party groups. The 
answer that has emerged from the analysis is that these desiderata are indeed satisfied, 
and that party branches, therefore, do provide an environment that is conducive to 
good deliberation. In the next chapter, I will look at the actual deliberations that occur 
in the branches, considering first the content of the disagreements facing branch 
members and then their reason-giving practices.  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Chapter 4 
When Partisans Deliberate: Disagreement and Justification 
In our politics each major party has become a compound, a hodgepodge, 
of various and conflicting interests; and the imperatives of party struggle, 
the quest for victory and for offices, have forced the parties themselves to 
undertake the business of conciliation and compromise among such 
interests.—Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System 
Preliminaries: the party as compromise 
Originally intended to describe the great American parties in the age of Jefferson and 
Madison, the above quote captures an important truth about political parties: parties 
are always a compromise. Even if partisans broadly agree on what principles should 
inform political decisions, they are not protected from conflict. Due to the plurality of 
different interests and preferences within parties, “intra-party dissension flares all the 
time, unsuppressed” (Rosenblum 2008, 361). Therefore, partisans need to “undertake 
the business of conciliation and compromise”. They need to accommodate dissenting 
voices and find middle ground on potentially divisive issues. Otherwise the unity of 
the party and its collective capacity to act are at risk (cf. Boucek 2012). 
 The requirement to negotiate compromises arises not only among policy-
making elites at the top level of the party. Often it also arises at the party base. The 
organised members, like those who engage in local branches, tend to disagree about a 
plethora of issues. One classic example is the impact and defensibility of the party 
leadership’s decisions. Was it right to coalesce with party X? Did it cost votes to 
promote policy Y? Ought we take a different stand on issue Z? Another set of issues 
organised members routinely disagree about concerns concrete courses of action they 
might pursue. How should the next campaign be framed? What can be done 
effectively to address pressing problems in the community? What stakeholders should 
we cooperate with in the pursuit of shared goals? In all of these cases, finding 
compromise is important in the sense that it is a prerequisite for concerted action. 
Without some sort of agreement on what the position of the group is on those matters, 
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the group will struggle to exercise collective agency (cf. List and Pettit 2011, ch. 2).  56
In other words, if partisans fail to agree, they will likely fail to act. 
 Normatively, there are at least two reasons for why the organised members at 
the party base should be capable of acting together. Firstly, the collective capacity to 
act is necessary in order for the party base to effectively contest the decisions of the 
party elite. Internal dissent is unlikely to be heard and taken seriously if dissenters do 
not speak with one voice and act in unison. This point is especially pertinent in the 
context of the model of intra-party democracy I have defended in chapter 1, which 
proposes the empowerment of the organised membership as a way to strengthen 
parties’ capacity to provide linkage.  Following this model, successful preference 57
transmission from the bottom up requires that members jointly question the position 
of the party elite and promote alternatives that are grounded in their own 
deliberations. Secondly, the collective capacity to act is crucial when members at the 
party base could take actions that would improve on the status quo and be backed by a 
majority of those affected—for example helping to promote a policy that the local 
community would benefit from, and that the larger part of its denizens would endorse. 
No doubt a failure to act here would not be normatively neutral, since it would favour 
the status quo and potentially disempower collective responses to emerging or long-
standing problems. 
 These preliminary reflections serve to remind us of the wider significance of 
effective deliberation within parties. The success of internal deliberation is an 
important determinant of the ability of the organised party members effectively to 
address local problems, and correspondingly impacts on their trustworthiness as 
 I say “some sort of assent” because an agreement to let something stand as the position of the group 56
can take different forms. It can take the form of full normative unanimity, for example. This occurs 
when the members of the group through discussion come to share beliefs. But it can also involve only 
partial normative unanimity, by which is meant an agreement on a group position without unanimity at 
the level of the substantive belief itself (see Moore and O’Doherty 2014, 303-305).
 Note: as far as the party’s overall capacity to act is concerned effective internal dissent might have a 57
decreasing effect—that is, if there can be no quick compromise found between the party elite and the 
organised members. It is a recurring finding in the empirical political science literature on parties that 
internal divisions undermine parties’ agentive capacities (and lead them to de-emphasise policy) (e.g. 
Katz 2014). This presents us with a complicated trade-off in which the value of intra-party democracy 
needs to be balanced against the value of a party’s general agentive capacity. Though I cannot discuss 
all the intricacies of this trade-off here, I suspect that no definitive rationale for why one should be 
privileged over the other can be given. Much seems to depend on the gains and losses action or non-
action brings with it.
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collective agents who are capable of changing political institutions in accordance with 
their normative commitments. Be that as it may, my primary concern in this chapter is 
not with what happens once deliberation has concluded. Instead, I will focus on how 
members of party branches discuss in circumstances of disagreement. So the chapter 
shifts the focus of the analysis from the preconditions for deliberation in party 
branches to actual deliberative practice.  
 I begin in a plain and descriptive fashion by listing the kinds of disagreements 
that arise in branch meetings, distinguishing between disagreements about 
organisational issues and disagreements about societal issues. I then clarify how I 
understand and operationalise the concept of justification in a brief excursion into 
democratic theory, before embarking on an in-depth analysis of two selected text 
passages. These two exchanges exemplify the type of political conversation one 
appears likely to find in party branches, exhibiting patterns that are dispersed more 
widely across the groups. In the course of the analysis I will also foreground what’s 
distinctive about deliberation among partisans, weaving the findings into the bigger 
picture that has emerged so far. 
Domains of disagreement 
In the previous chapter I have argued that disagreement is an important prerequisite 
for deliberation, and I have shown that, in party branches, disagreement arises for 
reasons to do with group diversity. What I have said little about was what branch 
members actually disagree about. Now I want to zoom in on the content of the branch 
members’ disagreements. In chapter 3 we have already encountered one concrete 
issue of conflict, namely cycling policy; but there are also other areas of 
disagreement. Indeed, the data from the group discussions suggests that participants 
disagree on a wide range of issues. While there appears to be among participants an 
agreement on the values that should predominate in the making of policy, differences 
surface when it comes to epistemic and preferential questions, that is, when it comes 
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to beliefs about the impact of a policy or a given course of action, as well as the 
expressed preferences for a policy or a course of action. 
 For purposes of analysis, a distinction can be drawn between two main domains 
of disagreement. The first and perhaps more common one encompasses matters 
relating to the strategy and organisation of the party. I call disagreements that belong 
in this domain disagreements about organisational issues. In these kinds of 
disagreement, participants are divided over such issues as the appropriate strategy of 
the party elite vis-à-vis political adversaries or coalition partners; the degree to which 
members should be involved in internal decision-making; or the future of the party 
more generally (disagreements over these particular issues arose across the groups). 
Usually divisions run here between (a) participants who hold what one might call 
“pragmatic” views, and see strategic behaviour and compromise as necessary for 
holding on to power and exercising influence on policy, and (b) participants who 
endorse what one might call “purist” views, and wish to see the party adopt a more 
principled, indeed sometimes uncompromising, approach in reaching certain political 
and organisational goals. This divide between “pragmatists” and “purists” in fact 
seems to be another important source of diversity in the groups. Even though it 
remains unmentioned in participants’ reflections on their deliberative experience in 
the group, it becomes readily apparent in the deliberative exchanges. 
 Notice that the pragmatist-purist divide that cuts through the party branches 
challenges two commonplace assumptions in political science. One is that activist 
groups at the partisan base are uniformly purists (the classic exposition of this view is 
May 1973). The other is that, insofar as there exists an ideological gulf between 
purists and pragmatists, this runs between the party elite (who are pragmatists because 
they have to compromise in order to win elections and govern) and the party base 
(who are purists because they care about principles and want to see these principles 
realised in full), but not across the party base (for such a perspective, see e.g. Katz 
and Cross 2013, esp. 171). As I have already suggested in the previous chapter, it 
seems that the party branches are much more internally complex than one would 
expect in light of the contemporary political science literature on the topic. 
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 The second domain of disagreement, then, involves what I call societal issues, 
that is, issues to do with grievances that are manifest in the local community or 
society in large, usually with more or less direct policy implications. Examples 
include growing social inequality, rising living costs, and public fear from 
immigration. Typically these kinds of issues are brought up in connection with 
references to current public debates, or in connection with the personal experiences of 
participants. These references in turn often serve as a point of orientation for the 
discussion. Principal causes of disagreement in this domain are contrasting personal 
experiences and different viewpoints on which values (of those that are central for the 
party) should inform the party’s stance on a given issue, or how specific values should 
be interpreted. A major reason why there exist different positions on the relative 
priority or substantive interpretation of values is, again, the pragmatist-purist divide 
within the groups. Those with a more ideological outlook tend to argue for a narrow 
interpretation of values, or assert that some values are too central to be compromised 
in the making of policy. The pragmatists, on the other hand, usually do not disagree 
about which values should predominate but tend to regard an outspoken commitment 
to certain values as compatible with a cooperative and compromising outlook. For 
them, what counts is concrete political achievements, not maintaining ideological 
purity. 
 Table 3 presents an indicative (but not exhaustive) list of points of disagreement 
participants mentioned in the group interviews. 
Table 3: Issues of disagreement 
Organisational Issues Societal Issues
• Is the party leadership committed to internal 
democracy?
• Are direct-democratic forms of intra-party democracy 
preferable to delegated ones?
• What is the best electoral strategy for the party in EU 
elections?
• Is the current party leader capable of winning the next 
election?
• Should the party conduct more sociological studies 
about its constituency to better meet their demands?
• Who should gain a place on the party list in the 
forthcoming council elections?
• How can more social housing be provided in the 
community?
• What can be done about the rising rents facing the less 
well-off?
• Should the minimum wage be raised?
• What can be done about the adverse affects of 
inflation on people’s lives?
• Should a (local) tramway line be extended?
• Does TTIP (and especially ISDS) endanger 
democracy?
• How can people living in poverty be appropriately 
supported?
• Should more bike lanes be built in the city?
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 What this list shows is that branch members problematise topics with direct 
implications for both the structure of the party they support and the political 
community in which they reside. Their discussions do not only touch on purely local 
issues or on intra-party politics. Nor are they exercises in non-decisional, purely 
theoretical reasoning. Even if individual branches have no authority to make final 
decisions regarding many of the topics under deliberation, each branch counts as a 
locus of practical reasoning. All of this lends more weight to the idea, developed in 
the foregoing chapters, that party branches are promising sites of deliberation. To be 
sure, whether the actual discussions of branch members actually qualify as 
deliberative has yet to be established. This is examined later in the chapter in an 
analysis of two particular instances of disagreement within the branches. The next 
section introduces the main category of analysis: justification. 
Justification: norm and practice 
The main question I want to address in this chapter is this: if the members of party 
branches disagree over a wide range of issues, and if their meetings provide 
favourable preconditions for deliberation, how is disagreement being dealt with in 
practice? What I want to do in particular is look at practices of justification among 
branch members, which serve as an indicator of how well conflict is discursively 
processed. First, though, we have to get clear about what precisely justification is, 
why it is normatively important and how we can operationalise it for empirical 
inquiry. This requires a brief excursion into democratic theory. 
Justification as a normative ideal 
Justification or “reason giving” is a central requirement in all theories of deliberative 
democracy (for overviews, see Thompson 2008, 495; Chambers 2010, 895). It is often 
indeed treated synonymous with deliberation; so it is perhaps the central requirement 
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of deliberative democracy. In essence, the justification requirement stipulates that 
participants to deliberation should offer each other an account of their viewpoints, 
providing reasons for why they think as they do.  Importantly, justification is 58
conceptually distinct from explanation in that it involves speakers “recommending” 
their views to one another, framing their reasons in such a way that they can be 
appreciated even by those who are initially inclined to disagree. This means, for 
example, that a view or a proposal is presented as reflecting values that others could 
come to share. Explanation also involves the provision of reasons (accounting for the 
emergence of, say, a particular problem), yet not necessarily an effort on the part of 
the speaker to present her arguments in such a way that those addressed could accept 
them. In other words, it does not require that the reasons one gives are placed in a 
favourable light.   59
 Why is justification thus central in deliberative theories? The answer is that 
most deliberative democrats regard justification as nothing less than a moral 
requirement. The lineup here includes such influential theorists as Amy Gutmann and 
Dennis Thompson (1996 and 2004), Joshua Cohen (2009) and Rainer Forst (2007). 
There are many differences at the level of detail among the specific theories of these 
authors, but by and large they all agree that citizens have an “obligation to justify to 
one another (…) the laws and policies that govern their public life” (Gutmann and 
Thompson 2004, 134). This obligation is derived from citizens’ more general moral 
duty to respect each other as free and equal. When we fail to justify to others the rules 
we would impose on them, so the argument goes, we flout our duty to respect them as 
 Notice that this point is rarely presented in such a stripped-down version. It usually comes with a 58
number of provisos, which are equally derived from moral considerations. One standard qualification is 
that justification ought to be practiced in public. This is because when “public things” that affect the 
political community as a whole—like laws, constitutions or the basic social structure—are at stake, the 
addressee of justification ought to be the public in large; private conversation does not suffice. Another 
typical caveat is that citizens are obliged to limit their justificatory efforts to providing only reasons of 
a certain kind, though what this exactly means is contested. Especially theorists who traffic in public 
reason endorse this latter clause, since they believe that not all types of reasons reflect the mutual 
respect citizens ought to have for each other. Accordingly, citizens should prescind from referring to 
their self-interest or their “comprehensive views” (that was Rawls’s term) about justice, right and 
wrong, etc., presenting instead reasons that appeal to widely shared ideals (for an excellent discussion, 
see Bohman and Richardson 2009). But since defending any particular conception of justification 
would take us too far from the topic of the present chapter, I will limit myself to an ecumenical 
definition here.
 It is important to note that in practice it may sometimes be difficult to distinguish between the 59
justification and the explanation. Whether an utterance is received as justification or explanation may 
in fact depend much on the listener.
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free equals and treat them solely as means—as objects of coercion, rather than as ends 
in themselves. We arrogate to ourselves a specific moral status we deny to others. This 
in turn would justify imposing moral sanctions like blame and indignation.   60
Justification as an empirical concept 
Having clarified what the normative value of justification is, the next question we 
have to address concerns the appropriate operationalisation of justification. If our task 
is to examine justificatory practices among partisans, how can we recognise acts of 
justification when we encounter them? And once identified, how can we evaluate their 
deliberative credentials? A good place to start looking for answers to these questions 
are existing empirical approaches to deliberative democracy. In Jürg Steiner and 
André Bächtiger’s influential Discourse Quality Index (DQI), for example, which I 
have discussed (and criticised) in chapter 2, a distinction is drawn between the (a) 
level and the (b) content of justification (Steiner 2012, 270-271). First, the level of 
justification is operationalised in terms of the number of reasons given by a speaker 
and the extent to which the speaker makes clear that these reasons speak for or against 
the course(s) of action under deliberation. By way of illustration, here are some 
sample codes for different levels of justification as presented by Steiner (2012, 270). 
1. The speaker does not present any arguments (asks, for example, merely for additional 
information). 
3. The speaker justifies only with illustrations why X should or should not be done. 
6. The speaker gives at least two reasons why X should be done and for at least two 
reasons a linkage is made with X. 
 Second, the DQI’s “content of justification”-code is disaggregated into three 
components. It asks (1) whether the speaker makes explicit her proposals’ costs and 
benefits for his own group and other groups; (2) whether references are made to 
abstract principles like equality or social justice; and (3) whether stories are told in 
 On why this might be a position even so-called “realists” can endorse, see Jubb (2015, esp. 685-686). 60
For an important criticism of strongly moralised views of justification, see Beerbohm (2011, ch. 4).
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order to reinforce the point. These codes are derived from the above-mentioned 
provisos that figure prominently in theories of political justification.   61
 This approach holds many of the problems I have mentioned in chapter 2, in my 
critique of approaches to the study of deliberation that are too far removed from actual 
deliberative practice. Above all, it de-contextualises justification, treating it as a 
practice whose quality can be meaningfully evaluated from a third-person perspective, 
without taking into account the situated and particular character of the deliberating 
collective in question. This is problematic because, as I suggested in chapter 2, 
justification is a highly contextual activity. It is about the deployment of reasons in a 
particular social environment, with a particular set of persons as addressee: the 
justificatory audience. What matters, therefore, is not so much how many reasons a 
speaker gives, or whether she makes a connection between those reasons and the 
proposed course of action. Nor is it necessarily relevant that speakers refer to abstract 
principles and discuss all the costs and benefits their proposals entail for society in 
large. Rather, reasons and arguments must be adapted to the specific justificatory 
audience that is being addressed (see Young 2002, ch. 2; Goodin 2008, ch. 9; 
Bächtiger et al. 2010, 42-48; Mansbridge et al. 2010, 67; Dryzek 2012, ch. 4).  62
Otherwise efforts at justification are unlikely to be resonant and dialogue will come to 
a halt, rendering the whole exercise of justification pointless. 
 To better understand this point, consider a literary example. When Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra for the first time addresses the village dwellers at the market place, his 
sophisticated philosophical considerations are met with laughter and 
incomprehension. “When Zarathustra had thus spoken (…) all the people laughed at 
Zarathustra” (Nietzsche [1886] 1988b, prologue, III). Zarathustra’s deliberations 
strike us as eloquent and sharp, but they are simply out of sync with his justificatory 
audience’s patterns of understanding. This frustrates his efforts at justification. Putting 
 For example, the code stating that speakers should refer to the costs and benefits of their proposal to 61
other groups is inspired by the widespread idea that good justification is sensitive to the common good.
 This point is often made in discussions of the role of rhetoric in deliberative democracy. Second-62
generation deliberative democrats, that is those who approach deliberative democracy in non-ideal 
terms and eschew Rawlsian public reason, allow that rhetoric does have important roles to play (e.g. 
Dryzek 2012, ch. 4). Similarly to what I am arguing here, many of them suggest that rhetoric raises the 
inclusiveness of deliberation, since particular, rather than universal, appeals are more likely to connect 
to individuals from different social and cultural contexts. I have discussed this issue in greater depth in 
chapter 2.
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the point in another way, even though Zarathustra’s arguments are, at least from a 
philosophical standpoint, of high quality, they prove unintelligible in the specific 
setting in which they are aired. Thus, there is a potential gap between the “objective” 
quality of reasons and their force and plausibility in the context in which they are 
deployed. This gap cannot be overcome by the DQI’s one-size-fits-all 
operationalisation of justification. What we need is a looser operationalisation, one 
that ratchets down the requirements a speaker practicing justification ought to satisfy. 
 With all this in mind, I want to suggest a strategy that is both normatively 
modest and phenomenologically plausible. If, as I have argued, justification’s 
principal currency is appeals that recognise the situated and particular character of the 
justificatory audience in question, and if the quality of justification cannot be 
ascertained without taking into account the justificatory audience’s engagement with 
the reasons offered by a speaker, then the satisfaction of two basic conditions should 
stand at the centre of our analysis. 
(C1) Reason-giving condition: A speaker must provide reasons rather than simply state 
her point of view or preference, though she retains discretion as to what kinds of 
reasons these are (in order to render them resonant to her justificatory audience). 
(C2) Uptake condition: The speaker’s justificatory audience, or some members of that 
audience (if the group is large and not everyone can be expected to speak), must react 
to the reasons provided by the speaker in a way that signals comprehension and 
reflection. 
 Some readers will find the formulation of these conditions frustratingly 
imprecise. But there are good reasons for making use of placeholder terms here. If 
justification is intersubjective and necessarily situated, insisting upon any narrowly 
defined threshold of permissible actions may unduly call for false precision. Any 
empirically meaningful conception of justification must leave room for agency. It 
must permit reason-providers to give an account of their views in terms that makes 
sense to those they address, rather than limiting the range of permissible forms of 
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communication (C1).  And, accepting that the justificatory audience has an important 63
role to play in the process, it must allow a wide range of reflective reactive moves on 
the part of the reason-recipients—provided, that is, that the reasons they were offered 
were understood and recognised as worthy of consideration (C2).  We ought not 64
impose onto deliberators a normative straightjacket just for the sake of reducing 
necessary degrees of underdetermination.   65
 A closely related worry is that the proposed operationalisation of justification is 
too normatively modest. If justification is couched in such permissive terms, it may be 
said, almost any dialogue may satisfy C1 and C2 and so count as “good justificatory 
practice”. Justification, then, loses its critical edge as a normative ideal. But I think 
this concern is unwarranted. For at closer inspection, the demands of C1 and C2 are 
far from normatively hollow. C1 explicitly precludes speech acts where no reason is 
given, which weeds out a substantial amount of utterances from the category of valid 
justifications. For example, statements such as “I prefer X” or “I think Y is better” do 
not classify as justification. Participants must say why they those certain 
preferences. C2 in its turn demands some reflection on the part of those to whom 
justification is given and so guards effectively against docile reactions like passive 
acceptance, and against disengagement triggered by reasons that are not meaningfully 
received.  Thus, it should be clear that not any dialogical exchange can satisfy C1 66
and C2. Though we have loosened the requirements of the justification criterion, there 
is no reason to think the operationalisation presented here is normatively empty. 
Instead, it strikes a balance between showing recognition for pertinent normative 
demands and the necessity to accept the situatedness of justificatory procedures. The 
 Some theories of deliberative democracy proscribe certain forms of communication. See the above 63
discussion of the “provisos” in fn. 59.
 For example, they may ask questions of clarification, critique the reasons given by a speaker or the 64
mode in which they were delivered, provide evidence that tells against the validity of the speakers’ 
argument, etc.
 On this point, see also my methodological discussion in chapter 2.65
 C2 may also be criticised for making participation in a justification procedure a mere option citizens 66
may choose to exercise, allowing as it does that “only some” members of a justificatory audience might 
react to the reason-providers’ arguments. Yet if we accept that justification is not a moral demand but at 
most morally desirable, as I have argued earlier, there is no reason to tighten the reins on reason-
recipients and impose a blanket participatory duty on them. The source of such a duty would be very 
difficult to determine. Moreover, in practice most deliberative groups will in any case be too large for 
each participant to be given the floor and present reflections on the reasons that were voiced.
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next sub-section examines whether the political discussions of party branch members 
satisfy C1 and C2, and looks closely at patterns of justification across groups.  
Two deliberative exchanges 
The preceding theoretical discussion was quite lengthy, but it has done the necessary 
conceptual groundwork in order for us to embark on our empirical analysis. It has 
clarified why justification matters and how we may think of it as an empirical 
concept. What I want to focus on now is two discursive exchanges among members of 
party branches. These exchanges were triggered by internal disagreement about issues 
falling, respectively, into the organisational and societal categories discussed at the 
beginning of the chapter. While in principle there are numerous passages of text that 
could be selected and usefully analysed for justificatory moves, those explored here 
were chosen because they present patterns that are dispersed more widely through the 
empirical material. The disagreements that prompted the discussion arose quite 
naturally in conversation, as participants talked through particular problems. No 
interventions on the part of the researcher were made. This free-flowing discussion 
provided an opportunity to study political reason giving among party members in its 
perhaps most natural form: as something that flares up in the course of repeated 
encounters among likeminded, politically committed citizens. 
 I have chosen to present only two examples of partisan deliberation for reasons 
to do with readability and analytical leverage. As far as readability is concerned, in-
depth textual analysis of the kind engaged below tends to require great amounts of 
space, making it sometimes difficult for readers to follow the argument. Focusing on 
two examples, which correspond neatly to the two umbrella categories of 
organisational and societal disagreements, elegantly avoids that problem. But besides 
these “aesthetic” motivations, I think that the two examples that are discussed in what 
follows are sufficient to make the broader analytical point this chapter seeks to make, 
and to make it in a adequately robust way. Presenting further examples of deliberative 
exchanges would not add anything of import to the argument and ultimately compel 
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us to sacrifice some of the analysis’ depth. Readers who are interested in more textual 
evidence of deliberation within party branches may turn to the thesis’s appendix, 
which offers additional empirical material. This material affords more insight into the 
wider context in which this chapters’ argument is embedded. 
 In order to examine whether C1 is satisfied, we shall focus in what follows on 
speech acts that contain (a) an evaluative statement about a given issue, and (b) a 
reason that is given in support of that statement. For example, “I think X is a good 
thing. This is because it can promote Y through Z.” In this example the speaker’s first 
sentence signals that she takes an evaluative stance with respect to issue X, while the 
utterance “This is because it can promote Y through Z” communicates a reason for 
why the speaker has come to think the way she does, and draws a link between the 
earlier evaluative statement and that reason. To see whether reason-recipients satisfy 
C2, on the other hand, we shall focus on whether they react in a way that may 
reasonably be interpreted as indicating comprehension and some degree of reflective 
engagement with the speech acts of the reason-provider. To pick a few examples of 
possible responses: reason-recipients may ask questions of clarification, critique the 
reasons given by a speaker or the mode in which reasons were delivered, or offer 
evidence that challenges the validity of the speakers’ argument. Both of the just-
described categories are deliberately loose, consistent with the normative arguments 
laid out above. They treat moments of deliberation as instances in which speakers 
exercise discursive agency, drawing only on minimal standards of good discursive 
practice.  
 In addition to fielding these two operational tests, I want to explore what kinds 
of arguments partisans exchange. The motivation behind this is not that some reasons 
are normatively more desirable than others, as some deliberative democrats believe. I 
have rejected this view earlier as imposing inappropriate constraints onto speakers. 
Rather, exploring the properties of the arguments aired in party branches allows us to 
understand what (if anything) is particular about partisan deliberation. Specifically we 
shall concentrate here on patterns in what is deemed relevant to justifying a given 
point. I make this the focus of attention because in practice a good portion of 
justification lies not in explicit reason-giving but in the assumptions of relevance that 
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are embedded in the utterance. Speakers often merely provide brief argument-sketches 
that hint at the reasoning that leads them to their conclusions, assuming that others 
will receive these as equally relevant to the justification of their point (Goodin 2008, 
88; Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; also see chapter 2). In exploring these patterns, I 
shall employ familiar categories, for example “storytelling” or “principled 
justification”, yet without implying that these categories carry any special value apart 
from usefully describing the particular instances of justification analysed. The point of 
this exercise is simply to make sense of salient patterns of political reasoning across 
the groups. In sum, we shall explore in the following (1) whether the justification 
criterion is satisfied in the political discussions of party members, and (2) what party 
members’ patterns of argumentation look like. 
Exchange 1: questioning the legitimacy of membership ballots 
Let us then move to the empirical material, looking first at a disagreement over an 
organisational issue. This occurs in the Theilheim group, its starting point being that 
one participant questions the appropriateness of membership ballots as a means to 
enhance intra-party democracy. To put things in context: the issue of membership 
ballots proved to be particularly contentious across the German groups. This is 
because the legitimacy of the ballot over the coalition agreement between the SPD 
and the conservative CDU/CSU party that was held after the 2013 Bundestag 
elections remains bitterly contested within the SPD’s membership. In each group, 
there were supporters of the ballot initiative (and of the “grand coalition” between 
CDU/CSU and SPD more generally). For them, the ballot represented a legitimate 
instance of direct democracy within the party. Yet there were also opponents, who 
usually objected that the ballot was procedurally flawed (we shall see shortly what 
exactly is meant by that). Perhaps unsurprisingly, supporters of the ballot were mostly 
what I have called “pragmatists”, that is, party members who see strategic behaviour 
and compromise as necessary for holding on to power and exercising influence on 
policy. Opponents tended to be what I have called “purists”, partisans who more 
!113
generally wish to see the party adopt an uncompromising, purely principled approach 
to reaching certain political and organisational goals. In the following passage, which 
appears about 38 minutes into the interview, the different priorities of supporters 
(Hans-Peter, Marita and Herbert) and opponents (Bernd) of the ballot become 
manifest. 
Bernd: Membership ballots are in principle a good thing. But of course, if one 
manipulates them and bludgeons [niederknüppeln] one’s adversaries in gatherings 
where there should be discussion about [the issue on which the ballot is held] … then 
this has nothing to do with grassroots democracy [Basisdemokratie] and it has nothing 
to do with a democratic decision. […] One could have saved this money. … Since 
there was ultimately also the argument “this ballot was so expensive that we can 
hardly afford campaigning now” [if the members had voted against the coalition and 
forced a re-election]. This was, amongst other things, a reason that was given for why 
one must agree [to the coalition agreement]. I thought that was really questionable. 
Hans-Peter: I have to say, Bernd: I absolutely disagree. Because there is certainly 
much more manipulation in the […] elected party committees than in a membership 
ballot. [That] is my opinion. So … I just cannot imagine that one can manipulate many 
people in the same way as when one wants a specific result in […] a committee. 
Bernd: Whoever uses party funds to advertise in big newspapers, but does not offer 
the same [financial] means to adversaries [within the party] … is democratically 
highly dubious. […] I think this was a waste of party funds. 
Hans-Peter: Then one has to abolish membership ballots, then one should have to 
say: “pointless!” … that is what follows from your reasoning. 
Bernd: Yes! If one does not conduct it in a democratic fashion, then one has to abolish 
it. Either everyone is provided with the same opportunity to argue with impact or not. 
Marita: I have a different view. […] When one refers an issue to others for a direct 
decision, then I will have a personal point of view on it. You will have a different one 
[pointing at other participants], you will have a different one, you will have a different 
one … [let’s] suppose. Then everyone will try to win over the majority for his position 
… for whatever reasons. What I do not like is the thing with advertising in big 
newspapers. Yet I have made my decision on the grounds of my own reflections. And I 
am a realist, I am businessman [sic], and I find it more important to hold public office 
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and exercise influence than sitting somewhere on the opposition benches and […] be 
unable to exercise influence. And so I bit the bullet and said: yes, let’s be part of this, 
so we can […] have a say and table our proposals and see … and if you look at the 
results today, then— 
Bernd [interposing]: We have put some ideas into practice [Inhalte umgesetzt], yes. 
But how does the party benefit from it? 
Herbert: Well, how does the party benefit? We have achieved things for the people! 
Marita: We want to achieve something for the people, not for the party! 
Herbert: The party is not an end in itself, Bernd! 
Marita: Consider the [higher] minimum wage of €8,50. That’s still not much but now 
it’s been achieved! 
 In this passage one sees several justificatory moves taking place. Central is 
Bernd’s expression of disapproval concerning the 2013 membership ballot, which 
initiates the discussion. Bernd claims that internal criticism of the coalition agreement 
between SPD and CDU/CSU—the issue on which the ballot was held—was 
suppressed by the party elite prior to the ballot. Three instances of suppression are 
cited in support of this claim, namely that the party elite lashed out at internal critics 
in the debates that took place before the ballot; “blackmailed” members into voting in 
favour of the coalition by suggesting the party would lack the funds to set up a new 
campaign; and used party funds to promote their plans to join a grand coalition in 
newspapers without offering critics equal opportunities to publicise their views. 
 Setting aside the question of whether or not it is factually correct that the party 
elite tried to disempower internal critics in the ways Bernd describes (given that 
similar accusations were voiced in other groups it seems likely that it is correct), there 
can be no doubt that Bernd’s argument satisfies C1. It constitutes a clear case in which 
reasons are given in order to substantiate an evaluative statement about a certain issue. 
 How do the responses of Bernd’s justificatory audience look? To begin, Hans-
Peter and Marita both openly disagree with Bernd, though to a different extent and for 
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different reasons. Hans-Peter, who reacts immediately to Bernd’s argument, appears 
entirely unconvinced. He first tries to relativise Bernd’s charges, and then expresses 
doubts about whether manipulating the outcome of a decision-making procedure is in 
fact possible when publics as large as the SPD’s membership are involved. Marita, in 
contrast, reacts in a more nuanced fashion. On one hand, she accepts Bernd’s worry 
about resource inequality in the debate preceding the ballot, at least insofar as she 
declares that she “does not like” that the party elite used party funds for promoting 
their position on the coalition agreement in key newspapers. On the other hand, she 
thinks it was inevitable that the party elite would try everything to win over a majority 
for their preferred course of action. 
 Despite the substantial differences between Hans-Peter and Marita’s responses, 
it is not difficult to interpret both as satisfying C2. Far from passive acceptance or 
unreasoned assertions, it is evident that both reason-recipients are engaging with the 
argument given to them. Even if some of the points that are being advanced—
especially Hans-Peter’s—are not developed much, and only gestures towards 
arguments are offered, the replies constitute instances of spirited disagreement on the 
basis of reasons.  
 As far as the specificities of argumentation in this exchange are concerned, 
perhaps the most notable thing in the discussion is that a key part of the reasoning 
leading Bernd to his conclusions remains implicit. Let me explain. When he criticises 
the party leadership for trying to silence internal dissent, Bernd seems to have in mind 
a strongly egalitarian conception of intra-party democracy, according to which 
resources to influence the process of internal will-formation ought to be equally 
distributed among the party membership. However, Bernd does not elaborate the 
details of the ideal of intra-party democracy he has in mind. Presumably he expects 
that others will catch the allusions and receive them as meaningful and persuasive. 
This is a risky strategy: it cannot reasonably be expected that one’s interlocutors will 
always be on the exact same wavelength. But here it seems that the others accept, or 
at least do not reject, Bernd’s implicit assumptions. After all, their criticism is 
addressed not to his premises but his conclusions. 
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 The most plausible explanation for why Bernd’s arguments are intelligible to the 
whole group is arguably that group members are very familiar with one another. To 
wit, they have a rough idea of “where the others are coming from” in their 
argumentation. Over time and through repeated exchanges they will have become 
increasingly aware of each others’ beliefs and convictions, and the kinds of arguments 
they are likely to hear from each other. So Marita, Herbert and Hans-Peter are able to 
make sense of Bernd’s positions on intra-party democracy because he has elaborated 
these positions in conversations that were held on prior occasions, or because these 
positions are in harmony with a wider set of previously defended views. Either way, 
Bernd’s claims are enmeshed in a broader history of discussion, one which is kept in 
the branch’s collective memory, so to speak. This sensitivity towards each others’ 
viewpoints and mindsets greatly facilitates reason-giving among the members of the 
group: it enables them to make their points understandable to each other, and lends 
them a sense for what is “out of bounds” in a debate. I will return to this issue later in 
the chapter.  
 This analysis must be supplemented with one further observation. This concerns 
the exchange’s inconclusiveness. Insofar as there is no sign that Bernd’s arguments 
have managed to persuade Marita, Herbert and Hans-Peter, and vice versa, the 
disagreement remains unresolved. That things are left open is common across groups 
when it comes to organisational disagreements: rarely do deliberations over issues to 
do with organisation or strategy yield consensus or the “joint acceptance” (Moore and 
O’Doherty 2014) of a position for that matter, even if many constructive proposals are 
put forward. The reason for this, I suggest, is that there is often simply no need for 
participants to find agreements on many organisational matters: as the present 
example shows, organisational disagreements are usually quarrels about issues that 
have already been decided, or indeed about matters that participants have very little or 
no direct influence on. However, this should not be read as a “failure” of deliberation. 
If anything, the spirited attempts at mutual justification and critical reflection that can 
be observed even when “undecidable” topics are discussed signal reason to believe 
that the groups’ capacity to deliberate can be emphatically affirmed. 
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Exchange 2: debating poverty and social inequality 
We turn now to the second deliberative exchange. This features a disagreement over a 
societal issue in the Linz group, that is, an issue relating to grievances manifest in the 
local community or society in large. We join the discussion about 28 minutes into the 
interview, just after one participant explained that the group’s regular discussions help 
him to clarify “what is really at stake” in public discourse as opposed to what is being 
“singled out by the media as important”. Ernest, a participant in his mid-70s, who 
throughout the discussion stressed his experience of poverty in his youth, reacts to this 
by identifying the problem that the general public is fundamentally misled and 
misinformed about their de facto material welfare. His contribution immediately 
receives deliberative uptake by Maria, a social worker, who contests Ernest’s moves 
on the basis of her inside knowledge of the more deprived sections of society. 
Ernest: I believe there are many different viewpoints, or rather wrong points of view, 
misleading views, concerning the development of prices. I have a very good memory 
of numbers and I can tell you today how much which product had cost 40 years ago, 
50 years ago. And if I compare that with how much [money] I earned back then, or 
how much others earned—because that I also still remember—then I find that we are 
extremely well off today! And the feeling that we’re not comfortably off today…
happiness is after all a matter of being content…arises from being told by advertising 
and commercials: ‘You need that [product]! And if you don’t have it, then you cannot 
live properly!’ … And I see my responsibility in telling people ‘You’re actually well 
off!’ 
Maria: I have to disagree with you in one respect: In my job I am very often 
confronted with people who have been evicted from their homes. And I can tell you of 
cases of mothers with two children, who were evicted because of rent arrears of 3000 
Euros. These are not big sums. It is getting tough at the moment…the last years in 
fact. And there are many things such as…many people cannot afford glasses anymore. 
In the 1990s, I remember, that was not a problem. Back then everyone in Austria was 
able to buy new glasses every 2-3 years. There are many people in Austria who are 
secretly [versteckt] really poor! And this is about heating, this is about having a piece 
of meat on the weekend, and so on. And some people are really not doing well in this 
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sense. And I think one has to calculate again from a…from our secure position what it 
means to live off 700 Euros [a month]. 
Ernest: Well, that [i.e. living off 700 Euros a month] is not possible. 
Maria: I know, but many people have to do that.  
Ernest: I know, but that is not normally possible. I have no illusions about that.  
Karl: Well, I agree. I have perhaps an even better insight into what people actually 
earn because we allocate public homes two, three times a week, and there we look 
closely at people’s income and also see how much the rents are. And then you know 
how much electricity and heating and so on costs. And, well, it is exactly like Maria 
says…by now a considerable number of people drag themselves around along the 
poverty line (an der Armutsgrenze herumkrebsen). Of course, you, Ernest, you look at 
this from your point of view. I could say the same. What did we have when we were 
children? How was it in our home? There were five of us—that is, three children and 
two parents—living on 60 square metres. But okay—today the standards are different. 
And we do not want to go back to lower standards! And many are simply unable to 
afford their rents for a flat that is appropriate measured by today’s standards. They are 
unable to afford that. That’s how it is. 
Ernest: Let me put it in this way: there’s no point in agreeing with people when they 
say they are poor, because that doesn’t build them up (aufbauen). What much better 
builds people up is when I say ‘well, whether I am doing well or not is ultimately 
never a question of money, but a question of comparison…with others.’ And if I only 
compare the bad bits, then one will feel even worse afterwards. 
Maria: And for me it’s clear: 500 Euros are relative. Whether I have 1500 Euros or 
1000 Euros a month makes a big difference. Whether I have 4000 or 4500 Euros 
makes no difference. And I utterly resist saying: it depends on you, whether you are 
doing well or not! Because such an argument is along the lines of ‘Me 
Incorporated’ [German: ‘Ich-AG’, a term chiefly used pejoratively to describe the 
prototypical lifestyle in an individualist capitalist society], where we are solely 
responsible for ourselves. And this is the exact opposite of the idea of the SPÖ, of 
social democracy, of solidarity, where there should be a certain standard of life for 
everyone. And beyond that everyone may consider aiming for more…but a certain 
shared basis for everyone… 
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Ernest: [Thinks] Well, yes. Solidarity. You’re right! 
 Does this exchange meet our two justificatory desiderata? I think yes. Both 
Ernest and Maria advance positions backed by argument, providing reasons for why 
they think as they do (C1). Maria’s several responses to Ernest, moreover, go way 
beyond the reactions of reason-recipients we have encountered in the Theilheim 
passage. Rather than merely expressing preliminary intuitions or reflections 
concerning Ernest’s position, she delivers a full-blown counter-argument to it (C2). 
Her reasoning may thus be interpreted not only in terms of a response to another 
speakers’ act of justification, but in terms of a self-standing justificatory move. What 
to make of Karl’s intervention, in which he balances Ernest and Maria’s position 
against each other? This, too, falls squarely within the purview of C2. Karl’s explicit 
and intellectually honest weighing of different arguments constitutes a paradigmatic 
example of the sort of reflective engagement with the arguments of others that 
enriches and sustains the deliberative process. In short, the analysis fully affirms the 
participants’ justificatory capacity. 
 When one looks at the kinds of reasons participants give each other, two things 
stand out: the strong use of narrative and the effective appeal to the principle of 
solidarity with which the conversation closes. First, as we have seen, all participants 
in the above passage draw on personal stories of some kind. Narratives are used to a 
much greater extent than in the Theilheim discussion. Ernest justifies his viewpoint by 
talking about his youth; Maria by conjuring experiences collected in her job as a 
social worker; and Karl, in his attempt to mediate between the others’ positions, 
anecdotally refers to the special insight into people’s lives he gains in his job, and 
invokes an autobiographical story akin that which Ernest articulates. Notice however 
that while storytelling typically involves the provision of a first person-account of 
one’s own experience, or of the experience of someone with whom certain interests or 
socio-cultural characteristics are shared (Young 2002, 73-74), Maria, and in part also 
Karl, use it to a different effect. Central to their stories is not so much their own 
experience, but the experience of others—others with whom they share little in 
common. One may call this second order storytelling. To see what is meant by this, 
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consider the following examples. In Maria’s statement, “In my job I am very often 
confronted with people who have been evicted from their homes”, the focal point is 
not the fact that she is confronted with those people but that there are people who 
struggle to pay their rent and risk homelessness. And when Karl says that “I have 
perhaps an even better insight into what people actually earn because we allocate 
public homes two, three times a week”, his emphasis is on the differential between 
people’s salaries and housing costs, not on the fact that he is involved in allocating 
public housing. So the point of those narratives is not to convey facts about the 
speakers’ own situation, or about the situation of people who are like the speaker, but 
about the situation of completely other persons the speaker cares about in some way.  
 One way of looking at second order storytelling of this kind is to see it as 
potentially strengthening the connection between parties and the wider citizenry. 
Why? Because expressing citizens’ concerns in a concrete and empathic fashion can 
raise consciousness for those concerns within the party. What is meant by this can best 
be brought out through an example. When Maria empathically speaks of “cases of 
mothers with two children, who were evicted because of rent arrears of 3000 Euros”, 
she does not talk of abstract social problems or anonymous statistics but of real 
existing citizens whose suffering deserves attention—citizens we all can relate to in 
one or another way. This personalised and somewhat dramatised way of presenting a 
problem can help foster and sustain awareness for that problem in the group (cf. 
Dryzek 2000, 68; Boswell 2013, 631). It can strengthen the extent to which group 
members feel responsible for addressing the problem, providing an impulse for 
collective responses. In this sense, communicating the worries of those the party seeks 
to represent in terms of second order narrative can be an effective way of translating 
their demands into political action. 
 The second notable thing about the sorts of reasons participants offer each other 
in the Linz group is that Maria’s principled appeal to solidarity eventually manages to 
persuade Ernest. Remarkable is the immediate resonance this appeal finds. It seems to 
speak directly to Ernest’s moral intuitions about political life, for after a brief moment 
of reflection he concedes that solidarity is an important political principle in the 
context of the issue under discussion, indicating a change of mind. Remember in this 
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connection the “pre-deliberative agreement on central political values” that was 
mentioned in the previous chapter. I have discussed this in connection with the 
question of whether participants enjoy an equal standing in their discussions. The fact 
that participants bring to the table such an agreement would seem to be an important 
enabling condition for arguments like Maria’s to succeed: indeed, without it being in 
place, any appeal to shared principles could easily misfire. For to accept Maria’s 
argument, Ernest arguably needs to recognise the value of solidarity and endorse it as 
a general principle that ought to guide political practice. He needs to attribute to it the 
same, or at least similar, importance as Maria does. This means that the participants’ 
like-mindedness regarding certain shared values performs an “agreement-facilitating” 
function. It plays an important role in finding common ground on potentially divisive 
issues. 
 A final point: if one looks beyond the Linz case, it emerges that appeals to 
abstract principles like solidarity or equality take place more frequently in 
disagreements about societal issues than in disagreements over matters to do with 
organisation. One straightforward reason for why this might be the case is that the 
party’s lead principles naturally have a more direct bearing on societal questions than 
on organisational ones: these principles tend to be a point of orientation for general 
political agendas and concrete policies, for shaping and designing political 
institutions, but not necessarily for such questions as who gains a place on the party 
list. Therefore, it will be more difficult for reason-providers intelligibly and 
persuasively to link those principles to organisational matters. Of course, principled 
considerations may play a role in disagreements over organisational issues. In the 
excerpt from the Theilheim group, for example, Bernd’s conception of intra-party 
democracy is clearly influenced by his interpretation of certain democratic ideals. But, 
as this very example shows, the principles informing organisation-related disputes are 
typically not those that are constitutive of partisans’ shared activity. In any case, if the 
observed pattern is any indication then giving party branches more weighty 
deliberative tasks, and encouraging them to discuss policy issues relating to society at 
large, as I have suggested in chapter 1, is likely to produce more of the principled kind 
of justification that we have witnessed in the Linz excerpt; and this might be the best 
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basis for strong, integrative agreements that are regarded as legitimate by all those 
involved in making it. 
Discussion and conclusion 
Tracing the two selected discussions indicates important things about deliberation 
among party branch members. Most importantly, it suggests that there is reason for 
optimism concerning their ability to deliberate. As we have seen, both discussions 
satisfy our two justificatory desiderata: the reason-giving condition and the uptake 
condition. They are marked by the mutual provision of reasons, with participants 
listening and responding to each other in a way that signals a degree of reflective 
engagement with the arguments in question. There are also no relevant differences 
between the two countries when it comes to party members’ capacity to deliberate. 
Consistent with the results of the previous chapter’s analysis of the preconditions for 
deliberation in party branches, branch members seem to deliberate just as well in 
Austria as they do in Germany. So again, it seems that we need not worry so much 
about contextual factors when thinking about the realisation of a deliberative model of 
intra-party democracy. At least within party branches, certain deliberative tendencies 
appear to persist independent of the institutional context that shapes party members’ 
participatory motivations. 
 Why might this be so? The two examined discussions reveal a deeper reason for 
why deliberation in party branches is likely to reach good quality. Normally, it is a 
purely contingent matter whether or not basic premises are shared as common ground 
among all participants to a conversation. That just depends on the nature of the beliefs 
that are present within the political community. In party branches, this contingency is 
significantly reduced. It is reduced, on the one hand, because branch members share 
many premises. Where they do not share premises, on the other hand, they are 
familiar enough with each other to know roughly what underlying premises their 
interlocutors construct their arguments upon. This is likely to sustain a sense of trust 
among them—recall in this connection the discussion of how partisanship can be a 
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carrier of equality—and facilitate the resonance of arguments even in heated disputes 
over the righteousness of certain policies or course of action. 
Table 4: Summary of the analysis 
 That participants are sufficiently familiar with each other to have some idea of 
the premises underlying each others’ arguments manifests first of all in the fact that 
they hardly engage in what Goodin (2008, 88-90) calls “premise probing”. Premise 
probing usually takes place when it becomes clear to the participants to a conversation 
that they do not get each others’ points. Participants then ask each other why they 
believe the things they say—“Why on earth do you believe that?”—and proceed to 
elaborate in fuller detail their underlying reasoning. This does not occur in the above 
passages. Either premises are accepted (call to mind how the Theilheim group deals 
with Bernd’s argument about intra-party democracy). Or, participants disagree over 
premises, but forego the “probing” process and proceed directly to questioning them 
(think for example of Maria’s final response to Ernest in the Linz passage, in which 
she attacks his premises without having demanded further clarification). It is no 
interpretative leap to suggest this has to do with the fact that participants know each 
other reasonably well, and have discussed many times before. Through repeated 
exchanges they are likely to have familiarised themselves with each others’ 
standpoints and commitments. They will have understood what kinds of arguments 
their fellow activists tend to make—who in the group is a “purist” and who is a 
“pragmatist”, for example. As a result, they will have a good sense of “where the 
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 But as I said, participants also share many premises. This comes out most 
clearly in the concluding moments of the Linz discussion, where Maria’s appeal to the 
principle of solidarity persuades Ernest to change his mind. The premise shared by the 
two participants is that solidarity is a value that should drive political decisions. This 
leads them eventually to converge at the same conclusion. The point to note here is 
that shared premises do important work in making effective deliberation possible. 
This is a well-acknowledged point in deliberative theory: from Rawls’s (1993) plea 
that good deliberation requires an “overlapping consensus” on the basic institutions of 
society to Dryzek and Niemeyer’s (2006) argument that “reciprocal understanding 
and recognition of the legitimacy of the values held by other participants in political 
interaction” (642) is the minimum requirement for civilised democratic discourse, 
authors have treated some level of shared premises as indispensable to deliberation. 
What the example of Maria and Ernest reminds us of is that party branches are good 
places to look for collectives with shared premises: insofar as partisanship rests upon 
a shared belief in basic political values, sharing premises with others is part and parcel 
of what it means to be a partisan. By implication, party branches are also good places 
to look for effective deliberation. 
 Of course, to recognise the benefits of partisanship for deliberation is not to 
imply that any party branch can produce good deliberation, and the differences 
between the two examined passages point to potential variations in the deliberative 
practice of party branches. But to recognise this limit means only that we need to be 
prepared for contingencies—not that the generally positive picture of deliberation in 
party branches that emerged in this chapter should be renounced. On the contrary, if 
the findings of this chapter are any indication, it seems that party branches could find 
their place among paradigmatic deliberative fora like town meetings or citizens juries. 
These sites of deliberation are often glorified as contexts in which ordinary citizens 
become legislators, as natural laboratories for democracy (Bryan 2003). Party 
branches seem to share their democratic credentials; they are capable of producing 
decisions with a distinctively deliberative pedigree.  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Chapter 5 
Failures of Partisan Deliberation 
Introduction 
The preceding chapters suggested that party branches are vibrant deliberative fora. We 
have seen that branch members approach each other as equals; that they belabour a 
diverse range of internal disagreements; and that their exchanges are marked by the 
mutual provision of reasons. In this final empirical chapter, I want to add nuance to 
this picture and look closely at what I shall call “failures” of deliberation in the party 
branches—non-deliberative moments that occurred despite favourable preconditions 
for deliberation. To be sure, precisely because the branches generally provide a 
supportive environment for deliberation, deliberative failures were rare. But those 
which occurred raise important questions about the limits of partisan deliberation and 
the design of deliberative institutions within parties. So it is crucial that we devote our 
attention to cases where deliberation has failed. 
 The chapter divides into three sections. I first clarify what a “deliberative 
failure” is, how deliberative theorists conventionally understand it, and why it is often 
normatively ambivalent. I then discuss three types of deliberative failure in party 
branches, looking specifically at (a) group splits and defection; (b) cases where 
deliberation does not arise, or only seldom arises; and (c) polarising tendencies among 
the groups. In the third section, I reflect on possible strategies for making deliberative 
failures tractable, suggesting different small-scale reforms to reduce the likelihood 
that intra-party deliberation goes awry. The chapter concludes that deliberative 
failures will be difficult to avoid in an internally deliberative party, but their most 
harmful effects can be limited through institutional design. 
Failures of deliberation in deliberative theory  
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What does it mean to say that deliberation fails? Deliberative democrats are divided 
over this question. This is because whether deliberation can be said to have failed 
depends on what ideals one thinks it should reach in the first place, and deliberative 
democrats disagree over what counts as appropriate deliberative ideals. On a more 
traditional understanding of deliberation, for example, deliberators’ openness to 
preference shifts is a key indicator of deliberative quality (Gutmann and Thompson 
1996, 174). Good deliberation, in other words, requires that people are willing to 
change their minds in light of others’ arguments. If one endorses this view of 
deliberation, one will interpret the refusal of deliberators to adjust their preferences as 
a deliberative failure. But this interpretation of the deliberative ideal has been 
qualified in important ways in recent times. So Mansbridge et al. (2010, 68) stress that 
“when interests or values conflict irreconcilably, deliberation ideally ends (…) in a 
clarification of conflict and structuring of disagreement, which sets the stage for a 
decision by non-deliberative methods.” This largely—if not entirely—eliminates the 
requirement that deliberators change their preferences. 
 To give another example, some deliberative democrats believe that 
deliberators should offer each other only arguments of a particular kind. Especially 
those who are committed to the idea of “public reason” often want to impose narrow 
limits on what constitutes authentic deliberation, suggesting that deliberators should 
refrain from appealing to their “comprehensive conceptions of the good” (i.e. their 
moral and political ideals) as well as to their self-interest. Again, if one supports this 
conception of deliberation, exchanges in which deliberators openly talk about their 
personal moral beliefs or about their basic material interests will count as failures of 
deliberation. There are clear limits to the way in which speakers can permissibly 
reason in a deliberative setting. But again, this way of conceptualising the justification 
criterion has been contested by influential theorists. As Bächtiger et al. (2010, 43) 
note, many deliberative democrats today are ready to admit even “claims cloaked in 
confrontational language or barely concealed sarcasm, conceding that this very mode 
of delivery may go hand in hand with the nature of the point that is being made, or 
necessary to communicate to a particular audience.” (This approach chimes with the 
one I have taken and defended in this thesis.) 
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 However, to say that what counts as deliberative failure “depends on what 
ideals one thinks it should reach in the first place” is not to say that classifying speech 
acts as deliberative failures is an entirely subjective matter either. It is not simply the 
case that one person’s deliberative failure is another persons deliberative success. This 
is because some deliberative ideals are non-controversial among deliberative 
democrats, even if how exactly they should be interpreted in practice may be. 
Obvious candidates are the ideals of reason giving (stipulating that participants to 
deliberation should offer each other an account of their standpoints) and mutual 
respect (stipulating that participants to deliberation should treat each other as equals) 
(for an overview of those ideals, see Mansbridge et al. 2010, 65-69; on mutual respect 
and equality, see also chapter 3). I would argue that no matter what version of 
deliberative theory one is committed to, these ideals will play a central role in how 
one thinks about deliberative success and failure. As I will indicate where necessary, 
all of the deliberative failures I will trace in what follows fall squarely within the 
purview of this understanding of deliberative failure. 
 An important point to note before proceeding is that deliberative failures are 
rarely “absolute”, in the sense that their consequences are unambiguously negative. 
For one thing, deliberating groups are usually in some ways connected to each other, 
and one group’s failure to produce good quality deliberation might have a positive 
effect on the deliberations of other deliberative agents. This idea has recently been 
popularised by theorists of “deliberative systems”, who propose to conceive of the 
various deliberative sites in a society in terms of “distinguishable, differentiated, but 
to some degree interdependent parts” which are “connected in such a way as to form a 
complex whole” (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 4; also see Dryzek 2012, esp. 139-140). By 
way of illustration, let me reiterate an example I have given in chapter 1. If a group of 
members at the party base polarises over an issue, this is likely to be the result of bad 
quality deliberation, where views are reinforced without weighing alternative 
arguments. But polarisation may lead that group of members to promote their position 
with special vigour, and so help to put their demands on the agenda of other party 
groups and party elites. Thus, the group’s internal polarisation serves the inclusion of 
views that would otherwise not be heard, which may be seen as a deliberative goal in 
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its own right (Young 2002). So conceived, deliberative failures are normatively 
ambivalent. Although they involve violations of some deliberative norms, they may 
have a positive “systemic” effect and promote deliberative goals elsewhere in society. 
 That deliberative failures are normatively ambivalent is true even if one does 
not adopt a systemic view of deliberation. This is because there are potential trade-
offs between different deliberative ideals, which become apparent even within single 
deliberative groups. In recent experimental research, for instance, it has been 
suggested that there may be a trade-off between the ideals of opinion change and good 
procedural deliberative quality (Baccaro et al., forthcoming). That is to say, a group of 
citizens might deliberate well in the sense of providing each other with sound 
arguments or in the sense of performing preference shifts—but it might not produce 
both good reasoning and changed minds at the same time. The explanation 
researchers have given is that good reasoning tends to occur when the majority of 
participants in a deliberating group have relatively strong, and rather developed, 
views on an issue, while the inclination to change one’s opinion tends to correlate 
with participants having weak and relatively undeveloped viewpoints. If this is 
correct, then deliberating groups will struggle to reach both ideals simultaneously. But 
a group’s failure to reach one of the two ideals does not disallow the procedure as a 
whole, either. 
 These points are important to bear in mind in the context of the analysis that 
follows. The types of deliberative failure I shall discuss may look normatively 
troubling, but they may also have positive effects on other deliberative fora within the 
party or beyond it. Nonetheless, I will not speak much to the “systemic” consequences 
of party branches’ deliberative failures. Though this would be an interesting question 
to pursue, consistent with the overall focus of this thesis my main concern is with 
individual party branches, and not with how those branches interact with other 
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deliberative institutions within the party or society at large.  Nor do I want to 67
examine potential trade-offs between different deliberative ideals. Again, while 
investigating those trade-offs arguably raises interesting questions (notably about the 
desirable outcomes of a deliberative process) I do not want to go into this here. 
Instead, I want to look in-depth at three distinct kinds of deliberative failure, and 
examine the complex reasons for why they occurred. 
Failures of deliberation within parties: three types 
When we think of failures of intra-party deliberation we think, paradigmatically, of 
aggressive factionalism. Historically, factional divisions have often made civilised 
communication within parties impossible. An illustrative example is the famous 
controversy between orthodox Marxists and revisionists that took place in the German 
SPD at the end of the 19th century. The two groups were divided by profoundly 
different views on the nature of capitalism and the role of the party in shaping and 
designing political institutions in accordance with socialist principles, leading to a 
serious war of words. At the party’s 1899 Hannover congress, for example, the 
famous Marxist August Bebel accused Eduard Bernstein, the key representative of the 
revisionists, of strengthening the party’s opponents with his attack on Marxism, and a 
few days later Bebel suggested that Bernstein should leave the party altogether 
(Berman 2006, 44-45).  68
 The particular deliberative failure in the case of factionalism consists in the 
rival groups’ inability to talk to each other constructively and/or respectfully. Their 
 Another straightforward reason for not placing too much emphasis on the systemic effects of 67
deliberative failures is sometimes mentioned by critics of the deliberative systems approach. Individual 
deliberative failures frequently cause harm in the deliberative settings in which they occur. Deliberators 
who treat others with great disrespect, for example, may cause deep offence and severe emotional 
distress. If one is willing to accept this for the sake of a more deliberative larger system, one relegates 
those who are harmed to second-class citizens who do not deserve to be respected as free and equal. 
Owen and Smith (2015, 223) call this the neglect of “deliberative equality” in systemic approaches to 
deliberative systems, and suggest that this neglect is “hard to square with the requirement that the 
subjects of a deliberative democracy can coherently represent themselves to each other as the equal co-
authors of the rule to which they are subject.”
 Of course, factional conflict need not be ideological in nature. It can also be rooted in self-interest, as 68
in the factional wars that led to the break-up of the Italian Christian Democrats in the early 1990s 
(Boucek 2012, ch. 7).
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divisions are simply too deep, or perhaps more accurately: too pronounced with 
regard to issues they both deem central to their agenda, to find a shared basis upon 
which deliberation could proceed; and each group is convinced that the other group or 
groups are harming the party as a whole. Often the result of this is gridlock, in the 
sense that taking collective decisions becomes extremely difficult (this was the case in 
the early SPD). Sometimes partisan infighting even causes parties to splinter. 
 Can similar conflicts arise within party branches? Yes. As I shall discuss 
shortly, some of the party branches that have been studied for this thesis have 
experienced corrosive internal conflicts, which put the integrity of the group at risk. 
These conflicts were of course smaller in scope, and thus much less harmful for the 
party as a whole, than factionalism at the level of the party elite usually is. 
Nevertheless, they pushed the individual branches’ ability to deliberate to its limits. In 
one of the two cases I will investigate, the group eventually splintered. In another, 
individual members defected. It is these extreme cases of deliberative failure I want to 
turn to first. Later in the chapter, I will look at different, and arguably less dramatic, 
instances of bad deliberation.  
Type 1: Group splits and defection 
The perhaps most extreme instance of deliberative failure occurred in the Vienna 
Sandleiten group. This is a group split, which happened approximately five months 
before the interview took place and was triggered by irreconcilable differences of 
principle and opinion. More specifically, a number of people left the group after deep 
and persistent disagreement over issues of immigration and multiculturalism. While 
one sub-section of the group promoted an open-minded attitude towards immigrants, 
and emphasised the benefits of multiculturalism for the local community and society 
at large, the other sub-section took a contrarian position on these issues, upholding 
restrictive and sometimes outright xenophobic views. It was the latter sub-group that 
eventually pulled out, leaving the more open-minded and egalitarian members in 
charge of the branch. 
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 To better understand the issues at stake, let us begin by looking at how 
Angelika, one of the remaining members, recounts the conflict: 
The weird (schräg) people we had here … ranging from right-wing extremist to 
brainwashed … we had everything here. When they were part of the group and 
worked with us, there were only arguments, only quarrels […]. We were only waiting 
for (was gerade noch gefehlt hat) one of them to say ‘Hail Hitler!’ in a group meeting 
… that’s how bad it was! And then we got rid of those people but still had one person 
in the group that tried to brainwash us … someone who probably voted for the FPÖ 
[the successful far right party in Austria] … and we all shut ourselves off (abkapseln) 
and said ‘we have a different opinion.’   69
 The references to the Hitler salute and the far right Freedom Party (FPÖ) 
provide an indication of how deeply divided the group was before the break-up. 
Indeed, since the current members of the branch strongly oppose xenophobia and 
disrespect towards minorities (see chapter 3), it is difficult to see how they could 
possibly have negotiated compromises with members who openly stood for 
prejudiced and intolerant views.  As internal conflict intensified, constructive 70
cooperation became increasingly impossible. Speaking about those who eventually 
left the group, Angelika recalls that “they did not accept any of our proposals … they 
were wearing blinkers, so to speak.” To which Elisabeth adds, “they actively thwarted 
every project we started.” 
 What makes the break-up of the Sandleiten branch a paradigmatic case of type 
1 deliberative failure is what is referred to in the first cited passage as “shutting 
oneself off” from those who hold different views: one party to the conflict became 
unwilling to engage in further communication with the other party. The declaration 
“we have a different opinion” hereby seems to imply “there is no point in belabouring 
our differences of opinion any further.” Discussion has stopped, and will presumably 
 Note: “We were only waiting for” is an inevitably awkward translation of the idiomatic expression 69
“was gerade noch gefehlt hat”, which may best be understood in terms of “what didn’t happen but may 
well have happened.”
 Here is how Angelika describes the group’s outlook towards others: “We are people who do not 70
pigeonhole others (wir hauen nicht alle in einen Topf hinein), right. We are open to everyone. One must 
say: one needs to get to know people, give them a chance … if they don’t want to engage, then so be it. 
But the group is open to all.”
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not resume. Some members of the group in fact not only refuse to discuss politics 
with those who defected from the group. They believe that there is no point in 
engaging with them at all. Bojan, for example, decided even to symbolically stop 
greeting them on the street: 
Meanwhile I have stopped greeting [those] people [from whom] I have heard 
statements […] that attack a certain race, religion, or whatever … statements against 
other people … even though they are old Social Democrats, yes. They [the people 
making racist statements] do not deserve this [being greeted]. One must not forget 
that in Sandleiten [meaning the municipal building complex] there were in the past 
many people … and luckily so! … with Hungarian or Bohemian roots. Without those 
people Sandleiten would have been so boring, right? I mean, Sandleiten … from 
stories I know … we had the best upholsterers, who did not have Austrian roots, we 
had the best general practitioner, who was shot because of people like those [who 
hold racist views] … because of his Jewish roots! That was after the war. So those are 
people do not hear a “good day” or “hello” from me, or, let alone, a 
“Freundschaft!” [the traditional greeting of social democrats and socialists]. They do 
not deserve that. No matter what […] academic title they have … that doesn’t interest 
me. 
 Bojan’s refusal to greet the former branch members constitutes an especially 
powerful signal that civilised communication between the rival groupings is not 
possible anymore. Greeting may be understood as a communicative gesture aimed at 
expressing recognition and respect for the other. As such, it may constitute a first step 
towards conciliation between opposing groups, serving the twin functions of asserting 
“discursive equality” and establishing or re-establishing the “trust necessary for 
discussion to proceed in good faith” (Young 2002, 60). From this perspective, 
refusing to greet others, as Bojan does, means denying those others equal respect and 
recognition; it conveys that one does not regard them as appropriate discussion 
partners.  His words (“they do not deserve that”) indeed suggest that he sees the 71
 An interesting question to ponder in this connection is whether it is normatively acceptable, or even 71
desirable, to exclude people who hold views that are as “unreasonable” as the group members suggest 
from intra-party deliberation. As discussing this question in sufficient depth would take us too far away 
from the topic of the present chapter, I do not want take a definitive position on this here. My suspicion 
is that partisans whose views are incompatible with the party’s lead principles—which is certainly the 
case here—may permissibly be excluded from the party.
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ousted members not as political adversaries, with whom a level of cooperation is 
possible, but as enemies, who do not deserve any respect or politeness, irrespective of 
their formal level of education and party affiliation. 
 Bojan’s passionate statement is met with collective approval in the group. Erik 
immediately responds, “Right! Nobody should be excluded. And this has nothing to 
do with skin colour or whatever, but with respect towards others. […] I believe the 
most important thing is … to treat people the same way you want to be treated 
yourself.” One way of reading this response in the present context is to see it as 
expressing a belief that is sometimes associated with the doctrine of “militant 
democracy” (cf. Niesen 2012): everyone deserves to be heard and taken seriously—
apart from those who seek to exclude others on what might be called “morally 
arbitrary” grounds and violate the most basic ethical norms. This belief, it would 
seem, is deeply rooted in the members of the group and fundamental to their self-
understanding. It shapes the group’s self-identity as egalitarian vanguard in the 
conflict-ridden environment of the Sandleitenhof, the large municipal building within 
which the group operates. This explains why the members of the group deem Bojan’s 
symbolic decision appropriate, and why the conflict arose in the first place.  72
 One notable consequence of the Sandleiten group’s internal conflict and 
resultant group split was that it unified those members who remained in the group. 
The fact that they prevailed over their rivals and seized control of the branch 
strengthened the sense of togetherness amongst them. Angelika seems to express a 
shared sentiment among members of the branch when she calls the break-up of the 
group a “reason why we fit together.” Those who are committed to the same political 
goals and ideals have remained in the group, which enables constructive 
communication and cooperation among the members. This seems in turn also to have 
 One way of looking at this case is to say that deliberative failure occurred because the members of 72
the Sandleiten group are partisans and consider certain political values non-negotiable. This is the 
negative effect of partisanship on deliberation many deliberative democrats stress: strong commitments 
undermine deliberators’ capacity to compromise (e.g. Hendriks et al. 2007, see also the discussion of 
inter-party deliberation and intra-party deliberation in the introduction). Notice however that in the 
present case the “reasonableness” of one party to the conflict—namely those who hold openly racist 
views—is open to question. When that is the case, it seems plausible that similarly uncompromising 
reactions may be observed among non-partisan citizens too. One need not be a partisan in the more 
narrow sense of the term that I employ here to find racist attitudes repulsive and reject compromise 
with people who hold these attitudes. So while there certainly is a connection between partisanship and 
deliberative failure in the current example, the conflict cannot be explained exclusively in these terms.
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increased the branch’s capacity to act: agreements and compromises on collective 
action plans are much more easily crafted when there is agreement on desirable 
political goals and the principles that inform them. So the group split exercised an 
agency-enhancing effect on the group, restoring their previously impaired capacity to 
take collective decisions.  
 Is it surprising that conflicts over the issues of immigration and 
multiculturalism erupted in the Sandleiten group? Probably not. In the conflict-laden 
environment of a large municipal building, where people with immigrant backgrounds 
and citizens who work in low-income jobs or are unemployed live door by door, it 
seems almost inevitable that some people adopt radical views. As Elisabeth, the 
chairwoman of the group, stresses, however, the quarrel within their group is not an 
isolated case: “one really has to candidly say this … it is a problem of Social 
Democracy that there are still, or rather again, … blue [i.e. very right-wing, blue is the 
colour of the far right FPÖ] ideas (Gedankengut) [within the party]. And these are the 
people who massively oppose foreigners and wage war against openness.” If this is 
correct, then the conflict in the Sandleiten branch may be indicative of larger tensions 
within the party, especially at the partisan base. 
 Let us turn now to the second case of type 1 deliberative failure, which 
concerns the defection of individual party members in the Bonn group. This case only 
loosely resembles the break-up of the Sandleiten group. At its heart is not so much an 
intra-group conflict, but the decision of individual members to leave the group for 
reasons to do with the party more generally, and the failure of the group to convince 
them to remain within the party. Although the members of the group mention several 
cases of defection, I want to look only at the most recent one: the case of Petra. This 
case brings out all the important issues at stake in this form of deliberative failure.  
 What happened exactly? Petra, explained the members of the group, left the 
party branch (and thereafter the party) shortly after the membership ballot that the 
SPD held in 2013. To recall: after the 2013 general elections the SPD held an internal 
referendum on the coalition agreement with the conservative CDU/CSU, which 
remains hotly debated among members of the party many of whom question the 
ballot’s democratic credentials. Petra exited the party because she, too, judged the 
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membership ballot democratically suspect. In her view, the party leadership did not 
accept any real internal opposition to the coalition agreement, and simply wanted to 
use the ballot as a means to legitimise its own position. For her, this was intolerable. 
As Katja recounts, 
If I have understood correctly from what I read on Twitter afterwards, then [she left] 
because she was of the opinion that the head of the party’s executive committee 
(Vorstandsspitze) massively manipulated the membership ballot […] in autumn 2013 
… the ballot for or against the grand coalition. And she is not so wrong! It was 
massively manipulated … so she left because of the manipulation that happened 
there. 
 In this passage, Katja not only sums up the reasons for why Petra left the 
party. She also expresses understanding for Petra’s disappointment and, presumably, 
outrage—if not for her decision to defect. “The members of the party’s executive 
committee exercised massive pressure”, says Katja with palpable frustration. “They 
said, ‘if the members vote against [the coalition agreement], then the whole executive 
committee will resign’ … and [they] tried to mobilise (Stimmung machen) in this 
way.” Klaus adds, “this pressure really existed … and this is a classic practice of top-
down politics … to proclaim from the top [of the party hierarchy] (von oben), ‘if the 
[party] base decides in this way, then we resign from our offices … that is indeed 
dubious, though I would not call it manipulative.” While not all members of the 
branch regard the actions of the party executive committee as thus democratically 
questionable, even some of those who later in the discussion reveal that they voted for 
the coalition agreement admit that the design of the ballot was dissatisfying on many 
counts.  
 Does this mean the group supported Petra’s decision to leave the branch and 
the party, or even encouraged her to “vote with her feet”? No—but if we consider how 
the members describe the final exchanges between Petra and the rest of the group 
before her defection, we find that they also did little to persuade her to remain within 
the branch and party. Even though many members of the branch agreed with Petra’s 
judgement concerning the democratic faults of the ballot, they were united in their 
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view that exiting the party is not a fruitful direction. As Klaus puts it, “I always say to 
myself: however much the party leadership blunders, they will never make me leave 
the ‘big tanker.’” Thus, Petra’s position on the issue, namely that the party 
leadership’s actions provide a strong reason to exit the party, ultimately found little 
support within the group. And rather than trying to give her reasons to remain part of 
the branch (and the party), the others simply asserted their position. 
 It might be asked at this point whether this case really involves a deliberative 
failure. Should deliberators not be free to exit deliberations? Is there not, as Warren 
(2011, 693) puts it, “a close correlation between the force of speech and the freedom 
of deliberators to exit arguments they do not find credible”? Of course, individuals’ 
capacity to exit deliberation is important to ensure that the deliberation that does 
occur is among free individuals—free in the sense that “they could, without threat to 
life or livelihood, exit the conversation” (Warren 2011, 694). Yet it must also be 
acknowledged that unilateral withdrawal is hardly ever the result of good deliberation. 
Recall that I have, in the previous chapter, conceptualised deliberation’s central 
justification requirement in terms of a “reason-giving condition” (meaning that a 
speaker must provide reasons rather than simply state her point of view or preference, 
though speakers retain discretion as to what kinds of reasons they give in order to 
render them resonant to their justificatory audience) and an “uptake 
condition” (meaning that the speaker’s justificatory audience must argumentatively 
engage with the reasons provided by the speaker in a way that signals comprehension 
and reflection). Thus, when deliberators simply exit the conversation, as Petra did 
when she defected from the Bonn group, this means that they fail to satisfy the uptake 
condition. In this particular case, it would seem, moreover, that the other members of 
the group did not manage to render their arguments for staying in the group 
sufficiently resonant to Petra. In this sense, the case of Petra’s leaving the Bonn 
branch may straightforwardly be interpreted as a failure of deliberation. 
Type 2: Deliberation does not arise 
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Deliberation within party branches may fail in a further respect: despite favourable 
preconditions for deliberation, branch members may not deliberate much (or at all). In 
the empirical material that was collected for this study, we find two cases of party 
branches in which political discussion rarely arises—the Berlin Mitte group and, 
again, the Vienna Sandleiten group, though there are considerable differences between 
the two groups. Beginning with the Berlin group, here deliberation does fails to occur 
because of the non-decisional nature of their meetings. The members of the group 
usually convene in the context of public talks with external speakers (such as MPs or 
policy experts) who are invited to speak to a particular political topic. Naturally, there 
is no requirement to take a collective decision in these talks, or anyway reach 
agreement on the issue under discussion. As a result, branch members do not discuss 
much. 
 Here is how the group’s members describe their meetings in their own words: 
Stefan: When I think back … we don’t have really big discussions about the topics 
[of the talks]. 
Klara: I would agree with you here … and with respect to the talks [we organise], I 
would also tend to say: there are some requests [by] interested [individuals] … but it 
is not so much about intense (krass) discussion, but about … interest in the topic … 
proper disagreement […] I have not yet experienced. 
Yannick: Well, we do not directly formulate a position in the context of such a talk 
… in this respect … so mostly one discusses a bit and then one splits up 
(auseinandergehen) and then … it was a nice evening [laughter]. It is indeed not the 
case that one directly [writes] a paper … a position paper about the topic of each 
event. Then things would be more controversial I believe. 
 While Yannick suggests that the reasons for the group’s lack of deliberation 
have to do with the already-mentioned non-decisional setup of the meetings, and even 
acknowledges that a different setup would possibly trigger more discussion, Stefan 
offers a different explanation, relating it to strong intra-group agreement: 
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It has always been like this in the branch (Abteilung) … that it was more shaped by 
consensus than confrontation. Why this is the case, I can’t say at all. But strangely 
enough … we tend to be oriented towards consensus. It’s not all rosy or so (lieb 
Kind), but I have rarely experienced issues about which we had really adversarial 
discussions. 
Gino adds to this that there are sometimes disagreements in the group, though these 
are easy to settle. 
There are from time to time different standpoints [among the members], but … those 
are in part … discussed away through proposals somebody makes, and then one 
somehow finds agreement. And then everything’s alright again. 
 The general impression one gets from reading these passages is that the group 
members are unconcerned with, perhaps even appreciative of, the fact that there is so 
little disagreement and debate—that is, little conversation of deliberative character—
in their meetings. At the same time, it seems that this story of internal consensus and 
harmony is not entirely consistent. Later in the interview, members of the group 
mention that there are several topics on which they regularly disagree. As I have 
noted in chapter 3, for example, one recurring conflict within the Berlin group is that 
over cycling policy, where the views of the older members and the views of the 
younger members appear almost irreconcilable. In this case of internal disagreement, 
there is no trace of pre-deliberative consensus and internal harmony whatsoever. So it 
seems that members like Stefan overstate the unity of the group when they claim that 
the branch is generally “oriented towards consensus.” A more plausible reason for 
why deliberation does not occur with great regularity is that alluded to by Yannick: 
the design of the group meetings fails to provide incentives for members to deliberate. 
If there is no requirement to develop a shared position, there is of course little point in 
thoroughly discussing complex issues (on this point, see Thompson 2008, 502-504). 
One might as well just have a “nice evening” together. 
 Moving now to the Vienna Sandleiten group, this presents an especially 
challenging case of this second kind of deliberative failure. In short, the group 
generally conceives itself as a collective of “doers” rather than “talkers”, which leads 
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some members even to pride themselves on their apparent refusal to deliberate. An 
emblematic example is how Angelika describes the group: 
What we do is political … with a political background. We all know that. But I would 
put it … in one sentence … thus: we do not talk, like the politicians on TV, but we 
act. It is political and we do it and everyone sees that. We need not sit down and argue 
like the politicians on TV, because we anyways see that all the time. Rather we know 
what we stand for, we know what we want, we know that it is political, and we do it. 
[…] And we will also not sit down and … because Erik has a different opinion, I have 
a different opinion … and if we’d then start to quarrel about this, this would be 
useless. It is much smarter to say: we do something for the people, for the elderly, for 
the children. 
 The populist sentiment Angelika expresses in terms of juxtaposing the group 
with “politicians on TV” is widely shared within the group and constitutive of its 
identity. Most members of the branch see themselves as doing the sort of political 
work that “really matters”—in contrast to the many party functionaries and elites 
who, as Elisabeth says, “have only their own career advancement in mind”, or, as 
Bojan says, “have a comfortable life […] and do not think of us.” As Angelika’s 
longer statement reveals, one central aspect of this differentiation is the assertion of 
the primacy of action over talk. Whereas professional politics is associated with cheap 
talk, the group conceives its own initiatives in the local community as having a 
palpably positive impact on people’s lives. In this connection, group members 
generally see little value in talking about their views and disagreements—unless it is 
absolutely necessary in order to, say, organise an event or help others in a coordinated 
fashion.  But these disagreements are rarely substantive political ones. 73
 This position is interesting as it evinces a distinctively non-deliberative self-
identity which is not found in any other group. While it is difficult to say how much 
this actually affects the group’s deliberative practice, however, it generally seems as 
though the group members overdraw their non-deliberativeness. Although the 
Sandleiten group may be the “least deliberative” group of those that have been studied 
 Compare Nina Eliasoph’s excellent anthropological study Avoiding Politics (1998). Studying civic 73
groups in America, Eliasoph traces a culture of apathy, where citizens are “too busy” to care about 
political issues beyond those that affect themselves or their local environment.
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here, it is not the case that its members on principle baulk at discussing political 
issues. Extended political discussions, in which arguments are weighed and 
developed, do sometimes occur. In the next sub-section, we shall look closely at one 
such discussion, which arose in the context of the interview. The analysis will reveal 
polarising tendencies, meaning that group members tend simply to affirm each other’s 
positions without sustained exposure to competing views. This constitutes a 
deliberative failure in its own right. 
Type 3: Polarising tendencies  
There is one remaining sense in which deliberation within party branches may fail. 
That is that the members of a branch persistently affirm, rather than question, each 
others’ views when they discuss. I call this third type of deliberative failure 
“polarising tendencies”, since groups may move to extreme positions when its 
members continually hear echoes of their own voices. This phenomenon, standardly 
called “group polarisation”, has been extensively studied by Cass Sunstein (2002 and 
2009), who gives two explanations for why it might occur.  The first is that members 74
of a deliberating group generally want to be perceived favourably by other group 
members. As they fear loss of reputation by being in the minority, they adjust their 
views to those of the majority. The second explanation is that the majority can supply 
more arguments in support of their position and thereby strengthen their confidence in 
their views, persuade those who are undecided, and silence potential opponents. In 
either case, group members take decisions not so much on the basis of arguments, but 
driven by social dynamics. This makes polarisation a distinctive deliberative failure. 
 Deliberating groups are most likely to polarise if they see themselves as 
sharing a salient identity, and if they meet regularly over time while minimising 
exposure to competing views (Sunstein 2002, 182). This implies that partisan groups 
 Though standard, the term “group polarisation” is somewhat misleading. As Sunstein (2002, 178) 74
clarifies, “It is not meant to suggest that group members will shift to the poles, nor does it refer to an 
increase in variance among groups, though this may be the ultimate result. Instead the term refers to a 
predictable shift within a group discussing a case or problem. As the shift occurs, groups, and group 
members, move and coalesce, not toward the middle of antecedent dispositions, but toward a more 
extreme position in the direction indicated by those dispositions.”
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may generally be vulnerable to polarisation. To the extent that members of these 
groups agree on a wide range of positions, there is a significant risk that deliberation 
will shift both the group and individuals to positions that earlier they might not have 
accepted (see Ypi forthcoming, 24).  Recall that this was one of the reasons why I 75
have introduced a diversity test for party branches in chapter 3: diversity has a 
depolarising effect as it counteracts the social dynamics that lead members of a group 
to shift their preferences toward the dominant view.  Recall also that the party groups 76
that were studied for this thesis generally passed this test, which implies that they are 
unlikely to exhibit polarising tendencies. On closer inspection, however, it turns out 
that one group leans towards the sort of “self-confirming” talk that often leads groups 
to polarise. The group in question is, once again, the Vienna Sandleiten group. A 
passage in which Erik, Bojan and Yvonne discuss what they find most objectionable 
about today’s politics and politicians brings out the problem at stake. 
Erik: The economy is dictating our parties, whoever, what they have to do! And our 
politicians, in my opinion, they only care about having a good job after all those years 
in politics … in which they have altered the laws in order to have it easy afterwards. 
Yvonne: Exactly! They only care about themselves. 
Erik: The cash cow (Melkkuh, meaning here “those who have to pay”) is he who 
works. 
Bojan: Yes, yes. 
Erik: I always thought that I was part of the middle class … [now] I was told I am 
not part of the middle class but belong to the poor. Even though I am a skilled worker 
(Facharbeiter) … [and] work accordingly [many] hours. 
 Ypi (forthcoming, 24) argues that polarising tendencies play an important role in sustaining partisans’ 75
political commitment, as they ensure that “agents do not give up too easily on political projects they 
have thought worthy of endorsement” despite “epistemic pressure”, that is, information that might call 
into question the value of certain commitments. In other words, some level of polarisation may be 
required for partisans to remain convinced that their political activism is necessary and worthwhile.  
 Just how much diversity is required to avoid polarisation is, of course, very difficult to determine. 76
Insisting on any bright-line threshold may unfairly call for false precision. As a basic rule, diversity 
should ensure that there is no dominant majority prior to deliberation, which is capable of silencing 
alternative views. 
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Yvonne: There are only poor people anymore, it seems. 
Erik: Yes … that’s how it is. 
Bojan: No, it would be good if we had people somewhere in politics who also come 
from normal jobs … as workers or not as entrepreneurs. But now we have only 
people who have studied and … theory and practice, you know … they are very good 
at negotiating. […] But it would be good that there are people in parliament who 
really were workers, who maybe even were on unemployment benefits at some point, 
who maybe have children too, who they have to raise. […] I do say that people who 
have studied deserve the money … because they have studied, because they work 
hard for it. But in politics itself one ought to … 
Erik [interposing]: … look more after the people! 
Bojan: Look after the people! And think to oneself, “what would I do now if I was a 
normal worker?” 
 In this passage, participants affirm and reinforce each others’ views, creating 
an “echo chamber” in which alternative perspectives are barely taken into account. 
This is precisely the kind of talk that usually produces group polarisation. When we 
consider the substantive content of the discussion, moreover, we find that the populist 
refrain of politics and politicians being out of touch with “ordinary people” is 
consistent with the group’s self-identity as a collective of politically committed 
citizens who are distinctively different from the ostensibly self-interested “politicians 
on TV.” Repeated polarising discussions are highly likely to strengthen and sustain 
this self-identity, leading to a greater sense of alienation from party elites and top-
level politics.  
 One way of looking at the deliberative deficiencies of the Sandleiten group is 
to see them as interrelated with each other, or perhaps more precisely, following from 
each other. When the group split (type 1 deliberative failure), internal opposition was 
virtually eliminated. The resultant unity among members helped form and strengthen 
the group’s self-identity, which happens to take a non-deliberative shape (type 2 
deliberative failure). This self-identity is in turn continually buttressed by repeated 
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exchanges in which members of the group affirm each others’ positions and refuse to 
take into account competing arguments and opinions (type 3 deliberative failure). It is 
not difficult to interpret these three deliberative failures in terms of a linear 
progression, with the break-up of the group constituting the root cause of later 
deliberative failures. The relatively low deliberative capacity of the Sandleiten group 
(compared with the other groups) can in this way be seen as directly resulting from 
the event that gave the group its present shape (i.e. the recent split-up of the group). 
 A final point worth noting is that although the polarising tendencies of the 
Sandleiten group present a clear case of deliberative failure, they may have some 
positive “systemic” consequences, in the sense that they may have a positive impact 
on the immediate environment in which the group operates. For the branch members’ 
unflinching commitment to equality and inclusiveness, which in part led to the break-
up of the group, may perform an integrative function in the conflict-prone, ethnically 
diverse context of the Sandleitenhof, the large municipal building complex that 
provides the group’s main area of activity. The actions and initiatives this commitment 
motivates—for example the community events the group organises (see ch. 2)—can 
promote dialogue between different ethnic and religious groups and facilitate peaceful 
coexistence. From the egalitarian perspective I am assuming by endorsing a 
deliberative approach to democracy, it may in fact be preferable to have members of 
the group find epistemic support among their peers (even at the cost of polarisation) 
than to have them renounce their commitments in an environment where, as we have 
seen, radically anti-egalitarian views are rife.  So there may well be something 77
defensible in the Sandleiten group’s polarising tendencies. 
 However, none of this should distract from the fact that the same deliberative 
failures may in a different context lead to quite different, possibly normatively 
objectionable, results. The group of partisans who left the Sandleiten branch when it 
split up is a case in point: their openly racist and exclusionary political commitments 
were nourished by repeated exchanges in which they refused to consider alternative 
 This is not an unfamiliar point in deliberative theory. In a famous article concerned with the tension 77
between deliberation and confrontational political activism, for example, Fung (2005) suggests that the 
extent of permissible deviation from deliberative norms increases according to the adversity of political 
circumstances. I think this is in principle correct, precisely for the reasons I have given here. But it is 
also clear that even if we may reasonably consider a deviation from deliberative norms permissible, it 
remains a deviation from deliberative norms.
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lines of argument. This is why they were unwilling to engage in constructive 
communication with those who eventually seized control of the branch in the first 
place. This ambivalence is built into deliberative failures, as I have argued earlier. 
Whether they are normatively problematic is largely context-dependent and has to be 
evaluated on a case-to-case basis. One major challenge for designing a defensible 
deliberative model of intra-party democracy is therefore to maximise the positive 
effects of deliberative failures, and minimise the impact of their negative effects. How 
this might be achieved is the question I shall address in the next section. 
Deliberative failures and institutional design 
It is important to bear in mind that the just-discussed cases of deliberative failure are 
singular instances: they do not reflect broader tendencies that are found across the 
party branches that were studied for this thesis. Nonetheless they are indicative of the 
possible ways in which partisan deliberation may fail. As I have suggested, a tenable 
deliberative model of intra-party democracy will have to include institutional 
safeguards that prevent deliberative failures of this kind, or anyway limit their 
negative impacts. In order to appeal to theorists and practitioners, it will have to make 
deliberative failures tractable. My ambition in this final section is to reflect on how 
this might be done. I want to sketch a palette of small-scale reforms for party 
branches: (1) training moderators; (2) linking individual deliberative groups together; 
and (3) raising the group’s influence. Each of these proposals is consistent with the 
account of intra-party democracy presented in chapter 1, and responsive to the 
intuitions animating this larger thesis. 
Trained moderators 
The first reform I want to suggest is to introduce trained moderators in party branches, 
whose interventions can reduce the likelihood of deliberative failures. 
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 Designers of deliberative experiments (e.g. deliberative polls) routinely put 
much effort into selecting and training moderators for the discussions. Typically 
moderators are advised to make subtle interventions to keep deliberation on track 
without pushing participants towards certain decisions. To take an example, Luskin 
and his colleagues (2014, 118) record that they trained their moderators 
to intervene only neutrally and as little as possible. There was no push towards (or 
away from) consensus; the participants were explicitly told that they need not agree 
on anything, and that they might come to agree either more or less over the course of 
the day. 
 Similarly, Steiner’s (2012, 253-255) extensive list of recommendations for 
deliberative moderators, which is based on evaluations of past deliberative 
experiments, includes guidelines like the following: 
If participants support an argument with personal or group interests, moderators 
should welcome such justifications. However, they should relate these special 
interests to the public interest, with formulations like (…) “We have now heard how 
this measure will help you or your group, which we understand. Could you now 
please reflect on how the measure will impact other people, perhaps also in other 
countries and future generations?” (Steiner 2012, 254) 
Such guidelines are intended to prevent deliberation from taking an inward-looking 
character that might lead groups to polarise. 
 In party branches, one need of course not specially recruit moderators. 
Branches usually have an elected chairperson who, in addition to participating in 
internal discussions and debates, also acts as moderator. My proposal is to acquaint 
these chairpersons with best practices in deliberative moderation, instilling in them a 
sensitivity towards all the sorts of problems that might arise in deliberating groups, 
and giving them the tools to prevent those problems from arising. Parties could 
achieve this for example by committing branch chairpersons to attend a number of 
training events when they are elected into their position, in which they receive advice 
from deliberative practitioners like those who design “artificial” deliberative events.  
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 This proposal targets all three types of deliberative failure. Firstly, specially 
trained chairpersons could prevent group splits or defections by mediating between 
rival sub-groups in the branch, or between single members and the rest of the group. 
They could de-emphasise difference and encourage participants to address each other 
in a constructive fashion, as moderators have successfully done in deliberative 
experiments in deeply divided societies (Caluwaerts and Deschouwer 2014; Luskin et 
al. 2014). Secondly, trained chairpersons could promote deliberation in branches in 
which deliberation rarely arises by inviting members to reflect on issues from 
different perspectives, taking into account (for example) how they might impact other 
groups in society. This kind of perspective-taking could, thirdly, also counteract 
tendencies of polarisation, where participants to deliberation refuse to reflect on 
arguments and opinions offered by proponents of radically different views. 
 Let me guard against a natural worry. Is relying on trained moderators to 
promote good deliberation within party branches not potentially inconsistent with the 
context-sensitive conception of deliberation I have endorsed in this thesis? Does 
instructing moderators to act upon “best practices” in deliberative moderation not 
imply compelling them to apply decontextualised criteria of how a political discussion 
should best be conducted? Responding to this concern allows me to clarify an 
important aspect of my proposal. I am by no means proposing that moderators should 
lead discussions according to strict guidelines that they are not permitted to modify. 
The point is rather that moderators should have a basic understanding of how 
moderation is typically conducted in deliberative settings, what deliberative failures 
are and how they could be averted. Once familiarised with this information, they 
should of course be free to make their interventions responsive to the particular 
circumstances of deliberation in their branch. So there is no trade-off between 




My second proposal, which targets the second and third types of deliberative failure 
(i.e. deliberation fails to arise and polarising tendencies), is to assemble the members 
of different party branches in regular joint deliberative events. One way of achieving 
this is to create “problem-oriented” partisan fora, as suggested in chapter 1. Such fora 
could for example convene the members of several randomly selected party branches 
in a larger deliberative setting to devise a strategy for the party in a particular policy 
field. They could address tasks like drafting a party or election manifesto, and make 
these exercises more collaborative and interactive.  
 Problem-oriented fora could help avert type 2 and 3 deliberative failures in the 
following way: if the members of two or more party branches are clustered together in 
a single forum, this increases the diversity of viewpoints in the forum, and so 
counteracts both deliberation-impeding levels of intra-group agreement (like in the 
Berlin group) and polarising tendencies (like in the Vienna Sandleiten group). 
Increased opinion diversity counteracts (1) deliberation-impeding levels of agreement 
within a group, since it increases the likelihood of disagreements, as well as (2) the 
twin social dynamics that lead members of a group to shift their preferences toward 
the majority view, since the more internally diverse a group is the less likely will there 
be a dominant majority that can silence opposition or instil in members a fear of loss 
of reputation by being in the minority (see above and the discussion of what I have 
called the “diversity desideratum” in chapter 3). 
Empowering branches 
The third and final proposal is to empower individual party branches, connecting their 
deliberations more directly to decisions. This proposal chimes with much of what I 
have suggested in chapter 1 of this thesis. And here again, problem-oriented fora may 
be the most promising design option. If these fora are designed in such a way as to 
promote a continuous and symbiotic relationship between the party’s decision makers 
and the members on the ground, in which the latter can visibly impact on the actions 
of the former, this may help prevent deliberative failure in at least two respects. First, 
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giving branch members decision-making power can offset the anti-deliberative 
impulses of non-decisional designs like that of the Berlin group, where members have 
little reason to discuss issues in a thorough fashion. To put it simply, that their 
deliberations matter can create a powerful incentive for branch members actually to 
deliberate. Second, involving individual branches in collaborative decision-making 
exercises can disincentivise the kind of “enclave deliberation” that commonly leads to 
group polarisation. If groups which tend to isolate themselves from the rest of the 
party (or perhaps even the rest of society), like the Vienna Sandleiten group, are given 
the opportunity to exercise influence on larger decisions, they will not only be unable 
to uphold their self-image as marginalised and excluded. Also they might be 
compelled to consider a much wider range of arguments than they would initially be 
inclined to. So in addition to serving an important democratic function, empowering 
party branches can also raise the quality of deliberation and avert deliberative failures. 
Conclusion 
There are many reasons why deliberation might fail, and perhaps equally many ways 
in which it can fail. Within party branches, deliberation may fail in at least three ways; 
or so this chapter has argued. Party branches may break-up or single members may 
defect. Deliberation may not, or only seldom, arise. Or, branches may display 
tendencies to polarisation, where branch members shift their preferences towards the 
majority view without weighing alternative perspectives. To avoid these failures, or at 
least minimise their negative impacts, an internally deliberative party requires 
“institutional safeguards”—moderation within branches ought to be professionalised, 
and individual branches should be connected with other branches in regular joint 
deliberative events, as well as equipped with more decision-making powers (for an 
overview, see Table 4). The latter two of these safeguards are already built into the 
deliberative model of intra-party democracy I have outlined in chapter 1. This 
proposes to convene members of different branches in problem-oriented fora and to 
connect their deliberations to decisions affecting the party as a whole. 
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Table 5: Summary of the analysis 
 While I think that these institutional design proposals would already go a long 
way in addressing the causes underlying most deliberative failures, however, it seems 
that an internally deliberative party cannot—and perhaps should not—be made 
completely failure-proof. Insofar as such a model of party is premised on a conception 
of the citizen as capable of agency and reasoning, there can be no one-size-fits-all 
strategy for preventing failures of deliberation. Institutional design can make party 
branches a more supportive environment for deliberation, and make deliberation more 
constructive, but it cannot not eliminate the possibility that deliberation might misfire. 
Yet the modicum of uncertainty this leaves us with (Will deliberation arise? Will it 
succeed?) is nothing to scorn or bemoan, but the natural consequence of a conception 
of intra-party democracy that entrusts members at the party base with discussing and 
deciding on the direction of the party. It is the inevitable result of treating them as 
self-determining agents who are capable of taking reasoned decisions on what the 
party should stand for and what policies it should support.  
Type of deliberative failure Reasons for failure Institutional safeguard
(Type 1) Group splits and 
individual defections
Irreconcilable differences 
between party members; 
inability to talk across lines of 
difference.
Introducing trained moderators. 
(Type 2) Deliberation does not 
arise
Members of a group overstate 
intra-group agreement or hold 
anti-deliberative attitudes.
Introducing trained moderators; 
connecting partisan groups; 
empowering single groups.
(Type 3) Group polarisation Members of a group shift their 
preferences towards the 
majority view without 
considering alternative views.
Introducing trained moderators; 




Conclusion: The Challenges of Deliberative Reforms 
Summary of the argument 
This thesis started with a diagnosis: the linkage between citizens and political parties 
is waning, weakening the capacity of parties to perform their important representative 
functions. The thesis then proposed a normatively attractive strategy to counter this 
tendency and reconnect citizens with parties. I argued for empowering local party 
branches, bringing their deliberations to bear on decisions about policy and the party’s 
more general direction. Party branches, these traditional sites of partisan activism, 
were placed at the centre of the “deliberative model of intra-party democracy” I 
outlined, first because they provide natural fora of political discussion, and second 
because they are closely linked to the local communities in which their members are 
based. A third and related virtue of party branches is that they are the only spaces of 
partisan activism that are open to the wider citizenry; as Duverger ([1954] 1990, 39) 
observed, “you only need to wish to belong to be able to do so.” Linking branches 
more directly to decisions, so the argument went, could therefore go a long way in 
strengthening a party’s footing in the wider citizenry. 
 Because it focuses on the deliberations of ordinary party members—
discursive exchanges, in which they form their preferences about particular political 
proposals by weighing arguments for and against—a deliberative model of intra-party 
democracy can also correct for the shortcomings of the dominant candidate selection 
and direct participation models of intra-party democracy. Since these models lack 
empowered venues of critical debate, they tend to drown out the voices of those party 
members who seek to promote alternative party visions, and in so doing reinforce the 
status quo. The deliberative model neutralises this status quo bias by treating intra-
party dissent as a resource the party can harness for its own benefit. It encourages 
party members to discuss, disagree and cooperate in making collective decisions that 
will inevitably be more informed and considered more legitimate than a simple 
majority decision. Importantly, however, the model is not meant to supplant candidate 
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selection procedures or occasional moments of direct democracy. As I have argued, a 
functioning party requires these “aggregative” mechanisms. Consistent with the 
theory of deliberative democracy, the deliberative model of intra-party democracy 
defines itself not in opposition to more conventional democratic mechanisms but as 
supplementing and improving these mechanisms in important ways (on such a view, 
see Goodin 2008). 
 Taking these theoretical reflections “outdoors”, the empirical part of the thesis 
addressed the question of whether organising intra-party democracy around party 
members’ deliberations is at all a viable idea. Demonstrating that citizens are capable 
of deliberating well is a standard way of establishing the potential of deliberative 
institutional designs (see Fung 2003; Mackenzie and Warren 2012); so my principal 
concern was with probing the quality of party members’ deliberations. Drawing on 
material collected in group interviews with members of local party branches in Social 
Democratic parties in Germany (SPD) and Austria (SPÖ), I examined whether party 
branches provide favourable preconditions for deliberation and whether the 
discussions arising within party branches reach basic deliberative standards. The 
picture that has emerged from the analysis was overall encouraging. Not only do party 
branches provide a supportive environment for constructive and respectful 
deliberative encounters. The exchanges their members engage in are also marked by 
the mutual provision of reasons, the hallmark of good deliberation. The analysis 
moreover found no salient differences between the two countries, which disconfirms 
the initial expectation that divergent motivations for partisan activism in German and 
Austria will be reflected in varying levels of deliberative capacity among branch 
members. In short, the empirical analysis emphatically affirmed the deliberative 
capacity of party branches. In order to complete this picture, I also investigated 
instances of “deliberative failure” within the branches and suggested institutional 
designs for making these failures tractable. Here it turned out that some of the 
deliberative institutions that were suggested in the discussion of the deliberative 
model of intra-party democracy can correct for many potential deliberative 
deficiencies. So none of the observed failures of intra-party deliberation would seem 
to undermine the overall potential of the model. 
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 Although the evidence I have marshalled is tentative and preliminary, and one 
should be careful with extrapolating from the findings, the results of the study 
generally give reason to believe that deliberative institutions such as problem-oriented 
fora, and partisan deliberative conferences and networks could successfully be 
implemented into the organisational architecture of parties. Parties, at least the 
established mainstream parties that were studied here, appear to possess the requisite 
deliberative resources: venues that provide favourable circumstances for deliberative 
exchanges and members who deliberate. Making parties more internally deliberative 
may be ambitious, in other words—but it is not out of reach. A deliberative model of 
intra-party democracy is a “workable ideal.” 
Are deliberative reforms really feasible? 
Some readers might find this conclusion disturbingly naïve. Reforming parties in the 
way proposed in this thesis, it may be objected, is illusory. Internal reforms cannot be 
achieved without the consent of party elites, and those elites will resist establishing 
deliberative designs as empowering ordinary members would imply a significant loss 
of power on their part. Thus a deliberative model of intra-party democracy is not 
feasible, though for reasons that have nothing to do with the deliberative capacity of 
party members. 
 But even if we believe that the observation that contemporary party elites are 
fundamentally interested in holding onto power is empirically accurate, the temptation 
to dismiss the proposal for making parties more deliberative as infeasible on these 
grounds must be resisted. To see why, let us first consider a more basic question. What 
does it mean to say a political ideal is “feasible”? To be sure, when it comes political 
ideals, the only plausible conception of feasibility we can adopt is a permissive one. 
As Valentini (2014, 791) puts it, we must not understand feasibility in terms of 
“feasible here and now”, since by this standard of feasibility “hardly any political 
ideal would count as feasible.” Imagine someone saying, “the ideal of a just society is 
not feasible because it cannot be realised tomorrow.” This makes little sense and 
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rightly strikes us as excessively conservative. Therefore, we should think of feasibility 
in the context of political ideals in terms of having reason to hope that a given ideal 
can be achieved, or at least approximated, from the status quo (Valentini 2014, 791; 
also see Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012).  
 Do we have reason to hope that the deliberative model of intra-party 
democracy proposed in this thesis can be achieved or approximated? I think yes. Even 
assuming that contemporary party elites are likely to block deliberative reforms, their 
preferences and behaviour may change over time.  Given the serious decline in 78
public support for established parties and the rise of ever stronger competitor parties, 
it is certainly possible to imagine that the elites who are in charge of the former 
parties will at some point feel compelled to initiate party reforms that go beyond 
paying lip service to internal democratisation in order to regain the support of the 
citizenry (and they might do so for purely self-interested reasons). Seen in this light, a 
deliberative model of intra-party democracy may indeed be considered feasible. 
 Let me be clear that I am not suggesting that the resistance of party elites to 
internal reforms isn’t a major obstacle to realising a deliberative model of intra-party 
democracy. It certainly is, and it will be hard to overcome, not least because parties 
have gradually established effective ways of minimising the costs of losing office 
(e.g. continuous access to public money), which significantly reduces the force with 
which electoral incentives apply to them (Katz and Mair 2009). What I am suggesting 
is that we must resist thinking about these obstacles in a deterministic fashion, 
assuming that the current state of parties is unchangeable. Importantly, deterministic 
thinking is not only implausible when it comes to parties; it is also intellectually 
hazardous, in that it easily leads one to deny the possibility of shaping and designing 
institutions in accordance with political ideals, and so to be seduced by the false 
promises of radical solutions that might lead to outcomes that differ from, perhaps 
even contradict, those which one has initially favoured. The biography of Roberto 
 Consider also the possibility that party members themselves may mount successful collective efforts 78
gradually to change the organisational structure of parties. In many established parties one finds 
internal movements pushing for the democratisation of decision-making procedures, and it is hard to 
think of a good reason for why none of them could succeed over time. If these movements consist of 
young party members—as is the case in the Sektion 8, for example, a group of young partisans who 
seek to promote organisational reform in the Austrian SPÖ—they may indeed grow increasingly 
influential with generational change.
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Michels, the great scholar of intra-party democracy, should serve as a warning 
example: frustrated by his deterministic belief that parties cannot be internally 
democratic (Michels famously spoke of an “iron law of oligarchy” in this connection), 
and that an emancipatory mass politics can therefore take no democratic shape, he 
eventually sought refuge in the authoritarianism of Mussolini’s fascism (see the 
biographical preface in Michels [1911] 1989).  
 Note that adopting an anti-determinist stance does not imply having to 
renounce one’s critical assessment of contemporary parties. One can retain the view 
that party elites are self-interested and power-seeking while accepting that, at critical 
moments at least, they can adjust their preferences and make consequential choices 
than run counter to our most pessimistic expectations. This has in fact been a long-
standing objection to disenchanted accounts of party organisation (like Michels’s) 
which see oligarchy and elite domination as inevitable: they overlook very real 
possibilities for organisational innovation and renewal (Panebianco 1988, 17). 
Can party members cope with complexity? 
There is another, more fine-grained, objection to the conclusion I have presented. For 
a deliberative model of intra-party democracy to get off the ground, it may be said, 
party members must be able to cope with complex and multidimensional policy 
issues. If they lack the epistemic competence to navigate complexity, there is no point 
in giving them the suggested degree of policy influence. The empirical evidence 
presented in the thesis leaves us guessing here. It shows that party members can 
deliberate well about basic political topics (Is the party leadership committed to 
internal democracy?, How can people living in poverty be appropriately supported?), 
but it says nothing about whether they are also capable of deliberating well about 
more intricate policy issues. Since this capacity is not established, it is by no means 
clear that the discussed deliberative reforms will work. 
 Notice that this objection is mainly an empirical one, and so cannot be 
rebutted conclusively here. But let me make two points in reply. First, while it is true 
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that this thesis provides no evidence suggesting that party members can deliberate 
well about complex policy issues, there is no straightforward reason to believe that 
they might not be capable of doing so. Empirical studies of designed deliberative 
events reveal that ordinary citizens can handle complexity with great sophistication, 
provided that they have access to the relevant information (e.g. the comprehensive 
volumes on Australian Citizens’ Parliament by Carson et al. [2013] or the British 
Columbia Citizens’ Assembly by Warren and Pearse [2008]).  If citizens without 79
much political experience can cope well with challenging policy questions, it seems 
reasonable to expect partisans, who naturally have a deep interest in politics and 
instinctively draw on a shared partisan platform to make sense of the political world, 
to cope at least as well. Consider in this connection also the increasingly popular 
“diversity trumps ability” argument, which holds that larger, more cognitively diverse 
groups can solve complex problems better than small groups of experts (Landemore 
2013, esp. ch. 4).  If correct, this argument gives us another reason to think that party 80
members could effectively handle the epistemic challenges of modern policy making. 
After all, as we have seen in chapter 3, party memberships are internally diverse, 
encompassing people with a wide range of different experiences and fields of 
expertise. 
 The second reply to the objection from complexity is that the issues party 
members would deal with in intra-party deliberative fora will not always or 
necessarily be very technical. As I have suggested in chapter 1, the different fora of a 
deliberative model of intra-party democracy (i.e. the problem-oriented forum, the 
partisan deliberative network and the partisan deliberative conference) are intended to 
address rather different deliberative tasks, which need not be extremely epistemically 
challenging. For example, while the problem-oriented forum design is meant to allow 
 In the studies of deliberative experiments cited here, it is also often noted that trained moderators can 79
help deliberators better cope with complex issues—for example by providing them with additional 
evidence and suggesting leads as to how this evidence could relate to the problems at stake. This means 
that my proposal of using trained moderators in intra-party deliberations (see ch. 5) may also have the 
happy effect of raising the sophistication of those deliberations.
 Based on findings from cognitive science and psychology, this argument is perhaps developed in 80
greatest detail in Hélène Landemore’s recent book Democratic Reason (2013). Note that I do not take a 
position here on whether the argument is correct: it is, after all, based on contestable empirical findings 
(see Ancell, forthcoming). All I want to do is highlight that there is potentially a strong epistemic case 
to be made in favour of involving party members in deliberations about complex policy questions.
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deliberation over very specific policy problems, and thus requires party members to 
cope with complex matters, the partisan deliberative network consists of a plurality of 
single branches (or “nodes”) which only address limited aspects of specific issues in 
their deliberations. In the latter case, party members will presumably not discuss 
issues that are more complex than those which they presently deliberate about in their 
branches. The general point here is that the institutions proposed in chapter 1 do not 
all require party members to be able to handle complex and multidimensional policy 
issues; so the idea of making parties more deliberative does not stand and fall with the 
capacity of party members to cope with complexity. But as I said in the previous 
paragraph, there are in any case good reasons to believe that complexity is a challenge 
party members can master. 
Is the model sustainable? 
A third worry concerns what might be called the sustainability of the deliberative 
model of intra-party democracy. Granted that the model is feasible, does it provide an 
attractive organisational template for future generations of politically engaged 
citizens? The specific concern is that the model has been developed and vindicated on 
the basis of observations about existing partisans and the ways in which they 
participate politically, without addressing the possibility that the motivational 
underpinnings of partisan activism may change over time. Is the model sufficiently 
sensitive to changing participatory demands? 
 This worry is plausible. Over the course of the 20th century, we have witnessed 
a tectonic shift in the structure of partisan engagement. While initially citizens tended 
to participate in parties because they belonged to a particular segment of society (e.g. 
workers),  
[w]ith more political information available to a more educated electorate, more 
citizens now possess the political skills and resources necessary to become self-
sufficient in politics. These changes mean that contemporary publics are less likely to 
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defer to party elites or to support a party simply out of habit” (Dalton and Wattenberg 
2000, 11).  
This transformation is by no means completed. With increasing “cognitive 
mobilisation”—that is, the increasing ability to process political information and the 
increasing availability and accessibility of that information—a growing number of 
politically active citizens seek political expression in non-traditional participatory 
channels such as online fora, blogs, and so on, and increasingly turn their backs onto 
precisely the kinds of institutions the deliberative model of intra-party democracy 
seeks to empower. Assuming that these trends will not arrest or reverse overnight, the 
question of sustainability then becomes a question of whether a deliberative model of 
intra-party democracy can provide an appealing alternative platform for more and 
more cognitively mobilised citizens. 
 This question can be answered by returning to an argument I have suggested in 
the introduction of the thesis, in the context of the discussion of the mass party model. 
This is that the deliberative model of intra-party democracy is especially well-
equipped to cater to the participatory demands of a cognitively mobilised and 
individualist citizenry because it allows them openly to express their views regardless 
of whether or not these views are consistent with the party line, and, even more 
importantly, because it signals to them that their views are taken seriously in the 
process of internal will formation (this point is developed at length in Invernizzi 
Accetti and Wolkenstein, forthcoming). These characteristics of the deliberative party 
seem indeed likely to increase the attractiveness of parties as participatory venues and 
generate an incentive for future citizens to engage more in partisan politics. So, 
insofar as sustainability is a matter of responding to increasing levels of cognitive 
mobilisation, the deliberative model of intra-party democracy would also seem to 
meet the sustainability requirement. At the very least, it seems able to go a long way 
in satisfying the corresponding participatory demands. 
Directions for future research 
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In establishing that deliberation constitutes an important dimension of intra-party 
democracy, the present thesis points towards a new research agenda for scholars 
interested in political parties. In these final paragraphs, let me highlight a cluster of 
promising areas for future research. Each calls for a fundamentally interdisciplinary 
approach to the study of parties that draws creatively from the rich resources political 
theory and empirical political science offer. 
 Intra-party deliberation and electoral systems. The first promising area for 
future inquiry concerns the complex relationship between intra-party deliberation and 
electoral systems. This topic is important in the light of recent theoretical attempts to 
link the deliberative credentials of parties to the electoral system in which they 
operate. Perhaps the most notable contribution in this emerging field has come from 
Daniel Weinstock (2015), who suggests that intra-party deliberation will reach higher 
quality in first-past-the-post voting systems than in proportional representation 
systems. This, Weinstock argues, is because first-past-the-post systems tend to create 
“big tent” parties with platforms covering the full range of policies that are of concern 
to the electorate. In order to create such platforms, party members have to work out 
reasonably complete and coherent conceptions of the common good in their internal 
deliberations (on this point, see also Rosenblum 2008, 359-360).  In proportional 81
representation systems, on the other hand, parties need not offer voters comprehensive 
platforms of this kind. They can campaign on a small set of issues or even on a single 
issue. This relaxes the requirement of considering questions about the good of the 
political community at large. 
 The first question this argument raises is empirical: is it true that parties with 
comprehensive platforms are peculiar to first-past-the-post voting systems? There is 
certainly reason to doubt the suggested connection between comprehensive platforms 
and first-past-the-post elections. For one, the two parties that have been studied in this 
thesis arguably qualify as parties with wide-ranging policy platforms, but neither 
 As Weinstock (2015) puts it, in deliberating their party’s agenda, party members will have to engage 81
in a “process of integration”, wherein they have to “think hard about how to fold the concerns of the 
party’s constituent groupings into a coherent set of policies” and meet halfway on positions that all can 
accept.
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Germany nor Austria are first-past-the-post systems.  Consider furthermore the so-82
called “niche parties” that emerged across Europe in the 1980s. These parties—mostly 
far-right nationalist parties and Green parties—first campaigned on a small set of 
issues that were neglected by the political mainstream. Over time, however, and with 
increasing electoral success, they developed positions on a broad range of policy 
issues. So, might the comprehensiveness of a party’s outlook be the consequence of 
electoral persistence and success, rather than of the voting system in which the party 
operates? And might the quality of intra-party deliberation, therefore, be a function 
not of the electoral system but of the party’s age and success? 
 A second and more theoretical question raised by the argument that first-past-
the-post voting systems will incentivise better intra-party deliberation targets the 
presumption that comprehensiveness is the main ideal according to which we should 
evaluate party platforms and the deliberative processes in which they are developed. 
Traditionally liberal theorists find the idea that deliberation produces complete 
conceptions of the common good normatively attractive.  But perhaps we should 83
question this widely accepted proposition when we think about intra-party 
deliberation. One might argue, with Martin Ebeling (forthcoming), that it is more 
important that intra-party deliberation generates sufficiently specific conceptions of 
justice than that it gives rise to maximally comprehensive ones, since governing 
requires that broad views about justice can be translated into specific actions. The 
problem at stake is familiar from debates about ideal and non-ideal theory: the more 
comprehensive the conception of justice a particular theory provides is, the less 
specific and thus practically useful it often turns out to be (see Valentini 2012b, esp. 
658-660). Accepting this argument, the question then becomes which electoral system 
can promote the development of sufficiently specific forms of justice within parties, 
or indeed the right mix of specificity and comprehensiveness? 
 Deliberative and aggregative dimensions of intra-party democracy. Another 
promising topic future scholars could address is the relationship between deliberative 
 Germany has a mixed-member proportional system, while the Austrian parliament is elected by 82
proportional representation. 
 As Rosenblum (2008, 359) notes with reference to Rawls, liberals tend to think that political 83
considerations should be situated “in what we consider the most reasonable and ‘complete’ conception 
of political justice we can advance.”
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and aggregative forms of intra-party democracy. This topic too has empirical and 
theoretical aspects. Empirical scholars could look for example at the way in which 
successful deliberation alters the outcomes of candidate selection procedures or 
membership ballots. Do party members select different candidates or choose different 
policies when they deliberate well about the candidates or policies in question, 
carefully weighing arguments for and against? Similarly, scholars could explore 
whether the degree to which party members can sanction key decision makers who 
are implicated in joint deliberations influences the quality and outcomes of 
deliberation.  Imagine a local-level partisan forum in which ordinary party members 84
deliberate with party officials who hold a seat in the local council. Does deliberation 
reach higher quality or yield different results when the former can recall the latter, 
compared with when party members have no sanctioning devices at hand that would 
allow them to pressure officials to act in accordance with the collective decision that 
emerged from their deliberations? Issues like these may seem trivial at first, but they 
ought to be addressed when designing deliberative institutions within parties. 
 This leads to the theoretical dimension of the topic: how should deliberative 
and aggregative mechanisms of intra-party democracy be connected to each other and 
sequenced? Answering this question is inevitably a normative exercise, but again 
taking guidance from empirical research is crucial. The just-mentioned example of 
party members’ sanctioning powers explains why. Only if we have evidence of what 
effects the party members’ ability to sanction officials exerts on the quality and 
outcomes of intra-party deliberation can we infer whether building sanctioning 
mechanisms into deliberative institutions within parties is useful, and if so, how these 
mechanisms should look. Dealing with this issue will involve handling normative 
trade-offs. Most importantly, while many deliberative democrats will find a 
Mansbridgean “selection model” of representation—a model in which agents have 
“self-motivated, exogenous reasons for doing what the principal wants” and are 
moved by reasons rather than sanctions to act in a certain way (Mansbridge 2009, 
369)—more appealing than models of representation that centre on rewards and 
 I should note that this particular issue was suggested to me in different forms by members of 84
different party groups.
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punishments, it may well be the case that some degree of sanctioning is necessary for 
a deliberative model of intra-party democracy to deliver its full potential. 
 Deliberative institutions within parties. A third area for future research has to 
do with the deliberative potential of participatory innovations within parties. What I 
have in mind here is that researchers could closely examine whether newly 
established intra-party institutions such as the Australian Labour Party’s Policy Action 
Caucuses I have mentioned in chapter 1—to recall: these are issue-based branches 
which receive financial support and resources from the party and are entitled to 
convene meetings, policy forums and put policy motions to the general party 
conference—provide a favourable context for deliberation. Besides their deliberative 
capacity, scholars could look at whether institutions of this kind succeed in creating 
participatory incentives for party members and whether the decisions they produce are 
taken seriously by party officials. These questions are perhaps most directly relevant 
to students of intra-party democracy and party activists who seek to explore novel 
ways of enhancing democracy within their own party. Yet they might also be of 
interest to scholars concerned with “democratic innovations” (Smith 2009), whose 
trademark interest in new ways of involving citizens in political decision-making has 
largely led them to neglect established democratic institutions. 
 These three areas of inquiry—the impact of electoral systems on intra-party 
deliberation, the relationship between deliberative and aggregative mechanisms of 
intra-party democracy and the deliberative performance of participatory innovations 
within parties—could in principle be addressed by theorists and empiricists alike, 
ideally with the former taking guidance from the latter and vice versa. They harbour 
the potential of stimulating a productive dialogue between two intuitively related 
fields that are too often kept distinct: party scholarship and democratic theory. 
Coda 
One way of thinking about the purpose of norms is to see them as allowing us to take 
a step back from actual institutions and practices, and consider alternatives to them 
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(Möllers 2015). The argument I have offered in this thesis is normative in this specific 
sense: it takes a step back from actual parties and existing practices of intra-party 
democracy and considers a possible alternative. This alternative does not require us to 
accept idealised views of partisanship, nor does it demand that we reinvent parties 
from scratch. By the standards of contemporary political theory, the alternative to the 
status quo suggested in this thesis—namely, a deliberative model of intra-party 
democracy—is in fact quite modest. It provides the blueprint for a building that can 
be built, rather than a regulative ideal that can at best serve as a point of orientation 
but never be reached in full. It exhibits concern for real-world practices and the 
limitations of the agents who engage in them, rather than abstracting therefrom. My 
hope is that the distinctive “realism” of the considerations I have presented, that is 
their non-ideal character and grounding in empirical research, lends them the capacity 
to inspire practitioners to initiate actual party reforms. This hope is far from modest, 
to be sure. But if the present state of parties in established democracies is any 
indication, then there is nothing to lose and everything to gain.  
 To my mind at least, parties can benefit from adopting deliberative 
institutional designs in numerous ways. It is not just bringing citizens closer to 
government that speaks for this strategy, though this appears to be the most important 
task. As I have noted at several points in the thesis, revitalising the linkage function of 
political parties through deliberative designs might also help counteract the decline of 
parties that so many commentators complain about. Much has been written in recent 
times about the increasing disengagement from partisan politics, growing 
dissatisfaction with and distrust in parties, problems of accountability and 
responsiveness, and so on (see, paradigmatically, Mair 2013a). Reorienting parties 
towards their partisan base—and through their base towards the citizenry—using the 
kind of institutions I have proposed in this thesis could work against these corrosive 
trends. Empowered deliberative participatory opportunities for party members could 
restore popular trust in the willingness of parties to take seriously the judgments of the 
citizens on the ground, and correspondingly provide an incentive to engage more in 
parties. Perhaps the decline of party could not be fully reversed with the help of 
deliberative designs. After all, the just-described trends are not only the result of 
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organisational failure, but also have to do with the loosening of class identities and the 
changing structure of the capitalist economy (Streeck 2012). But even if internal 
deliberative democratisation is no panacea, it could certainly strengthen citizens’ 
belief in the worth of engaging with collective political agency. 
 Secondly, letting the deliberated views of their party base inform parties’ wider 
agenda could also over time sharpen their distinctive political profile. Especially in 
Europe, is often lamented that parties fail to offer citizens real political choice, the 
standard complaint being that the “disintegration of traditional social bases combined 
with the reduction of ideological differences under the pressure of economic neo-
liberalism has made mainstream parties increasingly indistinguishable from each 
other, and less vote-worthy as a consequence” (Beetham 2011, 127). An empowered 
membership could counteract this tendency. Especially in centre-left parties, where 
ordinary members often hold significantly more leftist views than the party elite 
(Haute and Carty 2012), increasing the members’ impact on decisions might lead to a 
programmatic re-positioning that heralds a renewed capacity to offer voters credible 
alternatives.   85
 That voters have a choice of orientations within the political mainstream is 
critical in light of the strident populist challenge that is now a feature of most 
European democracies: the rise of such parties as the Front National in France, the 
Sverigedemokraterna in Sweden or, most recently, the Alternative für Deutschland in 
Germany has arguably been facilitated by the incapacity of mainstream parties to 
supply choice. To paraphrase one of Peter Mair’s most lucid observations about 
European politics, without opposition within the political mainstream, opposition to 
the political mainstream was bound to emerge.  Thus in order to stem the tide of the 86
populist challenge, mainstream parties will have to recover their ability to provide 
citizens with meaningfully different programmatic orientations. Indeed, given the 
ever-growing electoral strength of populist parties, it seems that both the long-term 
 This problem is certainly more a European than an American one. The pervasive political 85
polarisation that characterises American society has in fact led parties to offer citizens “too much 
choice” as it were, putting compromises on many policy issues out of reach (see Muirhead 2014). 
 “We know that a failure to allow for opposition within the polity is likely to lead either (a) to the 86
elimination of meaningful opposition, and to more or less total submission, or (b) to the mobilisation of 
an opposition of principle against the polity” (Mair 2013a, 293-294; cf. also Invernizzi Accetti and 
Bickerton, forthcoming).
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survival of the political mainstream and the health of liberal democracy more 
generally depend on the capacity of mainstream parties to provide political platforms 
that reflect a distinctive interpretation of the common good rather than the 
technocratic consensus that made those parties “indistinguishable” from one another 
in the first place. 
 Thirdly, some of the deliberative institutions I have outlined could powerfully 
aid the flourishing of transnational partisanship. Still a relatively under-theorised idea, 
transnational partisanship refers to cooperation of like-minded partisans across 
national borders. Its normative point is to connect what would otherwise remain 
separate political spheres in the pursuit of transnational political projects (White 2014, 
esp. 390-393). While this has often been an enterprise of party elites, the “partisan 
deliberative networks” I have suggested in chapter 1 of the thesis would seem well-
placed to transnationalise grassroots partisanship. Networks of this kind could be 
established to pool knowledge from partisans of several countries: Europarties, for 
example, could use them to draft a unified manifesto for European parliament 
elections. In such a set-up, designated fora of the respective national parties would 
form the networks’ single nodes; and these fora would in turn send delegates to a pan-
European partisan forum.  In this way, deliberative institutional designs within 87
parties may contribute to the democratisation of the European Union, a much-
discussed goal that is often the target of skepticism and distrust.  
 In sum, there can be no doubt that parties, and indeed democracy more 
generally, could profit from the suggested deliberative reforms in a variety of ways. 
Deliberative institutional designs open up new directions in connecting ordinary 
citizens to empowered decision-making sites, reinforcing their capacity to exercise 
collective political agency through the institution of the party; and they carry the 
potential of reviving the potential of parties to offer citizens political choice and 
inspire civic engagement. The challenge, then, is to take on these reforms. This thesis 
has been an invitation. 
 Europe-wide deliberative fora are not a purely fictional proposal. Consider for example the EuroPolis 87
deliberative poll conducted by James Fishkin and his colleagues (see Isernia and Fishkin 2014).
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Appendix 
In the analysis of partisan deliberation in chapter 4, I have examined two exemplary 
passages of deliberation. Prioritising depth over breadth, I have refrained from 
discussing further examples of deliberation among party branch members. This 
appendix presents more examples of deliberation within party branches. This serves 
two primary purposes. Firstly, it corroborates the conclusions I have drawn in chapter 
4. Most of the passages cited below easily meet the latitudinarian standard of 
deliberation I have defended in the thesis; with a few exceptions, the much-discussed 
ability of party members to engage in a give and take of reasons that conforms to 
basic standards of political justification is on display throughout. Secondly, offering 
more examples of partisan deliberation provides readers with a more complete picture 
of the kinds of discursive exchange that occur in party branches, offering an insight 
into the rich context in which the argument of the thesis in general and chapter 4 in 
particular is embedded. 
Example 1  
The first example is a discussion that took place in the Linz group about the relative 
merits of letting party members decide on a coalition agreement with another party in 
a membership ballot—just like the German SPD did after the 2013 general election. 
The interview was conducted a few months after the SPD held its ballot, and in the 
passage below participants reflect on the debate that arose within their own party—the 
SPÖ—about whether a similar direct-democratic procedure should be adopted to 
decide on future coalitions. The discussion revolves mainly around the delegation of 
authority and the availability of information to the wider party membership. 
Meo: If I haven’t looked into the coalition agreement at all [prior to the ballot] … and 
now I want to claim the right [to decide on it] … this means, at the same time, that I 
should comprehend the whole thing, and that I should take the time and the resources to 
read it. One can imagine, a coalition agreement has more than just a few pages … so 
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it’s about comprehension. That is, what does it mean for me? Now if I say, ‘yes, I want 
this’, or ‘yes, I want to participate in [making] the decision’, then I have to have the 
resources […] for it takes days to read the thing and to understand it. 
Ernest: If I am [voting] for it or against it, I have to know what I am for or against. 
And this presupposes that I have some knowledge about the content of the coalition 
agreement, and that doesn’t even have he who voted for it in parliament. So we don’t 
have it [i.e. this knowledge] at all. Or at least: I don’t have it. And so I do not want to 
subject myself to the responsibility to decide about something when I don’t really know 
what it is am deciding about. […] Therefore I am sceptical. Moreover, we have elected 
183 people into parliament … we really elected them ourselves … and they should 
work for their money. Therefore I am, and I adhere to this view, against it [i.e. voting 
on a coalition agreement]. Because then we might also say the next time we raise the 
parking taxes in Linz: ask the citizens of Linz, not the local government. Then the 
whole thing gets a bit complicated! In the end [also], we have elected people and they 
will in any case be re-elected or not, depending on whether they do what one expects. 
[short crosstalk] 
Maria: I think it’s always a balancing act, that one delegates authority and, so to speak, 
wants to retain some influence. One needs delegates, as you say, one gives them a 
mandate and says, ‘please do something useful [etwas Richtiges]’. But how can I, 
during the year, say ‘hey, I want that you in parliament to do things differently’? 
Ernest [interposing]: If get you get an appointment to chat [with an MP] …  
Karl: I believe any organisation knows: one needs a structure. Whether this is a sport 
club, right up to parties like the SPÖ, which is a big organisation … there is always a 
statute about structure … how who can be delegated, how who is governed, and so on. 
But I think this is necessary and it is in my opinion also bad if one would make 
fundamental changes here. That statutes were marginally changed and changes were 
brought about, this happened often in the history [of the party]. But in principle one 
needs an organisational structure from which these things follow. 
Ernest: If I did not trust my [branch] chairman, I would not sit here. So not every one 
of us can represent their views there [i.e. in local government]. Only one of us can 
represent us. And I am 100 per cent sure that Karl represents our views, because [our 
views are] his own. That is why we sit together. But that each and every one of us 
participates [mitreden] does not work for organisational reasons. And so I find: 
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democracy yes, direct democracy for certain questions … we are not the Swiss who 
vote on paying higher taxes, because if we did [vote on that issue], everyone would say 
we pay none at all. And so: I think it works the way it is. And certain things can of 
course be made [i.e. decided] with referenda, but these must be questions everyone 
understands. 
 In this passage we see again that participants are willing and able to justify their 
viewpoints to each other, even in the absence of the requirement to take a collective 
decision on the topic under discussion. Each speaker puts considerable effort into 
making a case for her position, presenting it in a way that it could be appreciated by 
others. Ernest certainly makes his point most forcefully, offering several arguments 
for why he prefers an internally hierarchical party that is structured around 
relationships of delegation over one that provides more opportunities for internal 
participation. And it seems that the concerns he raises are widely shared within the 
group: Maria signals agreement and Karl makes a point very similar to Ernest’s, 
stressing that parties require a functional organisational structure. Tracing the way in 
which speakers respond to one another also indicates that the condition of deliberative 
uptake is satisfied here. Even Ernest, whose main concern appears to be with driving 
his message home, makes plain that he had listened to and taken seriously what the 
other participants have said, referencing their contributions in his statements. 
 A note on the substance of the exchange: it is striking and somewhat unexpected 
that participants in the Linz group are thus sceptical towards the prospect of directly 
voting on a coalition agreement. Their views differ sharply from those expressed by 
the other groups that participated in this study: the members of the German groups 
were unequivocally in favour of letting the membership vote on coalition agreements, 
while the members of the other Austrian groups also widely agreed that their party 
must be made more internally democratic. 
Example 2 
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The next example of intra-party deliberation, which took place in the Vienna 
Wasserturm group, starts with participants complaining about problems of internal 
communication within the party. Christian stresses that it is hard for him to 
communicate to party functionaries that the party base is generally dissatisfied with 
the party’s present chairman (Werner Faymann). After one participant diverts the 
focus of the discussion to the question of how the party and its leadership should 
present itself to the voters, participants agree that those representing the party in 
public ought to be more courageous, in the sense of showing firm leadership when it 
comes to shaping society in accordance with the party’s aims and principles. 
Christian: If I let the people [i.e. the members of the branch] vote in a secret ballot … 
probably 98 per cent would say that they do not want Faymann [the leader of the party] 
anymore … how do you communicate that in the next [i.e. hierarchically higher] levels 
[of the party]? Which is doubly difficult in our district because at the next [hierarchical] 
level, where I work [sitze], Faymann’s wife works too. 
Fini: Yes, but that must not be a hurdle! 
Christian: Yes, it shouldn’t! 
Lisbeth [interposing]: Shouldn’t! I would tell that to her face. 
Christian: Mother [Lisbeth is Christian’s mother], if somebody would attack me like 
this, what do you think how you would treat him? 
[Laughter, tacit agreement on Christian’s point] 
Christian: So the question is … so to speak … how does one communicate such a 
story in the right way? And I know, I am not spared this discussion. Because it is also 
my duty as elected vice chairman of the SPÖ in Favoriten [the district of Vienna the 
party branch operates in] to pick up this story and carry it further and to say, ‘friends, 
it’s fuming there, they are not content.’ These are the things … how do you convey that 
[within the party]? And this is of course not so easy. 
Robert: I think what’s missing is courage! When I think about the story with 
Vassilakou [the chairwoman of the Green party in Vienna, who decided to pedestrianise 
one of Vienna’s main shopping streets, Mariahilfer Straße, despite great protests by 
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local shopkeepers] … the whole of Vienna thought she would fail with [her plans to 
pedestrianise] Mariahilfer Straße. All of us were sure: this was out of bounds. The way 
this began, we thought this would be a big failure for the Greens … [but] she had the 
courage, she took something on. And in the meantime … I was so stunned how 
resistance vanished … almost everyone is enthusiastic [about it] now. Why? [Because] 
she had courage. 
Marlene: Yes! Yes, indeed! 
Robert: We were all wrong [about this]. And this is what’s lacking in our own party. 
Where do we show courage? They [i.e. the party leadership] only try to hold on 
[klammern] [on past achievements] … and where is courage? That’s missing. […] 
Christian: I have to say, Robert, this is correct. […] They do not think like we do. We 
think focused on ourselves [auto-fokussiert]. […] And you are right about courage. I 
have by the way said this to Michael [i.e. Michael Häupl, the mayor of Vienna] … I 
said, ‘if one is committed to something and follows it through’ … ‘in the end this will 
be rewarded’.  
[collective agreement] 
 Let us focus on the second and substantially more interesting part of the 
exchange. Though the positions expressed by the speakers are not particularly 
controversial—I would argue that few people would disagree with Robert’s larger 
point about the importance of leadership and political courage—genuine efforts at 
justification are made by the speakers, and their arguments are taken up by the others. 
The example Robert uses to justify his point, namely the Green party’s leadership in 
pedestrianising Mariahilfer Straße, a key shopping street in Vienna, deserves 
particular attention. Its instant resonance with the other participants can be explained 
by pointing out the context in which the discussion took place. About six months 
before the interview was conducted, the topic of pedestrianising Mariahilfer Straße 
figured prominently in the local (and indeed national) media; and even though public 
opinion was initially polarised, the initiative enjoyed gradually more support among 
the general public. Around the time when the interview took place, public opinion was 
then largely positive about the “new”, pedestrianised Mariahilfer Straße. If one 
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followed the local media, it was easy to get the impression that many people were 
“enthusiastic” about it, as Robert put it. So in drawing on this example, Robert 
effectively made use of a case of immediate public relevance to justify his point. This 
is a paradigmatic example of successful justification in a specific social and political 
context. 
 Besides the participants’ justificatory moves, note how Robert and Christian 
describe the leaders of their party. Both suggest, with collective approval, that the 
leadership is self-referential in its outlook and that party leaders are more concerned 
with administering the status quo than with shaping society and transforming social 
and political institutions in accordance with the political goals the party stands for. 
This sceptical position is much more representative of the way in which most 
participants of this study describe their relationship to the party than the position of 
the Linz group we have examined earlier in example 1, where participants endorsed 
the status quo, appealing to the legitimateness of internal hierarchy and a general 
feeling of trust towards elected leaders. In fact, many of the exchanges about 
organisational issues reveal a pervasive sense of dissatisfaction among participants 
with their party and its present leaders. 
Example 3 
The third example is again a discussion in the Vienna Wasserturm group. Its topic is 
how the SPÖ should best deal with the far right Freedom Party (FPÖ), a party that is 
increasingly gaining electoral grounds in areas that were traditionally dominated by 
the Social Democrats. This includes Favoriten, the district in which the Wasserturm 
group operates. The principal concern of the participants is here with the question of 
what one might learn from the FPÖ in terms of electoral strategy, and whether a 
centre-left party like the SPÖ should at all look to the far right for inspiration. 
Christian: What I think is that the party [i.e. the SPÖ] does not engage seriously with 
the substantial positions of the FPÖ … in order to … 
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Michaela [interposing]: I think they [i.e. the FPÖ] do not engage with their own 
positions …  
Christian: … well, the problem is, so to say: when they [i.e. the FPÖ] claim a 
[political] topic [eine Position besetzen], the SPÖ’s reflex is, ‘that is all bullshit’. And 
… the truth … the truth is multi-layered … it is not all wrong what they say. But we 
have to engage substantially with the things at stake so as to analyse this and to say, 
‘how do we solve the problem’ … they [i.e. the FPÖ] capture a general sentiment [in 
the population] and that is often quite correct … even if some issues are certainly no 
fun … but it’s not only about immigrants [Ausländer] … 
Nicole: What the FPÖ does … what they permanently do … they conduct damn many 
studies … social-scientific studies which they pay [research] institutes to conduct … 
about demography, sentiments among the citizenry, capturing the composition of this 
city. That they went after the Serbs back in the days [i.e. the FPÖ tried to mobilise 
voters with a Serbian background], that they tried to drum up supporters, that is a clear 
sign … [that] they do not select people randomly but strategically. […] It is completely 
clear, they have clearly analysed the minority groups we have here in Vienna, be it the 
Serbs, the Bosniaks, Croatians, Poles … and they have analysed this and focused on 
one group, and this is how they … we [i.e. the SPÖ] capture a general vibe 
[Stimmungsbild] of the city but we do not analyse it. That is, we do not accurately 
target things, but … just like we don’t have strong opinions otherwise, we are vague 
about what we think is happening in the city. And I believe that … one can make use of 
what the FPÖ analyses. 
Michaela: But what do they analyse? I mean, when it comes to the Serbs … what do 
you want to do? Fair enough, they are the last Christians in the Balkans … this is why 
we want [to mobilise] them? 
Bernhard: No, with the Serbs and the FPÖ it’s about something completely different. 
They are rather nationalist, that is to say, they have national pride, which they, 
tragically, carried into the Yugoslav War, and so on. And that fits with the FPÖ’s party 
line, and they consciously make use of that [stürzt sich darauf]. 
Michaela: But that is not yet a [political] position! There is no substance! Nationalism 
itself is no … substance! 
Nicole: Yes, because they are all nationalist … the Poles, the Bulgarians, the Bosniaks 
too. And why they [i.e. the FPÖ] focused on them was […] first that they are the largest 
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[minority] group we have in Vienna, they are the most heterogenous group we have, 
and they are those who were the first [to come to] Austria, 20-25 years ago … where 
now the second, third generation is here … and [the FPÖ] says, ‘listen, you are one of 
us, you are third generation, you are Austrian, you are born here, you are a citizen, do 
you really want that the rest … from further away … comes here?’ And this is what 
they play with, with these feelings they play. You have a job, you have built up a life 
here …  
Michaela [interposing]: But this is still without substance … 
Nicole: It is an example of what you can make out of an analysis. One has to play to 
people’s emotions. I cannot only … that is what the SPÖ always does … only bring up 
sober, functional topics [Sachthemen]. I also have to play with people’s emotions. […] 
Christian: One example: the FPÖ analyses population growth and raising social 
expenditures … this is at the moment very intertwined … 
Michaela [interposing]: But so do we. That’s why we build enough housing! 
Christian: No. We think we’re at it but we do not build more. Nothing’s changing. 
This is so for various reasons … but they [i.e. the FPÖ] … they promote these issues 
and they discuss them. And then we come and say, ‘no, all of those problems don’t 
exist, it’s not happening.’ Like you, Michi [i.e. Michaela]. I hear this also from our city 
councillor. But I don’t believe that. I work in a housing cooperative, I know how 
difficult it is to even get one’s hands on property at the moment. That’s how it is. We do 
not need 7000 [new flats], we need in fact 10.000. The FPÖ occupies [besetzen] the 
topic … and rather than saying, ‘how can we develop ways of making things better 
together?’, we do not engage with this. We say straightforwardly that they are wrong. 
And this puts pressure on us, because the people can see that things are different, they 
can feel it. 
 This passage is especially rich in detail. It reflects that the members of the group 
seriously engage with the electoral and political strategies of their main political rival. 
Consequently, most participants’ efforts at mutual justification are argumentatively 
profound. Nicole and Christian in particular seek to be even-handed in their 
judgments, drawing on non-anecdotal evidence in support of their claims. What is 
noticeable is that Michaela, the only participant who appears to think that there is 
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nothing the SPÖ can learn from the FPÖ, makes no comparable effort to justify her 
position. She simply asserts her viewpoint without further defending it. So her 
statements hardly satisfy what I have, in chapter 4, called the “reason-giving 
condition”, which stipulates that a speaker must provide reasons rather than simply 
state her point of view or preference. Thus, even though her reactions to the other 
speakers’ contributions indicate a level of critical reflection and so signal deliberative 
uptake, her statements are insufficiently deliberative. Perhaps as a result of this, 
Michaela’s position does not find much support in the group: absent justifying 
reasons, her claims lack persuasive force. However, despite the low deliberative 
quality of Michaela’s contributions, the passage should not be interpreted as an 
example of bad deliberation. For the majority of participants justify their views in a 
thoughtful fashion and take Michaela’s contrarian position seriously, thus satisfying 
both conditions of successful justification we have established in chapter 4. 
Example 4 
The fourth example of deliberation among party branch members is a debate in the 
Bonn group concerning individual members’ relationship to their party. This exchange 
was triggered by the discussion about the defection of one group member following 
the membership ballot on the coalition agreement with the CDU/CSU. This issue was 
mentioned in chapter 5, which looked at failures of intra-party deliberation. Klaus’s 
statement about what he describes as his “basic loyalty” to the party kicks off the 
debate. 
Klaus: I always say to myself: however much the party leadership blunders, they will 
never make me leave the ‘big tanker.’ So there is a certain basic loyalty to … also to the 
historical party, yes. And therefore it was always out of the question for me … even 
when it [i.e. decisions of the party leaders] really goes against the grain for me … so 
the religious policy of the SPD really goes against the grain for me … but I would 
never quit the party because of that. 
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Katja: I see this quite like Klaus. I would not … for me it is always like in a marriage 
… there are good and bad times, and just because it is now a bad time, that does not 
mean that I would generally want to separate. I for one in any case only joined the party 
because I was against Agenda 2010 [a series of labour market reforms enacted between 
2003-2005 by SPD chancellor Gerhard Schröder, which have often been criticised as 
neo-liberal] and I said: if I don’t join now, I can never do something against this. And I 
was also against the grand coalition [in 2013] but I still remained in the party, even if I 
suffer a bit from that, and even if it’s not fun to see that I have been proven right and 
that we are always punished by the voters for that. But that’s how it is. It’s like in a 
marriage, and there one doesn’t simply give up without a fight. One has made a choice, 
and then… 
Maxim [interposing]: I think that it is precisely not like in a marriage. I think a party is 
actually not a place where I look for harmony. It is not a place where I look for 
consensus, but where I want to [engage in order to] bring positions ‘out on the street’. 
And so … disputes are part of the trade; disputes are important … it is important that 
we argue, but that we still in the end have a common position or a position for which 
we can jointly stand for. And I think, that is part of our daily business … that one 
argues on a daily basis in a party. And therefore I have a different relationship to the 
party than to my wife. There I do not argue daily, and there I do not think this is the 
meaning of it all. With respect to a party, I indeed think that arguing is a major part of 
its meaning. 
Katja: But ultimately your marriage is also about consensus. How one gets to 
consensus, that is again something different, to be sure. But I also can’t always aim at 
love, peace and harmony in a marriage. There are also different ways of attaining 
consensus. And in politics consensus is achieved by arguing. I think we do agree that 
these are important differences. 
Maxim: [Nods head in agreement.] To get back to the question of quitting the party … 
when the party in the end promotes a different position concerning certain issues than I, 
this is no reason for me to quit the party but rather to push within the party for 
revisiting the issue. When I am still not satisfied after that, I will revisit it again. And in 




 There can be little doubt that the normative conditions of justification—reason-
giving and uptake—are satisfied here too. Speakers try to make clear why they think 
as they do and thoughtfully respond to one another. Katja extends toward Maxim an 
empathy that attends to commonalities and differences. What makes the passage 
particularly interesting is how, in describing their relationship to the party as a 
collective project, participants make creative use of analogical reasoning. As they 
weigh arguments for and against the validity of the analogy between party 
membership and marriage, one is indeed reminded of political theorists, who often 
draw on analogies and examples of this kind in order to make their arguments 
resonant and persuasive (for a scholarly paper on parties that engages similar 
analogies, see e.g. Ypi, forthcoming). The outcome of the exchange is a collective 
agreement on a joint position, namely that quitting the party is not an option party 
members should exercise. Whether one looks for harmony and consensus or 
disagreement and contestation, membership in a political party ought to involve 
loyalty to the larger political project to which the party gives institutional expression; 
Klaus refers to the “historical party” in this connection. 
Example 5 
The fifth and final example the appendix presents is a rather heated debate in the 
Theilheim group about citizens’ political identities in the local community and the 
adequate electoral strategy for the party. It begins with Hans-Peter emphasising his 
failure to understand the SPD’s last election result in Theilheim, where the party lost a 
good deal of voters to rival parties. 
Hans-Peter: I must say, since this election I really question my sense of judgment 
(Menschenverstand). I would never have thought … I was one of those who said 
‘come on, let us work together … if we want to overthrow the current mayor … then 
we must fight together … we have organised events together … and I would never 
have thought that the blacks [i.e. the CSU voters] would rather vote for the UWG [i.e. 
Unabhängige Wählergemeinschaft, a local list of activists who do not belong to any of 
the established parties], and that the SPD-supporters would also rather vote for the 
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UWG. That is the only way I can explain this election result. And that is why I am still 
disappointed to this day. 
Bernd: But on the other hand … I can understand that if one traditionally supports the 
SPD, then supporting the CSU is preposterous. So … in different [political] 
constellations … I could fully understand that one thinks that way. 
Marita: I can’t understand that. 
Alwin: Neither can I. 
Marita: I said this earlier: in a small community council (Gemeindeparlament) one 
should jointly aim to make promote the welfare of the community, irrespective of 
whether one is red, green, black, or whatever. I can understand [traditional partisan 
rivalries] when it’s about politics affecting the federal state, when it’s about the country 
… where it’s really about substance. There I can understand when someone says: 
‘what, they are making a pact with the CSU? For goodness sake, I can’t vote for them 
anymore. They are betraying their principles.’ But on such a low level, where everyone 
should be pulling together (an einem Strang ziehen), and it should be in everyone’s 
interest to achieve the best for the community, there I cannot understand such conduct. 
But well, it is how it is. We can’t change it anymore. We can only draw our lessons 
from it and strive to make it to the top again. 
Bernd: In the end we have acknowledge that we, as SPD, are a self-standing party, and 
we have to fight for ourselves! And that means, that we do not fight for the CSU or the 
like! 
Herbert: But we didn’t! We didn’t! We had a list of our own. 
Marita: We didn’t ‘fight for the CSU’! We fought for overthrowing the mayor! 
Bernd: But we still supported the candidate of the CSU! That was the wrong strategy! 
 The argumentative dynamics in this exchange are similar to those we have 
observed in the Theilheim discussion analysed in chapter 4. By this, I mean that 
participants exhibit pronouncedly different attitudes concerning the way in which 
their party should deal with political rivals. Bernd evidently holds what I have called 
“purist” views. He is quite sceptical of cooperation with other parties, especially when 
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his own party is in a weak bargaining position because of insufficient electoral 
support. The other participants are more “pragmatist” in their orientation. Marita is 
particularly outspoken about her commitment to cross-partisan cooperation in the 
small community that is Theilheim. Even if the particular case of cooperation that is 
discussed in the exchange has resulted in a loss of votes for her own party, she thinks 
that working together with rivals for the good of the community at large is more 
important than the pursuit of narrow partisan goals. These differences of political 
approach account for the agonistic nature of the exchange; the excessive use of 
exclamation marks can only inadequately capture the belligerent tone that some 
participants struck.  
 Because the pragmatist-purist divide that runs through the group acquires 
special salience in this exchange, the quality of deliberation is palpably lower than in 
the other examples I have presented in this appendix. The main problem is that most 
of the interventions, especially those made towards the end of the passage, consist 
only of brief assertions and largely lack justifying reasons, thus failing to meet the 
reason-giving condition. However, it must also be noted that Hans-Peter and Marita 
make genuine efforts at justifying their viewpoints to the others; Marita in particular 
delivers her point with great clarity. So even though the passage in part comes close to 
deliberative failure, deliberative moves do take place. Even more pertinently, as 
participants remarked at a later point in the interview, the topic under deliberation has 
repeatedly been discussed by the group before. Participants are thus largely aware of 
the main disagreements that divide them, and they have already “agreed to disagree” 
on a previous occasion. Seen in this light, the passage lends itself to a more 
favourable interpretation: the fact that participants are willing to revisit the polarised 
issue at all, and the fact that some of them readily offer extensive justifications for 
their position, may be read as reflecting a more general commitment to political 
deliberation. But even with that in mind, there can be no doubt that the exchange itself 
is among the least deliberative of those that were examined in this thesis. Arguably a 
deviant case, it is clear that it fails to conform to our normative deliberative standards 
to the same degree as the other examples of partisan deliberation I have presented. 
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